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Foreword 
Matthew P. Farrell 
 
The tradition of the International Studies Symposium at 
Glendon College began in 1995, when a group of highly 
motivated International Studies students came together 
with a desire to push beyond the bounds of classwork 
and venture into the realm of experiential learning. Since 
then, senior International Studies students at Glendon 
College have continued to show their high calibre, 
carrying on the tradition of independently funding, 
organizing, and promoting symposia which focus on 
various countries and regions of the World. 
The inaugural year of the Symposium focused on 
Cuba (1995-1996), followed by China (1996-1997), 
South Africa (1997-1998), the European Union (1998-
1999), the Middle East (1999-2000), South East Asia 
(2000-2001), Brazil (2001-2002), Russia (2002-2003), 
India (2003-2004), The Great Lakes Regions of Central 
Africa (2004-2005), Mexico (2005-2006), Turkey (2006-
2007), Egypt (2007-2008), Venezuela (2008-2009), Iran 
(2009-2010), Hispaniola (2010-2011), Germany (2011-
2012), the Korean Peninsula (2012-2013), The United 
States of America (2013-2014) and, in 2015, on the 20th 
Anniversary, Japan. 
The Independent Study Committee on Japan, 
composed of some of the student organizers of the 
Symposium, is pleased to present this publication, Japan: 
Shining a Light on the Land of the Rising Sun, which 
contains a collection of transcripts and essays by some 
of the distinguished specialists who participated in the 
Symposium that was held on March 30, 2015 at 
Glendon College, as well as essays written by some of 
the student organizers of the event. We hope that these 
collected works will not only prove stimulating to those 
who have a pre-existing interest in Japan, but also eye-
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opening for those who do not. Most of all, we hope that 
through this text, we are able to share the passion and 
knowledge of all those who contributed to the 
Symposium and to this project. 
Japan was chosen as the focus of study for many 
reasons. Its extensive history, culture, and reputation for 
innovation are only a few of these. Other considerations 
include Japan’s rapid rise to prominence on the World 
stage in the twentieth century, only decades after 
rescinding the policy of isolation by which it had kept 
itself secluded for hundreds of years. Following this 
change, Japan quickly transformed from a feudal society 
to an industrialized nation, all the while maintaining its 
singular traditions and unique institutions. This 
inimitable situation (who would think that the oldest 
hereditary monarchy in the World, headed by the only 
reigning Emperor, would be hailed for its progressive 
society and technological prowess?) was yet another 
factor which motivated the choice of Japan for the 
Symposium. 
In this text, many aspects of Japan are discussed. 
The first section, “History and Memory: Japanese 
Communities during World War Two,” exposes the 
situation of Japanese migrants in Canada and the United 
States during and after the war and looks at the impact 
of the post-war Constitution of Japan in molding Japan 
into a pacifistic nation. In “The Economy Under Abe 
and Looking Ahead: Economy, Business, and 
Technology,” the question of economics is considered 
at three levels; the nation, specific companies, and 
workers themselves. The next section, “Post-growth 
Japan and Its Domestic Policies,” is perhaps the most 
diverse section of this volume, tackling domestic 
economics, education, and the indigenous population of 
Japan. This is followed by “Pop Culture and Identity: 
Anime, Angura, and Japanese Abroad,” which examines 
anime, one of Japan’s major cultural exports, pop 
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culture communities, and migrant-based relationships 
between Japan and Brazil, and between Japan and 
Canada. The final section, “Japan and the World: 
Politics and Diplomacy,” focuses on Japan’s 
international relations, both contemporary and 
historical.  
To fully explain or understand a country is a goal 
which no single work could hope to achieve and this 
text is no exception. Consequently, we do not claim to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of Japan. Rather, 
through this volume we aim to give an overview and to 
illuminate the complex and ever-changing country of 
Japan, opening the door to further inquiry and 
investigation. 
 
Préface 
Matthew P. Farrell 
 
Le premier Symposium Annuel des Études 
Internationales au Collège Glendon a eu lieu en 1995, 
quand un groupe d’étudiants en études internationales 
s’est uni avec l’intention de surpasser l’éducation 
traditionnelle pour s’emmêler dans les études pratiques. 
Depuis ce temps, des étudiants séniors en études 
internationales à Glendon ont montré leur haute 
capacité en continuant la tradition d’organiser 
indépendamment chaque année un symposium portant 
sur un pays ou une région du monde. 
Le symposium inaugural avait pour sujet le Cuba 
(1995-1996), suivi par la Chine (1996-1997), l’Afrique du 
Sud (1997-1998), l’Union Européenne (1998-1999), le 
Moyen-Orient (1999-2000), l’Asie du Sud-est (2000-
2001), le Brasil (2001-2002), la Russie (2002-2003), 
l’Inde (2003-2004), la Région des Grands Lacs en 
Afrique (2004-2005), le Mexique (2005-2006), la Turquie 
(2006-2007), l’Égypte (2007-2008), le Venezuela (2008-
2009), l’Iran (2009-2010), l’Hispaniola (2010-2011), 
l’Allemagne (2011-2012), le Péninsule Coréen (2012-
2013), les États-Unis (2013-2014) et, en 2015, sur le 
20ième anniversaire du Symposium, le Japon. 
La Independent Study Committee on Japan, 
composée de cinq parmi les neuf organisateurs étudiants 
du Symposium, est heureuse de vous présenter cette 
publication, Le Japon: Éclairant le Pays du Soleil Levant, qui 
est une collection de transcriptions et de dissertations 
par certains des spécialistes qui ont participé au 
Symposium le 30 mars, 2015, auxquels s’ajoutent des 
dissertations par certains des organisateurs du 
Symposium. Nous espérons que cette collection 
s’avérera intéressante et stimulante, non seulement pour 
ceux qui s’intéressent déjà au Japon, mais aussi pour 
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ceux qui commencent à le découvrir. Nous espérons 
avant tout qu’à travers ce texte nous réussirons à 
partager la passion et les connaissances de ceux qui ont 
contribué au Symposium et à ce projet. 
Le Japon se prête à l’étude pour plusieurs raisons. 
Son histoire extensive, son mélange de culture moderne 
et de traditions anciennes, et sa réputation pour 
l’innovation en sont seulement quelques exemples. Une 
des autres considérations prise en compte est l’ascension 
rapide du pays au sein du vingtième siècle, seulement 
quelques décennies après sa réouverture au monde suite 
à deux cents années d’isolationnisme. Suite à ce 
changement, le Japon s’est transformé d’une société 
féodale à une nation industrialisée, gardant néanmoins 
ses traditions et institutions uniques. Cette situation 
inimitable (qui aurait pensé que la plus vielle monarchie 
au monde, avec à sa tête le seul empereur régnant, serait 
réclamée pour sa société progressive et sa technologie 
avant-garde?) est un autre facteur qui a influencé le 
choix du Japon comme sujet pour le Symposium. 
Ce texte touche sur plusieurs aspects du Japon. La 
première section, « L’Histoire et le Mémoire: Les 
Communautés Japonaises pendant la 2ième Guerre 
Mondiale, » fait une exposition de la situation des 
migrants japonais au Canada et aux États-Unis durant et 
après la guerre et considère l’impact de la Constitution 
japonaise de l’après-guerre sur l’évolution du Japon en 
tant que nation pacifique. La question de l’économie est 
considérée à trois niveaux dans « L’Économie Sous Abe 
et à l’Avenir: L’Économie, les Affaires, et la 
Technologie, » où on examine la nation, des entreprises 
spécifiques, et des travailleurs. La section suivante, « Le 
Japon Post-Growth et ses Politiques Domestiques, » est 
probablement celle la plus diverse, se mettant à 
considérer l’économie domestique, l’éducation, et la 
population indigène du Japon. Ceci est suivi par « La 
Culture Populaire et l’Identité: L’Anime, l’Angura, et les 
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Japonais à l’Étranger, » qui examine l’anime, une des 
exports culturels les plus importants du Japon, les 
communautés de la culture populaire, et les relations 
migratoires entre le Japon et le Brésil, et entre le Japon 
et le Canada. La section finale, « Le Japon et le Monde: 
La Politique et la Diplomatie, » traite les relations 
internationales contemporaines et historiques du Japon. 
Aucun texte ne peut espérer d’expliquer ou de 
comprendre complètement un pays, et ceci n’est pas une 
exception. Conséquemment, nous ne prétendons pas 
donner ici une analyse compréhensive du Japon. Nous 
visons plutôt à donner un survol et d’illuminer ce pays 
complexe et évoluant, ouvrant la porte à de nouvelles 
enquêtes et à l’exploration. 
 
  
HISTORY AND 
MEMORY: 
Japanese Communities During World War Two 
 
L’HISTOIRE ET LE 
MÉMOIRE: 
Les Communautés Japonaises pendant la 
Deuxième Guerre Mondiale 
 
La Détention de la Minorité Japonaise 
en Amérique du Nord Durant la 
Seconde Guerre Mondiale 
Greg Robinson 
 
J’aimerais vous parler aujourd’hui de certains 
événements qui sont le plus souvent cités sous le nom 
de « l’internement » des Américano-Japonais et des 
canadiens japonais mais qui relèvent plutôt de la 
détention. 
Au printemps de 1942, après le déclenchement de la 
guerre du Pacifique, quelque 112,000 hommes, femmes, 
et enfants d’origine japonaise aux États-Unis, à raison de 
leur ascendance raciale, étaient entassés dans des centres 
de détention militaires sur la côte pacifique avant d’être 
renvoyés dans des camps d’internement. Le 
gouvernement américain les a emmené ensuite, sous 
bonne garde, vers l’intérieur du pays, où on les tenait 
encore captifs dans un réseau de camps construits 
hâtivement et gérés par un nouvel organisme fédéral, la 
War Relocation Authority (WRA). La plupart de ces 
américains d’origine japonaise sont restés en captivité 
pendant toute la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. Cette 
mesure est souvent citée comme la violation la plus 
importante des droits civiques des citoyens aux États-
Unis pendant tout le XXe siècle. 
J’aimerais aborder également la décision parallèle du 
gouvernement canadien d’enfermer quelques 
22,000 personnes d’origine japonaise venant de la côte 
Pacifique de la Colombie-Britannique dans des camps. 
Les canadiens japonais étaient arrêtés en deux vagues 
lors des rafles au printemps de 1942, puis ils étaient 
envoyés dans des endroits différents; des camps de 
travaux routiers, des exploitations de betteraves 
sucrières, ou des installations dans des anciens villages 
miniers abandonnés. Leurs biens étaient confisqués et 
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vendus dans des ventes aux enchères officielles. En fin 
du compte le gouvernement canadien a exigé aux 
canadiens d’origine japonaise de choisir de se réinstaller 
à l’Est ou d’être renvoyés au Japon une fois la guerre 
terminée. 
Parlons d’abord de mon pays natal, les États-Unis. 
Le 7 décembre 1941, après l’attaque japonaise sur Pearl 
Harbor, il y a la déclaration de guerre par le Président 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt qui est approuvé par le 
Congrès américain. Avec cette action, tous les 
immigrants japonais au pays, quelques 150,000 
personnes à Hawaii et sur le continent, deviennent 
subitement des soi-disant « étrangers ennemis » parce 
qu’ils sont barrés de la naturalisation américaine par le 
droit américain. 
Donc on leur impose un couvre-feu spécial: on leur 
interdit de se déplacer à plus d’une dizaine de kilomètres 
de leurs domiciles, on leur demande de remettre aux 
policiers les radios à ondes courtes, et leurs bateaux de 
pêche sont confisqués. Les consulats japonais restent 
fermés, ainsi que les journaux japonais, et les écoles de 
langue. Plus de 1,000 prêtres bouddhistes, professeurs 
de langue, fonctionnaires consulaires, et d’autres 
leadeurs des communautés japonaises sont arrêtées et 
mises en internement pour une période de semaines ou 
une période de mois par le Département de Justice. Ils 
seront plus tard offerts des auditions qui leur 
permettront d’offrir des preuves quant à leur manque de 
péril à la sécurité nationale. Un faible pourcentage de ces 
immigrants sont internés pendant toute la période de 
guerre mais la plupart sont « libérés » pour rejoindre 
leurs familles dans les camps. 
Néanmoins, la question ne s’arrête pas là. Au début 
de 1942, les autorités militaires de la côte Pacifique 
américaine commencent à redouter une éventuelle 
invasion de la part du Japon, et ils se méfient des 
communautés japonaises sur la côte pacifique. Ils sont 
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renforcés dans leur peur par un mouvement de haine 
raciale, un mouvement de colère animé par les blancs 
racistes et les groupes nativistes et xénophobes comme 
le American Legion ou les Native Sons of the Golden 
West, ainsi que les groupes de commerçants blancs qui 
redoutent la concurrence de marchands japonais, des 
agriculteurs, et d’autres. Ces forces incitent leurs 
représentants au gouvernement de faire pression pour la 
déportation de toute personne d’origine japonaise de la 
côte pacifique. 
Cette pression amène Président Roosevelt (qui avait 
ses propres préjugés à l’égard des personnes d’origine 
asiatique) à autoriser l’armée américaine à déporter tous 
les gens d’origine japonaise sur la côte pacifique loin 
d’une « zone militaire » qui est créée peu après et qui va 
composer finalement tout l’état de la Californie, la partie 
occidentale des états de Washington et Oregon, et le sud 
de l’Arizona. Donc, toute personne d’origine japonaise, 
nonobstant sa citoyenneté, sera déportée de la côte 
pacifique par l’ordre du président. La plupart de ces 
gens sont des jeunes, adolescents, ou enfants nés aux 
États-Unis, citoyens américains qui sont soupçonnés 
d’espionnage parce qu’ils sont d’origine japonaise. 
En 90 jours, au printemps de 1942, 109 427 japonais 
américains sont déportés de la côte Ouest. Ils sont 
contraints de se débarrasser de leurs biens fonciers et de 
leurs affaires personnelles avant leur déportation, et ils 
perdent donc la plus grande partie de leurs propriétés. 
On demande aux résidents japonais américains de se 
rassembler dans les écoles ou d’autres centres pour être 
raflés par l’armée. 
Ils sont mis d’abord dans des camps de 
rassemblement (« assembly centers ») dans des 
anciennes courses de cheval ou des parcs d’exposition 
sur la côte pacifique. Ces centres de rassemblement sont 
surpeuplés et inconfortables. Les soldats vident 
rapidement les écuries et les enclos à bestiaux pour en 
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faire des baraques destinées aux déportés. Des familles 
entières vont rester dans une seule pièce dans ces 
baraques, et les célibataires doivent cohabiter avec des 
parfaits étrangers. L’utilisation de la langue japonaise, 
sauf à certaines fins officielles, est interdite. Même les 
livres sont censurés, sauf pour le Bible, qui doit être 
approuvé par le gouvernement. 
À partir de la seconde moitié de l’année 1942, on 
commence à transporter des gens de ces centres de 
rassemblement aux camps à l’intérieur du pays qui sont 
construits par la WRA. Ces voyages durent parfois 
quelques jours, surtout les voyages jusqu’en Arkansas, 
où il y en a deux camps. Les autres camps se trouvent à 
Utah, Wyoming, Idaho, Colorado, Arizona, et 
Californie. 
Les 10 camps, dénommés officiellement centres de 
réinstallation (« relocation centers »), sont vraiment des 
camps de concentration américains. Ils se ressemblent 
sur bien de points. Tous se situent dans des zones très 
peu peuplés et habitables. En effet, à leur comble, les 
centres de Poston en Arizona et Heart Mountain au 
Wyoming restent au troisième rang des agglomérations 
dans leurs états respectifs durant la guerre. Dans les 
camps de l’Ouest, les températures vont de bien en 
dessous de 0 degrés en plein hiver jusqu’à 38 ou même 
40 degrés en été. L’air est sec et l’altitude est forte et 
pénible à supporter pour les résidents qui sont issus de 
la côte pacifique. La terre sèche du désert se transforme 
avec la pluie en torrents de boue, puis s’assèche 
rapidement pour devenir poussière. Il y a donc des 
tempêtes de poussière qui remplissent les baraques de 
poussière, les rendant impossible à garder propre. Les 
camps de l’Arkansas par contre sont situés dans des 
zones chaudes et marécageuses pleines d’insectes.  
Lorsqu’ils arrivent, on donne aux nouveaux détenus 
(qui dans le langage officiel on appelle des « résidents ») 
un logement, on leur fait subir un examen médical, et on 
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leur accorde une pièce de 4 sur 6 mètres dans une des 
baraques. Les baraques sont construites en bois brut 
recouvert de papier goudronné. Elles ne possèdent 
aucun revêtement intérieur et donc elles sont des abris 
insuffisants dans des climats rigoureux. Comme dans les 
centres de rassemblement, l’eau courante est installée 
uniquement dans les latrines. Les salles de douches et les 
toilettes sont séparées pour les hommes et les femmes, 
mais il n’y a aucune partition entre les toilettes. Donc, il 
est impossible d’y préserver même un minimum 
d’intimité ou de vie privée. Les murs dans les baraques 
ne montent pas jusqu’au plafond alors tout le monde 
peut entendre les autres. 
Bien que les forces de sécurité de la WRA 
contrôlent l’intérieur des camps, ceux-ci sont entourés 
de barbelés et des sentinelles qui tirent sur les gens qui 
risquent d’essayer de s’échapper. Le gouvernement 
prétende que les sentinelles sont là pour protéger les 
détenus, mais on peut voir sans difficulté que les fusils 
sont orientés vers l’intérieur et non vers l’extérieure. 
Donc il n’est pas impossible de voir quelle est la vraie 
fonction des sentinelles. 
Pour passer du temps, les détenus se lancent dans 
les activités sportives et culturelles. La vie religieuse est 
très riche, elle aussi, à l’intérieur des camps. Les gens 
parfois assistent aux services de différentes confessions 
pour avoir quelque chose à faire. Chaque camp possède 
son propre journal payé par le gouvernement et géré par 
les détenus, qui jouissent d’une mesure inégale de liberté 
de la presse, et le courrier reste censuré. 
La vie dans les camps n’ayant rien de normal et leur 
captivité étant si injuste, les détenus sont souvent 
mécontents et amers. Certains détenus vont protester 
individuellement en portant des affaires juridiques 
devants les cours qui vont monter jusqu’à la Cour 
Suprême, en protestant aux journaux extérieurs, en 
circulant des pétitions, ou en écrivant à des 
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sympathisants du monde libre. Il faut dire qu’il y a, dès 
le début, un certain nombre de gens à l’extérieur des 
camps qui vont appuyer les droits des japonais 
américains détenus; les religieux progressistes comme les 
Quakers, certaines organisations progressistes comme le 
Parti Socialiste des États-Unis et son chef Norman 
Thomas, et des individus comme l’écrivaine Pearl S. 
Buck. Il y a aussi beaucoup de noirs qui vont protester 
l’internement des japonais américains, le regardant 
comme un acte raciste à laquelle il faut s’opposer. Il y a 
même des avocats noirs qui vont appuyer les cas 
juridiques des japonais américains. Dans quelques cas, 
les détenus se regrouperont pour mener des actions 
collectives (des manifestations, parfois des émeutes) qui 
expriment leur résistance et réorientent la politique des 
camps. 
La WRA, presque dès le début, va favoriser la 
libération conditionnelle des détenus. Leurs raisons sont 
bien logiques: il est injuste de garder les masses dans des 
camps, c’est cher pour le gouvernement, et c’est 
humiliant pour un gouvernement qui prétend lutter 
pour la démocratie. Mais il leur faut régler avec la 
question: « comment libérer les gens sans admettre que 
le gouvernement a fait une erreur dans leur détention? » 
Donc ils vont d’un part défendre la politique officielle 
devant les tribunaux, mais d’autre part ouvrir toutes 
sortes de bureaux de réinstallation dans de différents 
états. 
En même temps, les chefs du Département de 
Guerre, conscient d’avoir surestimé le péril posé par les 
japonais américains décident d’autoriser le recrutement 
volontaire des citoyens d’origine japonaise dans l’armée 
à partir de 1943 (la conscription sera rétablie au début 
de 1944) pour construire un bataillon ségrégé. 
La WRA, voyant l’occasion de s’associer à l’armée, 
va imposer un questionnaire pour tester la « loyauté » 
des détenus de façon à justifier la libération 
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conditionnelle des japonais américains, mais cette action 
va s’avérer une erreur majeure. Il y a un grand 
pourcentage des détenus qui se méfient du 
gouvernement après leur détention, et qui va refuser de 
signer ou qui ne va pas donner un engagement 
inconditionnel à appuyer le gouvernement et de servir si 
nécessaire dans l’armée, qui sont les deux grandes 
questions du questionnaire. Donc quelques 15% des 
détenus vont être renvoyés de leurs camps à un centre à 
haute sécurité crée au camp de Tule Lake en Californie, 
où ils vont rester jusqu’à la fin de la guerre.  
Parmi les autres japonais américains, qui vont dire 
« oui-oui» au questions du gouvernement, peut-être un 
quart vont réussir à se libérer pendant la guerre pour se 
réinstaller à l’est du pays ou au Midwest, tandis que la 
majorité va rester dans les camps jusqu’en décembre 
1944, au moment où la Cour Suprême des États-Unis 
statue que l’incarcération des citoyens d’une loyauté 
reconnue est anticonstitutionnelle, ce qui donne 
occasion au gouvernement américain de commencer 
l’ouverture des camps et la libération des détenus. 
Pendant 1945 et le début de 1946, les gens vont quitter 
les camps. La plupart vont se rendre sur la côte 
pacifique. Même s’ils doivent affronter l’hostilité et une 
mesure de violence contre leur propriété, les anciens 
détenus vont réussir à regagner leur ancienne région en 
bon nombre. 
En partie grâce aux exploits de l’unité de combat 
ségrégé construit parmi des japonais américains, la 
442nd Regimental Combat Team, qui sera l’unité de sa 
taille le plus décoré dans l’histoire de l’armée américaine, 
les japonais américains vont avoir une bonne presse. Ils 
vont faire une bonne impression, une image plus 
positive, après la guerre. Grâce à cette image, et la 
conscientisation du pays sur l’injustice des camps, toute 
discrimination juridique qu’ils avaient dû affronter va 
s’effriter après la guerre jusqu’au point qu’en 1952, on 
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va rouvrir l’immigration au japonais du Japon et on va 
légaliser pour la première fois la naturalisation des 
citoyens d’origine japonaise. 
Maintenant je remonte finalement au Canada. Tout 
comme en Californie, en Colombie-Britannique il y avait 
une histoire de discrimination à l’égard des personnes 
d’origine asiatique et notamment d’origine japonaise. Il 
est peut-être encore pire en Colombie-Britannique parce 
qu’on y enlève le suffrage de toute personne d’origine 
asiatique et il y a une discrimination dans la fonction 
publique qui est encore plus forte. 
Toujours est-il que le déclenchement de la guerre 
entre le Japon et l’empire britannique suite à Pearl 
Harbor va susciter une nouvelle vague d’hystérie anti-
japonaise en Colombie-Britannique. Les élus de la côte 
pacifique, notamment le ministre du cabinet Ian 
McKenzie, font pression sur Ottawa pour une 
déportation totale de la population japonaise à 
l’intérieur, mais ils sont opposés (contrairement qu’aux 
États-Unis) par les chefs des services militaires qui 
disent qu’il n’y a aucun grand danger à craindre de la 
part des canadiens japonais, qui sont démobilisés et 
désarmés. Le plus grand péril, selon les militaires, est 
pour les canadiens japonais à craindre des racistes et des 
émeutes. 
Néanmoins, la pression de la côte pacifique amène 
le premier ministre W.L. Mackenzie King, qui avait 
aussi, comme Roosevelt, ses propres préjugés contre les 
asiatiques, à annoncer un arrêt en Conseil le 14 janvier 
1942 en se servant de la fameuse loi des mesures de 
guerre. King va décréter une zone militaire s’étendant 
100 miles de la côte occidentale de la Colombie-
Britannique, et va obliger à toute personne masculine 
d’origine japonaise de quitter cette zone pour aller 
s’enrôler dans un camp de travail routier. Cette action 
est faite dans le but d’apaiser l’opinion publique, mais en 
effet ça ne fait qu’encourager l’opposition, et les 
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hommes influents en Colombie-Britannique vont 
redoubler leur campagne pour l’expulsion de toute la 
population japonaise à l’intérieur du pays. Ce qui amène 
que finalement, le 24 février, quelques jours après 
l’ordre exécutif de Franklin Roosevelt (Executive Order 
9066), le premier ministre Mackenzie King va signer 
l’arrêt en Conseil 1481. Sous l’autorité du décret, 
quelques 22,000 canadiens japonais, dont la vaste 
majorité sont des Nisei (c’est-à-dire des canadiens 
japonais nés au Canada) de moins de 21 ans, doivent 
quitter leurs maisons sur la côte pacifique. 
Le gouvernement canadien va s’attaquer aux 
problèmes logistiques une dizaine de jours après le 
décret, au moment où le cabinet crée un nouvel 
organisme, la Commission de Sécurité de Colombie-
Britannique (BCSC), pour diriger l’évacuation. La BCSC 
est composée d’un industriel de Vancouver, Austin C. 
Taylor (connu pour ses propos racistes), à sa tête, et 
John Shirras, chef de la Police provinciale de Colombie-
Britannique, comme commissaire adjoint. La BCSC va 
nommer un comité de liaison avec la communauté 
japonaise dirigé par Etsuji Morii, un personnage riche de 
la pègre et un mafioso, ce qui ne va pas augmenter la 
confiance de la communauté japonaise ou ses membres 
respectables envers la Commission. 
En procédant à l’expulsion, les autorités de la BCSC 
vont se retrouver devant un dilemme à Ottawa comme à 
Vancouver: la BCSC n’a pas de ressources pour gérer 
l’évacuation et le puissant ministre de la défense 
nationale refuse d’intervenir. Donc, les autorités 
fédérales, contrairement qu’aux États-Unis, décident de 
créer plus de camps de travail routier pour les hommes, 
utilisant cette main-d’œuvre forcée. Pour le reste des 
japonais, le gouvernement va ouvrir des installations à 
l’intérieur du pays. Le 23 février, une première convoie 
va transporter 1,300 hommes japonais dans des camps 
de travail routier. Pour le reste, le gouvernement va 
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commencer en mars à organiser des rafles. La 
Gendarmerie Royale du Canada va commencer à 
envahir les communautés rurales et à prendre des 
personnes, qui ont juste un tout petit peu de temps pour 
organiser leurs valises. Parfois ils doivent même laisser 
la vaisselle dans la cuisine. 
Une fois arrêté, on les embarque sur des trains et 
des bateaux à vapeur et on les emmène à Vancouver. 
Pour mettre ces migrants forcés en captivité, la BCSC va 
réquisitionner les étables du bétail et les pavillons au 
Parc Hastings, ce qui est aujourd’hui le Canadian 
National Exhibition Grounds. 
Des milliers de personnes vont être installées dans 
deux grands pavillons pour le bétail; des femmes, des 
hommes âgés, et des enfants. Ils sont séparés dans les 
deux pavillons; les hommes âgés dans un, les femmes et 
enfants dans l’autre. Ils sont sur des lits de camp. Il y a à 
peine un mètre entre chaque lit. Au début, les vielles 
mangeoires servaient de toilettes et il n’y avait pas d’eau 
courant pour se laver jusqu’à ce qu’on va aménager 
quelques douches. La nourriture est fournie par une 
entreprise extérieure et c’est plutôt monotone et 
insuffisante, ce qui reflète bien le maigre budget de la 
BCSC, et donc les prisonniers vont faire une grève de 
faim en avril. On va installer par conséquent une cantine 
et une boulangerie pour augmenter les rations. Il n’y en 
a pas d’écoles non plus. Les détenus vont alors organiser 
des écoles de fortune. 
Certains groupes de Vancouver, notamment les gens 
du journal The New Canadian (le journal des Nisei), vont 
s’organiser pour aider les détenus et pour les encourager 
à suivre les conseils du gouvernement. Mais un autre 
groupe, le Nisei Mass Evacuation Group, va s’organiser 
pour protester la séparation des familles. Les membres 
vont dire que c’est injuste d’obliger les hommes à 
repartir dans des camps de travail routier et de les 
séparer de leurs femmes et enfants. Ils vont faire la 
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grève et insister d’être détenus en tant que prisonniers 
de guerre et internés. Ils vont refuser de s’enrôler pour 
être envoyés dans des camps de travail routier et ils vont 
même se cacher à Vancouver pour prévenir leur 
déploiement. 
Finalement, au bout de quelques semaines, le 
gouvernement doit céder. Les autorités vont accepter 
d’envoyer des familles entières dans des camps 
d’internement, tandis que les hommes célibataires vont 
être renvoyés dans de camps de travail routier. Mais cela 
a un coût: les gens qui ont déjà fait la grève pour ce 
résultat seront néanmoins envoyés dans un camp de 
prisonniers de guerre à Petawawa, Ontario et plus tard 
en Angler, Ontario. Là ils vont rencontrer, parait-il, le 
maire de Montréal Camillien Houde, qui lui y est interné 
pour avoir dénoncé la conscription des canadiens. Par la 
suite, il va accueillir beaucoup de canadiens japonais à 
Montréal. 
Toujours est-il qu’en même temps qu’elle réagisse à 
l’opposition du Nisei Mass Evacuation Group, la BCSC 
cherche des destinations pour les canadiens japonais. 
L’Alberta Sugar Beet Association, qui cherche 
désespérément de la main-d’œuvre, demande au 
ministre du Travail, Humphrey Mitchell, de lui envoyer 
des japonais pour travailler dans des champs de 
betterave à sucre. Finalement, presque 4,000 personnes 
sont envoyées pour travailler aux exploitations de 
betteraves à sucre en Alberta, au Manitoba, et dans 
l’ouest de l’Ontario. 
D’autres canadiens japonais seront permis de se 
rendre dans des « self-supporting sites » (des lieux de 
réinstallation autofinancés) comme Christina Lake, 
Bridge River, Minto City, Lillooet et McGillvray Falls. 
Ils sont obligés de payer les frais de leur propre 
transport et leur propre installation, mais ils y sont 
accordés plus de liberté. Il y a aussi plusieurs dizaines de 
femmes qui vont se déplacer dans des villes comme 
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London, Toronto, et Montréal où elles acceptent le 
travail domestique (ceci est vraiment la première base de 
la grande communauté qui existe aujourd’hui à 
Toronto). 
La plupart des canadiens japonais se retrouvent, 
bien malgré eux, dans des camps de concentration, 
désignés comme des lieux d’« hébergement intérieur, » 
dans des anciennes installations minières de la vallée de 
Slocan, en Colombie-Britannique. Là il s’y trouvait des 
logements abandonnés de l’époque des villes 
champignons, qui date de la ruée vers l’or, et il y aurait 
donc des places vides et désespères auxquelles les 
canadiens japonais redonneront vie. 
À partir d’avril 1942, la BCSC commence à déporter 
les canadiens japonais de la côte Ouest vers l’intérieur 
des terres. La vaste majorité seront installés à New 
Denver, Kaslo, Greenwood, Sandon, et Slocan City (qui 
comprend les villes satellites de Bay Farm, Popoff, et 
Lemon Creek), que le gouvernement canadien qualifie 
officiellement d’« établissements intérieurs. » De plus, la 
BCSC va construire un camp de concentration du nom 
Tashme, qui est construit à partir de rien, sur un ranch 
abandonné, à proximité de la ville de Hope. Au départ, 
la BCSC a l’intention de séparer et ségréger les détenus 
selon leur confession religieuse; les catholiques iront à 
Greenwood, les anglicans à Slocan, les protestants de 
l’Église Unie à Kaslo, et les bouddhistes à Sandon. On 
décidera par la suite de loger les gens en fonction des 
places disponibles, mais chaque zone sera plutôt 
associée à une confession particulière. 
Ni les Issei (la première génération d’immigrants 
japonais) ni les Nisei auront le droit de voyager sans une 
autorisation spéciale et ceux qui veulent déménager ou 
parcourir plus de 80 kilomètres doivent obtenir un 
laissez-passer. Les camps ne sont pas entourés par des 
barbelés comme aux États-Unis, mais dans des villages 
désertés dans les montagnes il n’y a aucun moyen de 
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s’échapper. Les gens sont tout simplement emprisonnés 
en exile intérieur. 
La BCSC n’a pas soigneusement préparé les camps. 
Ils ont reconstruit les baraques hâtivement, mais elles 
restent assez rudes. La BCSC refuse de donner la 
nourriture ou l’éducation aux gens dans les camps. Les 
détenus sont alors obligés de s’organiser entre eux la 
création des écoles secondaires et les organisations 
confessionnelles vont construire des écoles dans les 
camps. Dans le camp de Greenwood, l’église catholique 
va envoyer des instituteurs canadiens français pour gérer 
des écoles. 
En 1944-45 quand la guerre prend fin, le 
gouvernement canadien va obliger au canadiens japonais 
de faire un choix: ou de se réinstaller à l’est du pays, ou 
d’être déportés au Japon une fois la guerre terminée. 
Toronto devient la première destination pour les 
canadiens japonais. Montréal, Windsor, et Hamilton en 
sont d’autres. (Montréal a maintenant la plus grande 
communauté de japonais dans le monde francophone). 
Mais 10,000 canadiens japonais vont refuser de quitter 
les camps pour un avenir inconnu dans des zones 
éloignés de leur ancienne région. Le gouvernement 
canadien entame des processus pour les déporter une 
fois la guerre terminée, une question qui va rester en 
suspense pour quelques années pendant que les 
canadiens japonais amènent devant la cour cette action. 
La Cour Suprême du Canada et finalement le Conseil 
Privé à Londres vont finalement appuyer le 
gouvernement canadien dans son droit de déporter, 
même de façon involontaire, toute personne d’origine 
japonaise. 
Mais l’opinion publique va se tourner contre le 
gouvernement après la guerre, et le gouvernement va 
finalement renoncer à la politique de déportement 
involontaire. Il va néanmoins garder les restrictions de 
guerre sur les canadiens japonais jusqu’en 1949, 
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quelques 4 ans après la fin de la guerre. Ce n’est qu’en 
avril 1949 que les canadiens japonais auront le suffrage 
et auront le droit de repartir vers la côte pacifique. 
Conséquemment, le Vancouver va avoir une très petite 
communauté japonaise pendant longtemps, jusqu’à la 
reprise de l’immigration. 
Il faut signaler qu’après la guerre les canadiens 
japonais, comme les japonais américains, ont mis de 
l’effort pour se réhabiliter et pour se redresser. Ils ont 
fait des efforts pour s’organiser politiquement, à une 
moindre échelle, mais ça prend jusqu’aux années 1970-
1980 avant qu’ils organisent des campagnes pour 
chercher des réparations pour leur traitement injuste 
pendant la guerre. Leur campagne va triompher en 1988 
aux États-Unis et au Canada avec la signature de 
législation donnant réparations. Aux États-Unis on 
donne des excuses officielles et un paiement de $20,000 
à chaque détenu. Au Canada, on donne des excuses 
officielles et $21,000. Mais les réparations ne pouvaient 
pas compenser tous les dommages faits par la perte de 
propriété, la perte de liberté, et la perte d’humanité par 
les détenus d’origine japonaise dans les deux pays. 
Les dommages faits à nos démocraties respectives 
sont innombrables. C’est pour ça que j’ai qualifié cet 
incident comme une tragédie de la démocratie. Merci. 
My Experiences During the 
Second World War 
Frank Moritsugu 
 
Dr. Greg Robinson has done the overview of what 
happened during the Second World War to both 
Japanese Canadians and Japanese Americans. During 
that last big war, as Dr. Robinson said, how our 
government treated more than 21,000 Japanese 
Canadians was both unique and totally unjustified. And 
today, as one of the survivors of those unique 
experiences, I am going to tell you about what I went 
through back then—as did other members of our family 
and thousands of other Japanese Canadians. 
By the way, just to inform you of what I am in 
addition to being a survivor of wartime mistreatment 
experiences and before that. What you see up here is a 
card that only Japanese Canadians, sixteen years and 
over, were issued during World War Two. There was 
also a national registration card issued to everybody 
over sixteen but it had no pictures, prints, or anything 
like on this card. With these cards, Mounties could take 
a good look at us and figure out what we looked like. So 
to inform you what I am in addition to being a survivor, 
I am a retired journalist who was the first Japanese-
Canadian writer-editor to be hired by Maclean’s 
magazine (back in 1952). And also the first to be hired 
by the Toronto Star 10 years later in 1962, as the 
Assistant Entertainment Editor and columnist. 
I also spent 13 years as an Ontario government civil 
servant. During my Queen’s Park years, I lived in Japan 
for seven months in 1970 as deputy commissioner of 
the Ontario Pavilion at the Osaka Expo. I retired in 
1989 (imagine, nearly 26 years ago). By the way I am in 
my early nineties, and my last fulltime job was being a 
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professor in the Print Journalism program at Centennial 
College. 
What became the pivotal experience of my life 
began on December 7th, 1941. On that day in 1941—it 
was a Sunday—Japanese aircraft attacked Pearl Harbor 
in Hawaii and that surprise attack began the war against 
Japan by the United States and the Allied countries 
including Canada. It came during the third year of the 
Second World War which had begun in 1939 with the 
Allies—of which Canada was a member along with 
Britain and France—fighting Germany and Italy, mainly 
in Europe and then Africa. Then in 1942, a few months 
after this new war began, more than 21,000 Japanese 
Canadians who lived on the British Columbia (B.C.) 
coast were expelled from our homes and our 
communities and sent inland, usually to detention 
camps.  
What did this government action 73 years ago do to 
us? Here are some details: Those of us who were 
working lost our jobs or our businesses. Those of us 
who were students had to leave our schools or 
universities. Those of us who owned property (cars and 
trucks, houses, farms, fishing boats, businesses, and so 
on) had it all confiscated by the Canadian government 
and later sold without our knowledge while we were still 
in camps. And our communities (Japanese communities) 
were broken up to disappear forever. At the time, 95 
percent of Japanese Canadians in Canada lived on the 
B.C. coast. There had been about 30 such Japanese-
Canadian communities on the B.C. coast—on the lower 
Mainland, the Fraser Valley, upcoast and on Vancouver 
Island. And consider this, if you will: Nearly three-
quarters of us who were treated this way were citizens 
of Canada.
Why did the Canadian Government order this mass 
removal? One official reason given at the time was that 
with Japan entering the Second World War, and 
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therefore our country being at war with that country, 
those of us here of Japanese origin could not be trusted 
to remain loyal to Canada, especially if the Japanese 
invaded us across the Pacific. A second official reason 
given was sort of a reversal. Canada did not need to be 
protected from us, but we needed to be protected from 
the hysterical anger of other British Columbians—many 
of them severely upset by the war possibly coming so 
close from across the Pacific. As you recall, the war at 
that time was really from across the Atlantic. Well, 
confidential Canadian government documents finally 
released in the 1980s have proved that both of those 
reasons officially given for expelling us from the B.C. 
coast and sending us inland were false. At that time, the 
federal government had been advised by the Canadian 
Army and the RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) 
that there was no need to move us from the B.C. coast. 
So the real reasons for our mistreatment were political, 
economic, and racist. 
As you know, Germany and Italy were also enemy 
countries of Canada in the Second World War. And it’s 
true that some German Canadians and some Italian 
Canadians were interned in this country. But not all the 
German Canadians nor all the Italian Canadians were 
expelled and detained the way we were. And to the 
Canadian government, it didn’t matter whether we 
Japanese Canadians were immigrants who hadn’t gotten 
Canadian citizenship yet (like my parents), or were those 
few immigrants who had managed to get their Canadian 
citizenship, or were born here (as I was, and my 
brothers and sisters). It didn’t matter so long as we were 
of Japanese origin. At that time the Canadian 
government also labelled all of us “enemy aliens.”  Yes, 
we became “enemy aliens” officially. And so we were all 
kicked out of our homes and communities and sent 
away. 
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When that happened I was 19, nearly two years out 
of high school because I had finished Grade 12 at the 
age of 17, and I was working for my father who had a 
landscape gardening business in Vancouver. Let me tell 
you what sort of person I was back then. What kind of 
guy the authorities decided was an “enemy alien” and 
had to be expelled from the Pacific Coast. 
First, I was born in this country in 1922 on the B.C. 
coast in a small town called Port Alice on the 
northwestern tip of Vancouver Island, where Dad had a 
job at the pulp mill which was the reason for the town’s 
existence in that location. When I was about 
kindergarten age, the family moved to the city of 
Vancouver. So my brothers and sisters and I grew up in 
the biggest B.C. city. In the spring of 1942, I am this 19-
year-old. I am a former Boy Scout troop leader. I have a 
green belt in judo. I am a baseball nut. I am also a 
bookworm. I love jazz and swing music. And I’ve pretty 
well gotten over acne, after having it bad during Grades 
11 and 12. 
My father came to Canada from Japan in 1912. 
After working hard for several years and putting money 
aside, in 1921 he went to Japan to bring back a wife, my 
mother. And, in December of 1922, I was born at Port 
Alice. Later came four brothers and three sisters, so 
there were eight of us – all born here, all of whom grew 
up Canadian. As in most immigrant families, when the 
older children were small the language at home was our 
parents’ first language—in our case, Japanese, of course. 
But soon—sometime between kindergarten and early 
public school grades, English became the main language 
for me and my brothers and sisters, even at home – a 
common pattern among immigrant families in Canada.   
In my case, it also happened that English was one of 
my best subjects in school. So being elected the high-
school paper editor by the Grade 12 journalism class 
was not that surprising. By the way, I was the only one 
 
History and Memory 
21 
 
who wasn’t white in that particular class, and the 
majority of them had voted for me. But the English-
language part of my life went a lot farther than that. I 
knew Japanese children’s songs and Japanese popular 
hits that our music-loving parents passed onto us. But 
most of my own favourite music was in English—
whether American pop songs or Western tunes, British 
folk songs and traditional airs. The first tune I learned to 
play on the harmonica was Red River Valley, the cowboy 
song. And all of my bookworming, of course, was in 
English. 
But in those years there was one big thing that 
stopped me and the other Japanese Canadians in British 
Columbia from being recognized as 100-percent 
citizens. That was that even when we reached the age of 
majority (which was 21 back then), we were not 
permitted to vote. Not in municipal, provincial, or 
federal elections. That’s because anti-Asian Canadian 
attitudes had dominated British Columbia since well 
before I was born. Way back in the 1890s, provincial 
laws were passed which said that no one of Japanese, or 
Chinese, or East Indian origin would be given the right 
to vote—even if born here or otherwise qualifying for 
citizenship papers. (We say “South Asian” these days for 
people from India, Sri Lanka, etc.). And under the 
federal election laws of that time, if you didn’t have the 
provincial vote, you couldn’t vote federally either. 
Not having the vote not only made me and others 
like me less than first-class Canadian citizens, but also 
kept me out of certain kinds of work in B.C. I couldn’t 
become a lawyer. I couldn’t become a pharmacist. I 
couldn’t become a civil servant. I couldn’t work in a 
mine, even if I wanted to. And, of course, I couldn’t run 
for public office, at any level. All in all, not having the 
vote said that in the eyes of the law of the land, I wasn’t 
as good a Canadian as the majority of my schoolmates. 
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For a few minutes, let’s go back to the beginning of 
the Second World War.  Back in September 1939 when 
that war began in Europe—with the Allies (which 
included Britain and Canada) against Germany and Italy, 
I was just entering my final year at Kitsilano High 
School—Grade 12. So it was natural that during that 
final school year many of my classmates and buddies 
regularly discussed what to do next after they graduated. 
What most of them wanted to do was enlist in the 
Canadian armed forces to go fight in Europe. Unlike the 
more recent wars, the Second World War was a 
“popular” war. Most young men and many women 
wanted to serve in the armed forces—“to fight for the 
country,” as they used to say. 
But this talk at school about joining up in the Air 
Force or the Army didn’t include us Japanese 
Canadians. We were left out because from the 
experience of Japanese Canadians older than us who 
had tried we already knew that the authorities would not 
accept our enlistment. That, too, was official policy in 
B.C. Then, as mentioned, on December 7th, 1941, Japan 
attacked Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. The next day Canada 
was at war with the country my parents had come from. 
Mind you, Japan had nothing to do with me. I could 
understand simple Japanese and read the language a bit 
and had eaten sushi since I was very young but I’d never 
been there.
Then a few months after war against Japan began in 
early 1942, the manure truly hit the fan. Now that 
Canada was at war with Japan, many B.C. politicians 
poured on intense and often-racist pressure to kick all 
of us off the West Coast and, ideally, out of the 
province. This campaign was backed by most 
newspapers, labour unions, and even some church 
ministers. Very soon the federal government bowed to 
the screaming from B.C. and decided to move all of us 
from our homes to beyond the 100-mile-wide so-called 
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“protected area,” which ran all the way up the B.C. 
coast. Although Ottawa decided that every one of us 
was to be moved— men, women, and children—the 
moves were made separately. This meant that most 
families were split up. You could only stay together as a 
family if you agreed to go work on the sugar-beet farms 
of Alberta or Manitoba or on farms in Ontario. Sugar-
beet farms were important because with the war in 
Europe, the ships that used to bring cane sugar could 
not do that anymore. So our sugar had to come from 
the beets.  
In the first two phases of the mass expulsion, they 
moved the men out—men who were 18 to 60. Those 
sent away first were men who were not Canadian 
citizens, like my father at the time. They were sent to 
work camps in the woods along the Canadian National 
Railway (CNR) line in northeastern B.C. near Jasper, 
Alberta. Then the authorities moved out men like me 
and my next brother Ken, who had turned 18 in 1942, 
shortly after the so-called mass “evacuation” orders 
came down. There were several different work camps 
for Canadian-born or naturalized men. The one my 
brother and I ended up in was called Yard Creek and 
was one of five camps in British Columbia along the 
Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) main line. 
By the way, if we weren’t trusted to be loyal why 
was it that the men-only work camps were located 
alongside the two main railway lines, the CNR and the 
CPR? It was where we saw troop trains, trains carrying 
armoured tanks and other military equipment, and so on 
go by almost daily. If we wanted to help the enemy by 
damaging the railway, it would have been so easy. Our 
work camp was located in the foothills of the Rockies, 
some miles west of a town called Revelstoke. We were 
put to work on what was to become a part of the Trans-
Canada Highway.  
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So, in our family’s case, Dad was expelled in March 
1942. A few weeks later in early April, I had to go. Then 
a few months later, Brother Ken came out to the Yard 
Creek Camp where I was. That meant that with all three 
adult males sent away, my mother and the other six 
children—whose ages ranged from 16 down to 3 years 
old—were left back in Vancouver. They knew they were 
going to be moved from the coast too, eventually, but 
they didn’t know when or where, nor what was going to 
happen to them. Imagine how Mom must have felt. 
Finally, that summer, it was decided that Mom and 
our younger brothers and sisters would be sent to a 
newly built family detention camp called Tashme, near 
Hope, B.C. It was newly built because married men like 
my father had been sent down from their original camps 
to construct hundreds of cheap tarpaper shacks to 
house the expelled families. There were eight such 
family detention camps, mainly in the West Kootenay 
area of the B.C. interior. So in September 1942, about 
half a year after Dad and my brother and I were sent 
away, my Mother and the six younger kids were finally 
moved, saying goodbye to Vancouver where we had all 
grown up.  
The family stayed 14 months at the Tashme family 
camp. During that time, in February 1943, men like 
myself and my brother in the work camps, who were 
not married, were allowed to go visit our families for 
two weeks. The authorities decided to allow us because 
they were concerned that we would cause a lot of 
trouble and go on strike because we were unhappy with 
the way we were treated. So for two weeks, Ken and I 
went to visit Tashme. Then, the family decided to leave 
because Mom and Dad were concerned about the 
education of the children. Yes, you could leave the 
detention camps but there was only one way you could 
get out: You had to agree to leave British Columbia and 
go eastward. In our family’s case, the only place the 
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family could find to go to was Southwestern Ontario to 
do farmwork. My brother Ken and I were allowed to 
join the family, because we were all leaving B.C. So, in 
March 1944—two years after Dad was sent away from 
Vancouver—the family was reunited at last on a large 
farm in St. Thomas. That’s south of London, Ontario. 
The men in the family, including teenager Harve, 
became farmhands—city hicks learning how to strip 
cows, work in a haymow, and clean out an awful lot of 
animal manure. That was more than 70 years ago but I 
can smell the cow manure to this day. And being city 
guys we spent our time wondering how we could get 
out of there to resume more civilized lives somewhere 
else. 
By the way, although we had moved out of B.C. to 
Ontario, we were still under certain restrictions—as 
were all Japanese Canadians wherever they were across 
the country: If we were 16 or over, we had to carry a 
Japanese registration card with us at all times. It was a 
unique form of wartime ID, having a mug shot on one 
side and the owner’s right thumbprint on the other. We 
could not go anywhere 50 miles or more from where we 
lived—even for a social visit— without getting a permit 
from the local RCMP (the Mounties).  We definitely 
could not go to the British Columbia coastal area, even 
to visit. And although the Canadian forces were 
appealing for recruits, we could not be accepted by any 
of the armed forces if we had lived in B.C. when the war 
began. And although we had left B.C., we still could not 
vote. 
Then in early 1945, suddenly things changed hugely. 
A secret recruiting campaign was begun by Ottawa to 
get Japanese Canadians to volunteer. In this recruiting, 
we still weren’t allowed to enlist in the Air Force or the 
Navy. Our volunteering was for one job only—to join 
the Canadian Army and be sent to Southeast Asia to 
work as Japanese-language interpreters for the British 
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forces out there. This near-miracle (to be allowed to 
enlist as so many of our school buddies already had) 
came about because the tides of the war had changed. 
In late 1944 and early 1945 the Allies found themselves 
finally doing well in Europe against Germany, and in 
Asia against Japan. One result in Asia was that suddenly 
more and more Japanese soldiers were being taken 
prisoner by our side. 
However, the British and the Australian forces in 
the Pacific, unlike the Americans, could not make 
effective military use of these prisoners. This was 
because the Allies did not have enough personnel 
around who could interpret in Japanese when prisoners 
were interrogated, or translate captured Japanese 
military documents. Ironically, the only country in what 
was then called the British Empire, where a sizable 
number of citizens of Japanese descent lived, was 
Canada.  And Canada, as you now know, had banned 
most of us particular citizens from serving in the armed 
forces.  
So in April 1945, three years almost to the day from 
when I had to get on the CPR train in Vancouver to 
leave my original hometown under RCMP escort, I got 
on an electric train from St. Thomas up to London (no 
police escort this time) to volunteer for the Canadian 
Army. I was in the Army for only about a year and a 
half, but I spent nearly a year of it overseas, serving 
mainly in India. This was because I was among a group 
of 22 Japanese Canadians who were rushed overseas 
with barely any training because the British forces in 
Southeast Asia were desperate for interpreters.  
Although I had never been to Japan, I had learned 
enough Japanese when growing up that I became an 
army interpreter-translator with the rank of sergeant in 
the Canadian Army Intelligence Corps. I was attached to 
Special Force 136, a British counter-intelligence 
operation in the Southeast Asia Command. During my 
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overseas stay in India, the Second World War finally 
ended in August 1945. Then followed the military 
takeovers of places held by the enemy such as Kuala 
Lumpur in Malaya, Saigon in Indo-China (which is now 
called Viet Nam), and Singapore. And that was followed 
by military occupation of enemy countries. In spring 
1946, my duties completed, I was returned to Canada. 
In June 1946 I was discharged from the army to become 
a civilian again. I had two medals: the Canadian 
Voluntary Service Medal for volunteering, and the 1939-
45 Star for being overseas when the war was still on.  
A few days later, something happened which 
reminded me—a returned Canadian Army overseas 
veteran—that things had not changed at all for us 
Japanese Canadians—even for those of us who had 
served the country in war. It was two or three days after 
I’d become a civilian—I wasn’t working yet. A Mountie 
constable arrived at the door of our St. Thomas 
farmhouse and handed me a brown envelope containing 
a wallet-sized piece of paper. It was my Japanese 
registration card—the document that only Japanese 
Canadians over the age of 16 had to carry. I had been 
forced to carry mine since April 1941, when registration 
was done the first time back in Vancouver. As I 
mentioned, the card had a photograph of me on one 
side, and my right thumbprint on the other. I had given 
my card up on enlistment. 
By becoming a Canadian soldier when I finally got 
the chance, I had assumed I would never again see the 
hateful piece of ID that declared that there was 
something different about me and those like me, 
something so wrong that the police, and especially the 
Mounties, could easily check us out. But despite the 
Second World War being over for nearly a year, and 
despite my service in the Canadian Army, that detested 
ID card was being handed back to me, to carry again at 
all times. In effect, having to carry the card signified I 
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still was not Canadian enough. Then the young Mountie 
added to the insult. He said, “By the way, that picture of 
you is rather weather-beaten. Go into town and get new 
portraits taken.” Obviously at my expense! “Attach one 
to the card, and send two copies for our files.” What 
with being sent to a men-only work camp and also 
serving in the Army, my vocabulary was quite extensive.  
So in response, I swore at him using every swear 
word I knew and threw the envelope and the 
registration card at him. He let them fall to the floor, 
turned on his heel, and as he left, he repeated, “Don’t 
forget to send us the new photographs.” It probably 
won’t surprise you that I never did. By the way, my 
Mother was the only person at home when the Mountie 
came and she witnessed the whole thing. And after he 
left, she said “You shouldn’t swear at a Mountie, you 
know?” But by Canadian law even with the war well 
over, this returned serviceman and others like me had to 
carry that Japanese-Canadians-only ID card for nearly 
three more years. 
After the Second World War ended in 1945, we 
Japanese Canadians who underwent the wartime 
mistreatment had to start our lives all over again. What 
we didn’t know was that for the very first time many of 
us would enjoy totally unexpected opportunities. 
Especially if we were no longer in British Columbia—
the province where we were born and where we had 
been when war against Japan began. As one example, let 
me share with you my own experiences after the war. I 
was lucky to be one of many wartime survivors in their 
new parts of Canada who got the kind of jobs that were 
impossible for us back in prewar British Columbia.  As 
mentioned, I had served in the Canadian Army 
overseas. On my return to Canada, I was discharged in 
June 1946 and became a civilian again.  
Being a WW2 veteran meant getting special benefits: 
either a small farm or a post-secondary education. At 
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Kitsilano High School in Vancouver, in addition to 
editing the student newspaper, I had been an eager 
cartoonist, so I applied to the Ontario College of Art to 
become a commercial artist. But because OCA—like 
most post-secondary schools—was jammed with 
returned veterans, I had to wait a whole college year to 
go there. 
My first choice would have been to study journalism 
because after Pearl Harbor I had worked at The New 
Canadian, the only Japanese-Canadian newspaper 
allowed to publish during the war against Japan, first in 
Vancouver and later at the Kaslo family detention camp. 
Working with Editor Tommy Shoyama taught me a lot. 
And writing and editing was my Number One dream. 
But growing up in racist B.C., we Japanese Canadians 
knew that getting such work on a mainstream 
publication was impossible for those like us. A Japanese 
or Chinese name in a daily newspaper or national 
magazine byline? Pure fantasy back then. 
Then in September 1946 after helping out with the 
harvest at the St. Thomas farm where our family was, I 
went to visit friends in Toronto. It was on that visit that 
I discovered that our world in postwar Ontario wasn’t 
the same as back in B.C. This is what happened: One 
friend I looked up was Irene Uchida who wrote for The 
New Canadian in its early years and who I’d met during 
my months in the Powell Street offices of the paper. 
Hearing that I was waiting a year to go to the Ontario 
College of Art, Irene suggested that for something to do 
meanwhile, I should go see Dr. B. K. Sandwell, the 
editor of Saturday Night magazine. He was one of the 
active members of The Co-operative Committee on 
Japanese Canadians, which was campaigning to prevent 
Ottawa from forcibly deporting to Japan those evacuees 
who had agreed to be sent in 1945 because it was the 
only way they could stay in B.C. Not because they 
wanted to go to Japan.  
30 
Moritsugu 
So, with nothing to lose, I made an appointment 
with the Saturday Night editor, and went to his office on 
Richmond Street near the old Toronto City Hall. Dr. 
Sandwell turned out to look like a gentleman out of a 
Dickens novel. He first asked me about my wartime 
experiences, during which I naturally mentioned my two 
times at The New Canadian, and he suddenly asked: 
“Moritsugu, why won’t the Japanese still remaining in 
B.C. come out east?” This was in 1946, a year after the 
war ended. Even with most of the family detention 
camps closed, more than half of those expelled from the
B.C. coast still remained in that province.
And being 23 years old and knowing everything, I
gave Dr. Sandwell 5 or 6 reasons why they didn’t want 
to leave B.C. despite the racist attitudes there. Then Dr. 
Sandwell said, “Why don’t you write about that for us?” 
I said, “Thanks, I’d like to” and left his office with 
something special to do. I walked all the way up Yonge 
to near Bloor where I was staying with the Sumi family 
on Hayden Street. 
Then, suddenly, reality hit me. Me write an article 
for a national magazine—when all I had ever done was 
write for small newspapers? And how do you write a 
magazine article anyway? There was a bookshop on 
Yonge Street near Bloor where I had noticed there was 
a shelf of how-to-write books. So I went in and found 
one titled How to Write Non-Fiction Articles. Yes, 
that’s what I had to do—write a “non-fiction article.” I 
bought the book, retired to the Sumi attic where I was 
staying, did everything the book suggested, rented a 
typewriter, and drafted the article in a week or so. I 
showed the draft of the article to Irene Uchida—she 
also showed it to Kunio Hidaka, who I think was the 
first B.C. Nisei to get an Ontario-government job. They 
checked it over and made some suggestions, which I 
followed, and then sent the article to Dr. Sandwell. That 
was in September 1946. 
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Back at St. Thomas, a few weeks later in October, I 
got a phone call from The New Canadian which had 
moved from Kaslo to Winnipeg. The paper needed an 
associate editor on the English side to work with Editor 
Kasey Oyama because Noji Murase, who had succeeded 
me in Kaslo when I moved to Ontario in 1944 to rejoin 
our family, was leaving to join his family, which had 
moved from the Lemon Creek camp to Hamilton. So if 
I wasn’t doing anything could I work on the paper in 
Winnipeg? 
Not being crazy about farm work, I jumped at the 
chance and joined The New Canadian in Manitoba.  A 
few weeks later, I got a letter from Saturday Night editor 
B.K. Sandwell that my article would be published in one 
of the forthcoming November issues (the magazine was 
a weekly then). When that week arrived, I rushed to a 
store on Portage Avenue which carried out-of-town 
publications and found the latest Saturday Night. Flipped 
it open, and there it was: My article—“Why the 
Japanese Don’t Want to Leave B.C.” Back in the issue 
on page 54. Naturally, I bought several copies—had to 
send one home to St. Thomas right away. Back at the 
The New Canadian office, I was congratulated by 
everyone and for a day or two floated about in 
happiness. 
Then suddenly it hit me. I didn’t have to go to the 
College of Art after all. With only a high-school 
education and experience on a Japanese-Canadian 
newspaper, I had been published by a national 
magazine, which showed that in this new postwar 
world, it was possible for someone like me to become a 
mainstream journalist. Wow! 
So I wrote to Miss Jean Story in Vancouver, my 
high school English and Journalism teacher—told her 
about the Saturday Night article and asked her advice 
about learning journalism. She replied, “Why not ask 
Dr. Sandwell? He was a Queen’s University professor.” 
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I did as she suggested—Dr. Sandwell wrote to me that 
there were two journalism schools in Canada, one at 
Carleton University and the other at the University of 
Western Ontario. But the best approach would be to get 
a good liberal arts education because the journalism part 
I could learn on the job. So in Winnipeg while working 
on The New Canadian, I attended the first year at the 
University of Manitoba. That would give me university 
entrance in Ontario where the final high-school grade 
was Grade 13 back then. 
Then in 1948—when The New Canadian moved to 
Toronto for its final home—I left the paper to 
concentrate full time on my education at the University 
of Toronto. I chose an Honours Political Science & 
Economics degree program, and also worked on the 
student paper, The Varsity—which was a daily then: 
Monday through Friday. In my third year, I was elected 
editor-in-chief of The Varsity. And that year, I won the 
best editorial award in the annual Canadian University 
Press competition. That was quite wonderful but what 
followed was even more so. It turned out that one of 
the judges of the competition had been Ralph Allen, the 
best editor Maclean’s magazine ever had. By the way, 
back then Maclean’s was not a weekly newsmagazine but 
a monthly feature magazine with such staffers as Pierre 
Berton and June Callwood. 
During the next year, 1952—my final year at U of 
T—one day in January, Ralph Allen phoned to invite 
me to come down to Maclean’s when I had some spare 
time. There, Mr. Allen asked me if I had any half days 
free in my university timetable. I said, “Yes, Thursday 
afternoons I don’t have any lectures or labs.” “Well, 
come on Thursdays starting next week,” he said, “and 
we’ll teach you to be an assistant copy editor. And after 
you’ve finished your exams (which would be sometime 
in May) you can come on fulltime.” So there I was, not 
quite a university graduate, already being offered a job 
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on the staff of Canada’s most important magazine. Of 
course, I jumped at the chance. 
Everyone at Maclean’s welcomed me when I showed 
up on the first Thursday afternoon. Then a couple 
weeks after I started at Maclean’s, one staff member who 
had been out of town on an assignment came down to 
our office to welcome me too. He said, “Frank, come 
up to my office a minute, I’ve got something to tell 
you.” So I followed him up to his office; he closed the 
door and then put out his hand saying, “As the first Jew 
in this building, let me welcome the first Japanese.”  I 
learned sometime later that the Maclean-Hunter 
publishing company, which put out more than 30 
publications including Maclean’s, Chatelaine, Mayfair, 
Canadian Homes and Gardens, the Financial Post, and many, 
many trade publications, had had a no-Jews policy until 
sometime in 1950. Sid Katz, who became quite famous 
as Maclean’s science and medical editor, was the one 
welcoming me.  
And that is how I got into mainstream journalism—
being in the right place at the right time. A possibility I 
had never dreamed of in my prewar and wartime B.C. 
days. That first opening to me was followed by my 
eventually becoming Managing Editor of Canadian 
Homes and Gardens, and then Assistant Entertainment 
Editor and columnist at the Toronto Star, then Expo 
Editor at the Montreal Star during 1967—our country’s 
Centennial Year, etc. And in later years, other Nisei who 
also began their careers on The New Canadian became 
well-known staffers of mainstream papers and 
magazines, such as Ken Adachi, Mel Tsuji, Rick 
Matsumoto, and my brother Henry Moritsugu. 
And our being able to work at that higher level—
starting in the 1950s, of course—was parallel to the 
opportunities offered to other Nisei and Sansei in once 
forbidden professions. To mention a few other 
examples: the world-famous architect Raymond 
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Moriyama, the novelist-poet Joy Kogawa, the world-
famous biologist David Suzuki—those three had been 
classmates at the Bay Farm, B.C. family detention camp, 
as it happens. Other Japanese Canadians who became 
national leaders included the late Irene Uchida—who 
was one of my mentors—she became Professor 
Emeritus at McMaster University; and the ethnic 
newspaper editor Tom Shoyama, who became a senior 
civil servant in Ottawa. Plus Margaret Lyons, who 
became a CBC vice-president, in charge of its radio 
operations. By the way, when she was born in Mission, 
B.C., her name was Keiko Inouye.
Another postwar achievement by Japanese
Canadians was the development of young lawyers, some 
of whom eventually became partners in Canada’s top 
law firms. You will recall that in those years when we 
didn’t have the vote, none of us could become lawyers. 
And in the 1980s, a campaign was begun, led by young 
Japanese-Canadian lawyers, to get an apology and 
redress from the Canadian government for the unique 
and wholly unjustified mistreatment we had suffered 
during the Second World War. Then in 1988, more than 
40 years after all this was done to us, the Canadian 
government finally decided to officially acknowledge the 
injustices done to Japanese Canadians between 1942 and 
1949. And to back up its gesture and apology, Ottawa 
agreed to give each of us survivors an award of $21,000 
as symbolic compensation. This historic action came 
about because of the determined campaign led by 
Japanese Canadians, which was also supported by other 
Canadians of many kinds and beliefs. 
So for today’s young Japanese Canadians—that is 
our children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren—
there aren’t many doors that are still closed to them. 
And if any door is closed, they know how to open it. 
I’m sure you’ll agree that it’s a better happy ending than 
most stories get these days. Thank you. 
The End of Belligerence: 
How Demilitarization Shaped the 
Japanese Identity
Alexandra Welsh 
We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all 
time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals 
controlling human relationships, and we have 
determined to preserve our security and 
existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the 
peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to 
occupy an honoured place in an international 
society striving for the preservation of peace, 
and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, 
oppression and intolerance for all time from the 
earth. We recognise that all peoples of the world 
have the right to live in peace, free from fear 
and want. 
- Preamble to the 1947 Japanese Constitution1
Introduction 
When the war-weary Allied forces, led by American 
troops, entered Japan after a full surrender on 
September 2nd, 1945, both sides were unsure of what to 
expect of this new, rocky relationship between 
vanquished and victorious.2 The Allies were expecting 
resistance, if not full-blown rebellion, against their 
attempts to completely rebuild and reshape Japanese 
1 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation, (New York: 
Routledge, 2009): 22. 
2 Melissa Willard-Foster, “Planning the Peace and Enforcing the 
Surrender: Deterrence in the Allied Occupation of Germany and 
Japan,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 40, no. 1 (2009): 41. 
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society.3 The Japanese, on the other hand, were 
expecting, at best, complete subjugation and extreme 
collective punishment of their culture, and, at worst, the 
widespread massacre of their people.4 Both parties were 
pleasantly surprised at what they encountered instead. 
The Japanese people found the American soldiers to be 
kind, while the troops encountered calmness and 
cooperation from the newly occupied state.5 It was in 
this way that the Occupation of Japan, an event that 
would shape international relations for decades to come, 
began. 
The overall receptiveness of the Japanese people to 
the invading Allied forces, and their willingness to 
embrace the enforced mandate of demobilization, 
marked the beginning of a shift in the cultural identity 
of the country that would have lasting effects not only 
on the civil society of the state, but on its international 
political role for decades to come. This paper will argue 
that, while the demobilization of Japan was a measure 
imposed by an outside power, the resulting deep-rooted 
and long lasting pacifism were a result of the same social 
structures and cultural practices that had enabled the 
Japanese military fanaticism which culminated in 1945. 
Japanese Society and Militarization 
The structure of Japanese society which allowed it to 
become militarized in such a radical way leading up the 
Second World War is, in many ways, inimitable. Unlike 
the cases of Germany or Italy, whose militarism arose 
from political ideology, the militarism of Japan grew out 
3 Makoto Iokibe, “Japan Meets the United States for the Second 
Time,” Daedalus 119, no. 3 (1990): 93. 
4 Ibid, 94. 
5 Ibid. 
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of the expanding strength of the military.6 While the 
military and civilian branches of the Japanese 
government were officially designed to rank equally, 
with the Emperor as the pinnacle of power presiding 
over both, throughout the 1930s the military branch 
grew rapidly in size and power, eventually outgrowing 
any accountability it once owed civilians.7 
This rampant development of the military was 
coupled with the dominance of hierarchical 
relationships that were inherent in Japanese society. In 
pre-war Japan, the household, or ie, was the primary unit 
of governance, consequently obstructing a relationship 
between the government and the individual.8 The Civil 
Code of 1898 vested the heads of households with 
significant power over their families, which led to the 
development of the family state, or kazoku kokka, in 
which members of each ie were deeply loyal to the 
family, which was in turn limitlessly loyal to the 
Emperor.9 The government promoted this system, as 
they were able to successfully portray loyalty to the 
Emperor as an extension of loyalty to one’s family.10 
While the ie was abolished as a legal unit in the 1947 
constitution, the government and the elites continued to 
promote it as a form of social control.11 
The Japanese people were also raised to believe that 
they owed the Emperor, who was cast in the role of 
caring father, god, and supreme commander, complete 
loyalty until death.12  Together, these factors created the 
                                                          
6 Yukio Satoh, “The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy,” Adelphi 
Papers 178 (1982): 2. 
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perfect conditions for widespread militarism.  
Additionally, the education system carefully crafted by 
the government was successful in churning out 
thousands of graduates who expounded the importance 
of allegiance to one’s employer and government, and yet 
had very low expectations of quality of life as workers.13 
These carefully moulded masses also had little or no 
conception of the differentiation between public and 
private life, and were willing to surveil their fellow 
workers in order to ensure that no one stepped out of 
line.14 
The military was successful in engaging every aspect 
of society in its campaign against America.15 While 
Washington was keeping tabs on the growing military 
power of a State with which it once had a tenuous and 
largely superficial relationship, it was not until the 
Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941 
that Americans were fully aware of the force that Japan 
was willing to wield against them.16  
 
The Plan for Japan 
 
The United States did not wait until surrender was 
imminent to begin designing the post-war Japan. While 
it is true that the Americans waited over two years from 
the declaration of war to engage, they were confident, 
once they did mobilize, that victory would be 
guaranteed.17 It took the U.S. only a matter of months 
after declaring war against the Japanese to take it upon 
themselves to plan the way in which they would mould 
the island nation once they had successfully defeated it 
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in battle.18 They struggled with the question of what role 
they wished Japan to ultimately play in the international 
community once they remodelled it. Washington 
identified three possible options. They could flatten 
Japan to a pre-industrialized version of itself, neutralize 
it forever by removing all military capabilities, or set up 
the state as a future ally of the U.S. in the Pacific.19 
The option they ultimately chose was a 
combination, for although the Allied forces decided not 
only to eliminate all existing weapons, but also the 
infrastructure to create weapons in the future, they 
nevertheless managed to successfully create a political 
and economic relationship that turned Japan into a force 
on the international stage and an ally in a region that 
was in a state of constant change.20 
The Occupation itself was unique in that none of 
the major islands that compose Japan had yet been 
invaded, and their standing army remained roughly three 
million strong.21 It was also singular in that never before 
had a country that was limitedly invaded at the time of 
surrender been so thoroughly occupied after the fact.22 
The Allied forces, led by the United States, infiltrated 
every corner of Japan, tearing down militaristic 
institutions and imposing ideals of democratization. The 
plan that US policy-makers had created for Japan 
included promoting democracy, fostering local 
autonomy through a decentralized system of 
government, supporting the rights of workers and 
unions, and handing power to the people, particularly 
women.23 
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The primary tool the Allied Occupation used to 
sculpt Japan was the rewriting of the Japanese 
constitution, the existing version of which had been 
drafted in the Meiji Period, and thereby the elimination 
of all the seeds of militarism from the building blocks of 
the society.24  Article 9 of the new document came to be 
known as the peace clause.25 Through this article, the 
Japanese people renounced the sovereign right to wage 
war, as well as the right to use either force or the threat 
of force as a means of settling disputes.26 The new 
constitution, though enforced by a foreign power, was 
successful in establishing a new state that shied away 
from militancy and unnecessary force in both domestic 
and international settings.27 
Outside of the drafting of the new constitution, 
American policy-makers had the opportunity to 
completely reset all of Japanese society. They chose 
instead, along with their destruction of the Japanese war 
machine, to utilize selective violence in order to control 
the population as a whole, for more often than not, 
simply the threat of violence was enough to ensure 
compliance.28 
The mandate of the Occupation approved of the 
kidnapping of civilians for tactical purposes in areas 
where the troops were not satisfactorily embraced, but 
the most poignant violence that was used, though it was 
very limited, was the execution of those, both military 
and civilian, who had run the country during WWII.29 
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This choice, which was viewed as leniency by many, 
occurred due to the fact that the Americans did not 
wish to bring down the government.  General Douglas 
MacArthur, the man tasked with the reconstruction of 
Japan, intended to play a background role in the 
endeavour, and therefore required a certain amount of 
cooperation from the Japanese people in order to be 
successful.30 One of the most important decisions made 
in this regard, as a measure to ensure compliance at the 
time and to prevent future uprisings, was the choice to 
maintain the imperial line in Japan. 
 
The Emperor and the Post-War Uncertainty 
 
The role of the Emperor in the bombing of Pearl 
Harbor and the ensuing violence and terror between 
1941 and 1945 remains unclear to this day. While it is 
certain that many acts of war were carried out in his 
name, the amount he as a man did to incite violence, or 
conversely, measures he took to prevent violence on the 
part of his citizens is largely lost to history.31 The reason 
for this gap in knowledge is that before and after the 
Japanese surrendered, one of their top priorities in their 
relationship with the U.S. became to protect not only 
the life of the current Emperor, but also the right to 
maintain the imperial line going forward.32 
This was largely due to the fact that the role of the 
Emperor in the mythology of Japan, as a direct 
descendent of a single imperial line, was a historical 
rallying point for the Japanese people.33 Even on August 
10th, 1945, just one day after the second atomic bomb in 
the course of three days had been dropped on this 
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country, decimating two cities, the Japanese government 
announced to the U.S. that they were willing to 
surrender only under the condition that the post-war 
measures taken against the country did nothing to 
jeopardize the Emperor, either the man himself or the 
station he held in Japan.34 There was, however, no 
consensus amongst the Allied leaders in terms of how 
he should be punished, and therefore this attempt at a 
conditional surrender was unsuccessful. While the 
British and the Soviets wanted him to be tried and 
executed on war crimes, MacArthur and the American 
administration fought to target solely military leaders.35 
This decision was partially a strategic one, but was 
also based on MacArthur’s initial impression of 
Emperor Hirohito. A few weeks after MacArthur set up 
his offices, Hirohito paid him an unexpected visit. While 
the General was expecting this man, who had been the 
face of his enemy for three years, to come begging for 
his life, the Emperor instead told MacArthur that he 
alone could be held wholly responsible for the actions 
of his subjects, a fact that MacArthur could punish as he 
saw fit.36 The Emperor had come, in reality, to plead the 
case of his people, who were slowly starving to death. 
He told the General to dispatch of his own assets and 
the assets of the imperial family in a way that would 
feed his subjects.37 This humility on the part of the 
Emperor aided the decision that saved his life. 
Rather than put an end to the imperial line, the 
Occupation forces chose instead to strip the position of 
the majority of its powers through the first article of the 
constitution, which reads as follows: “The Emperor 
shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the 
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people, deriving his position from the will of the people 
with whom resides sovereign power”.38 Ultimately, 
without a formal investigation into the role of the 
Emperor in the violence of WWII, the blame for the 
violence which occurred was placed on the shoulders of 
several members of the military branch of the 
government, as well as a few civilian leaders.39 
This intense protective rallying around the Emperor 
occurred despite the fact that many Japanese people, 
particularly soldiers, blamed the Emperor and his 
advisors for what they believed to be an unnecessary 
surrender.40 The imperial advisors were labelled as 
defeatists and there were accusations that the Emperor 
was too easily manipulated.41 As the Allied troops took 
over Japan, there were ritual suicides all over the 
country, as well as those who withdrew into the 
countryside to continue the fight against the Western 
oppressors.42 
 
Demilitarization in the Cold War and Beyond 
 
After seven years of occupation and a security treaty, 
the U.S. had successfully created a state that was so 
averse to militarism that it was unlikely it would ever 
again engage in warfare.43  The generation that had lived 
through WWII, particularly those who had been in 
Japan for the decimation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
were unable to separate in their minds the value of force 
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when used sparingly from their memories of war.44 The 
newly created, American-approved, history curriculum 
was teaching Japanese children to feel remorse for the 
actions of their people.45 The result was an almost 
complete turn to pacifism on the part of the 
government, which continued to live in the shadow of 
the aggressive policies of those who had come before 
them.46 As a state, they largely turned inwards in an 
effort to rebuild their country and their economy, a task 
at which they were successful.47 
The pillar of peace in the Pacific, however, was no 
longer the role that the U.S. wished for Japan to play. As 
tensions rose between the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
and the Cold War escalated, the U.S. hoped to find a 
military ally in Japan, a country that lay so close to their 
enemy.48 Instead, they found a country that was 
perfectly happy to let the U.S. continue utilizing their 
military bases in Okinawa, but had little else to 
contribute to the cause.49 Even as the Soviets advanced, 
placing their military bases on islands that the Japanese 
claimed as their own, the Japanese government took no 
steps to defend their territorial claims, both because 
they did not have the military capability to do so and 
because they did not wish to break with their newly 
established pacifism.50 
The one action the Japanese government took, 
which many deemed contrary to the ideals outlined in 
the Occupation Constitution, was the creation of the 
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Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF), which occurred at 
the outbreak of the Korean War.51 There were some 
within Japan who were concerned that this step marked 
the beginning of a return to militarism.52 Others pointed 
out that the peace clause in the constitution only limited 
external force, and did not deal with issues of self-
defence in case of attack from an outside source.53 
Japan, however, needed to be cautious when developing 
any capability of force, as the countries surrounding it, 
particularly China, were likely to have a strong counter-
reaction to any indication that Japan was approaching 
the possibility of remilitarization.54 
Since the Cold War, Japan has maintained its 
security relationship with the U.S. During the early years 
of the anti-terrorism wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
Japanese Marine Self-Defense Force provided tactical 
support from the Indian Ocean.55 This continued until 
2005 when Japan elected a Prime Minister who called it 
home, due to the fact that the new leader utilized a 
more conservative interpretation of Article 9 of the 
Constitution.56 
 
Conclusion 
 
The imposition of pacifism by foreign forces on the 
state of Japan was embraced and maintained with 
unexpected fervour and fanaticism by the Japanese 
people. This fanaticism echoes the passion and loyalty 
with which the Japanese war machine operated. The 
continued promotion of the ie by the government, 
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despite its removal as a legal unit, encouraged the 
Japanese people to maintain a deep-seated allegiance to 
their families, the edicts of their government, and the 
Emperor, all of whom were expounding the virtues of 
pacifism. 
Going forward, the future of militarization in Japan 
is contingent on either the reinterpretation or the 
rewriting of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. The 
possibility of this occurring, however, has created deep 
debates within Japanese society. As the generations 
which remember the War age and pass away, and the 
younger generations become a larger proportion of the 
voters, public approval of the SDF and general 
openness to the possibility of remilitarization increase.57 
Japan, however, is still in a state of limbo, in which the 
future of remilitarization is uncertain. Although located 
in a geographically precarious area in which the growth 
of military capabilities would likely be beneficial, both to 
the state and to its American allies, the deeply 
embedded ideals of pacifism remain an important and 
determinative aspect of Japanese society. 
With the constitution and the embedded sense of 
hierarchy and loyalty as the dual foundations, the Allied 
forces successfully reshaped Japan into such a deep state 
of demilitarization that, over sixty years later, not even 
the power of the White House is able to bring Japan to 
the decision to reengage the militarism that has lain 
silent for so many decades. 
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Abenomics and the Re-Emergence of 
Japan: A Start 
Bernard M. Wolf 
 
This presentation analyzes the three essential ingredients 
of Abenomics (the “Three Arrows”) and their impact. 
For Abenomics to be successful, the third arrow, 
structural reform, is the most important, but also the 
most difficult to implement. The third arrow is 
described by The Economist magazine as follows: “Part of 
its strength is its breadth: it is less a single arrow than a 
thousand strong bundle of acupuncture needles”.1 
Basically, Japan, with its rapidly aging and declining 
population, requires a large number of structural 
reforms in a whole host of areas. 
In the ‘60s, ‘70s, and ‘80s, Japan was the envy of the 
world (sometimes referred to as Japan Inc.). In the ‘60s, 
there was growth of 10%, in the ‘70s there was growth 
of 5%, and in the ‘80s there was growth of 4%. Japan 
was the home of advanced manufacturing. It introduced 
the world to the concept of “lean manufacturing,” for 
example, the Toyota Production System, which is 
analyzed in The Machine that Changed the World.2 
Today Japan is the world’s third-largest economy 
and fourth-leading exporter. It has advanced 
technological know-how in some sectors, a formidable 
manufacturing base, a world-class infrastructure, and a 
large and affluent consumer market. 
The current appearance of economic success comes 
after Japan lost two decades following the Asset Bubble 
collapse in the early 1990s. In those two decades there 
was chronic deflation and very low economic growth. 
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Overall productivity growth has stalled well below 2 
percent for much of the past 20 years. The labour 
productivity gap with the United States and other major 
advanced economies has been widening across most 
industries. Even Japan’s advanced manufacturing 
industries lag behind the comparable US and German 
sectors in labour productivity by almost one-third. A 
continuation of current trends would lead to annual 
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth of only 1.3 
percent through 2025, which is extremely low! 
One of the most important problems facing Japan is 
the huge demographic challenge, namely the ageing and 
shrinking population.  Japan is the world’s oldest 
country and in fact, the population began to decline in 
2011. If the current nationwide fertility rate of 1.4 and 
the close to 0 net immigration continue unchanged, 
Japan’s population of 127 million will drop almost a 
third by 2060 and two-thirds by 2110. Additionally, 
Japan has one of the world’s longest life expectancies. 
In 2013, a quarter of the population was age 65 or older; 
by 2040, that share will rise to more than one-third. In 
2014, Japan’s dependency ratio reached 77%, meaning 
that it took 100 working age people to take care of 77 
non-working age people. Less workers means a lower 
GDP, lower household purchasing power, lower 
investment, etc. It will also lead to a shortage of skills. 
The higher health and social security expenditures will 
create increased government fiscal pressures. 
The “Three Arrows” of Abenomics (Structural 
Reforms, Fiscal Stimulus, and Monetary Easing) are 
seen as a method of addressing Japan’s economic issues. 
Two of the “Three Arrows,” monetary easing and fiscal 
stimulus, essentially jump start the economy, but 
structural reform is required to sustain the momentum. 
These structural reforms face strong headwinds from 
entrenched interests which have long benefitted from 
the various rigidities. 
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Monetary easing consists primarily of aggressive 
monetary easing, or quantitative easing (QE), whereby 
the Bank of Japan purchases monetary assets in 
exchange for newly printed money at the rate of ¥80T 
($700B) per year. This can be compared with the 
strategy of the Federal Reserve of the United States, 
which, beginning in September 2012, launched a round 
of quantitative easing (QE3) during which it purchased 
$1T worth of monetary assets. Japan has tried this type 
of solution before, but this time may show better 
results. Fiscal stimulus was provided by means of a 
lower corporate income tax rate, but at the expense of a 
hike in the consumption tax. The difficulty of using very 
aggressive fiscal stimulus is the government debt, which 
is greater than twice the national GDP and far exceeds 
that of other industrialized countries.  
The achievements of Abenomics can be expressed 
in numbers. Since the start of the Abe administration on 
December 26, 2012, the Japanese economy has been on 
a gradual recovery trend. Equity prices (75% increase by 
February 2015), exchange rates (yen-dollar exchange 
rate climbed from 85.15 to 118.95 by early 2015), 
unemployment rate (declined from 4.3 to 3.3% in two 
years), and business conditions all look more favorable. 
However, there were negative short-term effects on 
the Japanese economy from the consumption tax hike 
(5% to 8%). The real GDP growth rate fell into the 
negatives in April-September. Another increase in the 
tax to 10% has been postponed to April 2017.  
With continued yen depreciation (currently around 
120 yen to one dollar), exports in the October-
December 2014 quarter increased by 2.7% from the 
previous quarter and there has been an increase in 
corporate earnings. Reductions in corporate tax 
beginning in 2015 will accelerate the motivation to 
invest. Consumer sentiment has been improving since 
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December 2014 and there are signs of a recent 
resurgence in consumer spending.  
The impact of yen depreciation is significant. It 
expands exports, reduces imports, increases production 
of import competing goods, encourages domestic and 
foreign investment, and stimulates economic growth. It 
also increases the profits of efficient firms and results in 
price increases which can reduce deflation. 
Furthermore, it encourages companies to raise wages 
(they are competing in a tight labour market) and 
induces more women and seniors into the labour 
market. Finally, the rise in equity markets promotes a 
wealth effect which stimulates consumer spending.  
Essentially, it leads to a virtuous circle instead of a 
vicious circle. 
The oil price shock is a big bonus for Japan since all 
energy is imported, given the shutting down of nuclear 
generators. It reduces costs of production and 
transportation, and increases household purchasing 
power.  
Recently, pension funds have begun to shift away 
from domestic bonds. The Government Pension 
Investment Fund and three smaller public pension 
funds (totalling $1.3T) are changing their asset allocation 
to 50% equity. They have set allocation targets of 25 
percent each for Japanese and overseas equities, up 
from 12 percent. They have also boosted foreign bonds 
to 15 percent from 11 percent, and cut local debt to 35 
percent from 60 percent. Alternative investments can 
make up as much as 5 percent of holdings. These 
initiatives promote higher equity prices in Japan and 
greater returns for the pension funds. 
Now let us return to the third arrow of Abenomics. 
As already stated, The Economist described the third 
arrow as follows: “Part of its strength is its breadth: it is 
less a single arrow than a 1,000-strong bundle of 
acupuncture needles.” 
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With Abenomics, we have seen limited accelerated 
structural reforms and deregulation in some sectors of 
the Japanese economy. In the energy sector, Abenomics 
launched the first fundamental reform in 60 years, 
including opening up the electricity market to small 
retailers and allowing non-Japanese companies to enter 
the business (from 2016). This has and will lead to a 
further boost in competition for retail electricity. 
In the areas of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, 
structural reform has come in the form of accelerating 
integration of farmlands as agriculture moves from part-
time family business to larger scale operations. The 
reforms have also supported proprietors in agriculture, 
forestry, and fishery in expanding businesses to include 
processing, distribution, and sales. Structural reform 
also encourages companies in other industries to enter 
agriculture-related businesses. A third major area 
affected by structural reform is the medical care sector. 
In November 2013, a reform to commercialize 
regenerative medicine was enacted. Furthermore, 
Abenomics introduced an early ratification system for 
drugs (reduction of the waiting period for ratification 
from 7 years to 2 or 3 years) and supports the 
cultivation and processing of cells to be outsourced to 
external parties. 
Accelerated structural reforms and deregulation in 
Japan have also resulted in the inauguration of National 
Strategic Special Zones, which are created for carrying 
out bold regulatory reforms in the fields of medical care, 
agriculture, employment, etc. Six areas were initially 
specified. Yabu City, Hyogo was specified as a center 
for agricultural reform in hilly and mountainous areas, 
Fukuoka City as a center for employment system reform 
to promote new businesses, Okinawa as a center for 
international tourism, and Niigata City as a center for 
agricultural reform in large-scale farming. Furthermore, 
the Osaka/Kyoto/Hyogo Area was specified as a center 
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for international innovation in the field of medical care 
and general support. Finally, the Tokyo Area (including 
Kanagawa and Chiba) was specified as an international 
business and innovation hub, notably regarding urban 
development, employment guidelines, and medical care 
for foreigners. 
In addition, Abenomics aims to double the stock of 
Inward Foreign Investment by 2020. This is expected to 
stimulate competition and bring Japan new ways of 
doing business, renewed innovation, and new 
technologies, as well as help it integrate into global 
supply chains thereby increasing productivity. 
In the area of international trade, Japan is pursuing 
membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade 
Agreement. Previously protected sectors will be open to 
more competition in a variety of areas and will require 
structural changes in the spirit of those already 
mentioned and which may be easier politically to 
implement as part of a trade agreement package rather 
than as individual changes. The Agreement also means 
that new markets will be opened for Japanese exports. 
Japan already has 15 FTAs (Free Trade Agreements), 
but all with relatively small countries. 
Another key initiative to raise the growth rate of the 
Japanese economy is to increase the labour supply by 
encouraging greater labour force participation (women, 
the elderly, and increased immigration). In order to 
achieve a labour force increase, there are several 
strategies in place. One is to raise female labour force 
participation in the 25–44 age range to about 80 percent 
by 2040, from 71 percent now, thus narrowing the gap 
with the United States and Germany and bringing two 
million additional women into the workforce. Another 
strategy aimed toward women is to increase the 
proportion of females in upper management and to 
reduce the wage gap between women and men. The 
labour force could also be enlarged if Japan keeps the 
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elderly working longer by raising the retirement age. 
Additionally, the government must emphasize labour-
saving technologies and organization, as well as consider 
an increase in immigration. 
There are also other potential fixes to the labour 
market. Japan’s longstanding lifetime employment 
model has contributed to low productivity and 
consequently legal strictures around lifetime 
employment have mostly been lifted, making the labour 
market more flexible in theory. But downsizing is 
viewed negatively in practice, producing inefficient 
bureaucracies that lack agility as it is costly to fire regular 
employees. Workers, too, are reluctant to advance their 
careers by changing employers, which limits their 
incentive to develop new skills. In addition, allowing 
temporary workers, or haken, has given flexibility, but at 
the same time, firms have little incentive to invest in 
these employees. To combat this, the government can 
try to encourage changes in attitude and practices. 
The educational system requires change for the next 
generation. Through it, Japan can encourage 
entrepreneurship, critical thinking, experimentation, and 
innovation. There should be greater links between 
schools and industry and the system ought to question 
traditional ways of doing things. For example, more 
emphasis ought to be placed on merit rather than 
seniority. Education can also help the next generation 
learn about other cultures and the way 
economies/businesses are organized elsewhere, thereby 
fostering a ‘global mindset’. 
A recent Report by the Mckinsey Global Institute, 
The Future of Japan: Reigniting Productivity and Growth, aims 
to explain how a private-sector transformation could 
revive Japan. The Report suggests that “[C]ompanies 
have multiple avenues for growing revenues and finding 
deeper operational efficiencies. These strategies fall into 
three main categories: adopting global best practices, 
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deploying next-generation technologies, and organizing 
for discipline and performance”.3 Such initiatives will 
generate a more competitive landscape, question 
accepted (traditional) practices and attitudes, and give 
cause to think in terms of flexibility rather than rigidity. 
According to the Report, around one-third of the 
productivity potential can be captured within four 
sectors; advanced manufacturing (as companies become 
more like Toyota, Honda, Denso, and Fanuc), retail, 
financial services, and health care.  I highly recommend 
the Report for a more in-depth analysis of what Japan 
needs to reignite its economy. 
Abenomics offers promise for lifting the Japanese 
economy out of stagnation. Much will depend on the 
success of the structural reforms that form that third 
arrow. 
                                                          
3 Georges Desvaux, Jonathan Woetzel, Tasuku Kuwabara, Michael 
Chui, Asta Fjeldsted, and Salvador Guzman-Herrera, The Future of 
Japan: Reigniting Productivity and Growth, March 2015. 
  
The Toyota Way 
John-Paul Farag 
 
I’m part of the advanced technology and powertrain 
group at Toyota Canada and we are tasked with looking 
at technologies that are coming into the market that are 
relatively new. Preparing the market, preparing 
consumers, preparing our dealers, and really trying to 
educate as many stakeholders as we can. This 
opportunity allows us to share what we see coming 
down the pipelines and what it all means, not only for 
Toyota, but also for the economy in general. So my goal 
is really to give the perspective of a Japanese company 
as kind of a complement to the really broad explanation 
we’ve just heard. 
What I want to do today is give a brief outline about 
Toyota in Canada, what our footprint looks like here, 
both from the sales and manufacturing sides and then 
touch a bit on the Toyota Way, our guiding principles, 
what makes us who we are as a company, and how we 
do business. Then I’ll speak a little bit about the 
motivating factors for these new technologies: why are 
we investing so much energy and so many resources 
into developing these new technologies, not just from 
the perspective of the automotive sector specifically, but 
also as it expands beyond. 
We’ll also touch a bit on the technology specifically. 
Not to get too bogged down in the technical details, but 
we will touch on the types of technologies we are 
bringing to market, everything from hybrids to 
hydrogen fuel cells. Then we’ll look at what we’re doing 
outside of the vehicle dimension as I mentioned, 
beyond the automotive scope, in which Toyota is doing 
a lot, though it might not necessarily be obvious to a lot 
of people. 
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We are celebrating our 50th year in Canada this year. 
When we started operating in Canada we had 48 
dealerships across the country, we sold two models, and 
we sold that first year a grand total of 755 vehicles. So 
we have come a long way since then. In 1983 we 
established our first manufacturing operation in Capton, 
British Columbia, which makes aluminum wheels. It 
actually opened in 1985, the same year that Toyota 
announced plans to build an auto-assembly plant in 
Cambridge, Ontario. The first car from that plant, the 
Toyota Corolla, rolled off the production line 
November 30th, 1988, and is actually still on display in 
Cambridge at the Toyota manufacturing plant. So if you 
are ever there on a tour you will see it on display in the 
atrium. 
Now as one of two manufacturers from Japan, we 
have worked very hard to establish ourselves in Canada. 
We have developed a network now of over 300 Toyota, 
Lexus, and Scion dealers from coast to coast. We have 
established all the support systems for those dealers, 
from vehicle and parts marketing and distribution to 
financial services, sales, and training. Our own 
operations and those of our dealers employ thousands 
of Canadians directly and help maintain thousands of 
additional jobs at our partners and suppliers. We’ve also 
created a cold weather testing centre in Timmons, 
Ontario and, as I mentioned, the wheel manufacturing 
operation in British Columbia. Both have global 
mandates, so again, expanding beyond just the Canadian 
market. 
And, as I mentioned, we also built assembly sites. 
We have two in Ontario; one in Cambridge and one in 
Woodstock. Cambridge has been operational for more 
than 25 years now, while Woodstock, which was the 
first green field assembly plant in Canada, officially 
opened for business 7 years ago. These plants build four 
Toyota models and a Lexus luxury vehicle as well. They 
 
The Economy Under Abe and Looking Ahead 
61 
 
employ thousands of Canadians in well-paid, high-
skilled positions. TMMC (Toyota Motor Manufacturing 
Canada) was the only assembly plant in the country to 
build both a battery-electric hybrid vehicle and a full 
electric vehicle. The vehicles we build in Canada 
account for almost 50% of our Canadian sales. Equally 
important, our plants are net exporters of vehicles. So 
the majority of vehicles we build in Canada are sold into 
the United States. 
That gives a brief outline of Toyota in Canada but 
we have to ask ourselves “how did Toyota as a global 
company evolve from a company that began making 
automatic fabric looms into a global manufacturer of 
vehicles and a leader in the development of advanced 
technology, both within and beyond the automotive 
sector?” Toyota’s methods and our philosophies 
continue to be studied even today and it is these 
concepts that have really guided Toyota over the years. 1   
These precepts are the foundation of what has made 
Toyota not only a successful Japanese company but also 
a successful global and Canadian company. They have 
been handed down over generations and they remain 
the basic management philosophy for global Toyota 
operations. They have a simple, timeless message: it 
emphasizes teamwork, respect for people, and 
continuous improvement. The Toyota precepts 
continue even today to guide the company as we grow 
and transform with the times. 
                                                          
1 1) Be contributive to the development and welfare of the country 
by working together, regardless of position, in faithfully fulfilling 
your duties 
2) Be at the vanguard of the times through endless creativity, 
inquisitiveness and pursuit of improvement 
3) Be practical and avoid frivolity 
4) Be kind and generous, strive to create a warm, homelike 
atmosphere 
5) Be reverent, and show gratitude for things great and small in 
thought and deed 
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From the Toyota precepts emerged what we call the 
“Toyota Way.” The Toyota Way really outlines the 
concepts that make up the foundation of the pillars of 
our business philosophies. Challenge is one, and that is 
really to challenge us, to stretch us, and develop us, to 
creatively reach our goals. Kaizen, which I am sure many 
of you have heard is Japanese for “continuous 
improvement,” is essentially the systematic problem-
solving that never ends, a continuous cycle, where there 
is always room for improvement. Respect, starts with a 
respect for people, but is also a commitment to the 
development of our team members, because at Toyota 
we recognize that our people are our only appreciating 
assets. Teamwork is built on that: to take highly 
developed individuals and have them work together 
towards a common goal. And finally, what we call Genchi 
Genbutsu, which is Japanese for “go and see,” 
encourages all of us to go to the source and observe to 
truly understand the actual situation as opposed to 
hearing it second-hand. 
The Toyota Way overall affects every aspect of our 
company. It impacts every decision we make as a 
business, including why and how we develop new 
products and technologies to bring to market. 
That brings us to the motivation that is pushing us 
to develop these new technologies. I think that everyone 
in this room could probably agree that the development 
of the automobile of the past hundred years has had a 
dramatic impact on human civilization. It has allowed 
mobility on a grand scale. Today there are about 900 
million vehicles around the world and every year that 
number grows by about 20 million. So we at Toyota 
have to take the long-term view and see how we can 
continue to provide mobility to the growing number of 
drivers and consumers. But to do so we have to plan 
ahead of time. For some companies, 3-5 years or 5-10 
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years might be long-term, but at Toyota we are talking 
anywhere from 20-50 years. 
We are really taking that view and looking to see 
how we can continue to provide these options but do it 
in a sustainable way. As an automaker we have 
identified three major environmental challenges that we 
have to work with. One is the need to work to reduce 
carbon emissions and greenhouse gases that cause 
global warming. The second is the need to continue to 
deal with smog-forming emissions. These are different 
emissions, which do not necessarily cause global 
warming, but which do affect the quality of the air that 
we breathe, especially in busy urban centers. The third 
challenge is the need to reduce oil consumption and to 
look for different, diverse sources of energy that we can 
use to power new technologies. 
This kind of gives you a brief glimpse or outline of 
why there is a need for action right now. Energy 
demand in the next hundred years is projected to triple 
what it is today. Although we are going to see renewable 
energy sources make up a larger portion of that supply, 
it will not be enough in the initial stages to meet that 
demand. As a result, you are going to see things like coal 
and petroleum consumption significantly intensified in 
the future. 
From an automotive company’s perspective, finding 
new energy sources for the technology is only one part 
of the equation. We need to develop advanced 
technologies that can improve the actual efficiency of 
the vehicles, regardless of what type of fuel that we are 
using. That is why we began development of our Toyota 
Hybrid Synergy drive. A lot of people think that hybrids 
are a more recent development, but Toyota actually 
started working on these several decades ago. We 
debuted our very first hybrid vehicle at the 1967 Tokyo 
motor show. But it was not until more recent 
advancements in engine-computer controls and power 
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electronics that we were able to commercialize the 
technology. 
I will not get into exactly how a hybrid works in too 
much detail, but the goal of the hybrid system is to draw 
on the benefits of two unique power traits. So you have 
your traditional engine with a gasoline tank, but you also 
have an electric motor which is powered by a battery on 
board. Using the two systems together allows drivers to 
enjoy the benefits of each one while compensating for 
the downsides of the other. It really is a true synergy and 
that hints at why we named this the Hybrid Synergy 
Drive. But the result is a very clean, very quiet, very 
spirited drive using less fuel, producing fewer emissions, 
and simultaneously improving performance, which is 
key. The best part is that the driver does not have to 
change their driving habits at all. They drive the vehicle, 
they refuel, and they maintain the vehicle, just like any 
other conventional car. And we believe that this 
familiarity is one of the key reasons why hybrids have 
been so successful since they have been introduced.  
Since we launched the first Prius in Japan in 1997, 
we have witnessed the technology become mainstream. 
That technology we debuted in Japan is now in Canada 
and here we sell 11 models. We have sold over 7 million 
hybrids around the world, including over 100,000 units 
here in Canada. In fact, last year every two out of three 
hybrids sold in the country were either Toyota or Lexus. 
Contrary to what you may hear, hybrids are not 
simply a bridge technology or a temporary stopgap until 
something better comes along. They really do provide a 
platform upon which new advanced technology 
powertrains are being built. What I mean is that hybrid 
technology is both scalable, meaning it works in very 
different classes of vehicles (anything from 
subcompacts, to midsize, to SUVs, to luxury 
performance vehicles), and flexible enough to work on 
different powertrain designs. So it is not just gasoline 
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engines that work with the electric motors. You can 
have different architectures. 
You may have been seeing lately what we call the 
three latest automotive technologies to hit the market. 
They’re really all variations of hybrid technology. They 
all share common components, common architectures. 
First are the plugin hybrid vehicles, which are similar to 
hybrid vehicles. They both have gasoline power and 
electric power, but they have larger batteries, you are 
able to plug the vehicle in, drive short trips on electric 
power, and have that gasoline as a reserve in case you 
want to drive further distances. Then you have electric 
vehicles, which are only half of a hybrid, but still use 
similar components such as electric motors, batteries, 
and power controls. 
There are some challenges with that technology of 
course. And now you are starting to hear more and 
more about hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, which I will 
touch on in just a few seconds and which are also built 
on a hybrid platform. What that means for Toyota is 
that because of our experience and our knowledge of 
hybrid technology we have really been able to position 
ourselves well to continue to develop and improve these 
other powertrain technologies as they become more 
commercially viable. 
One particular powertrain technology which is 
getting quite a bit of attention these days is the 
hydrogen fuel cell vehicle. Toyota recently announced 
that we will be launching our first commercially-
available hydrogen fuel cell vehicle, the Toyota Mirai, in 
select regions around the world this year. Now mirai is 
the Japanese word for “future,” which is an appropriate 
name for this vehicle because Toyota truly believes that 
we are at a turning point in automotive history and that 
the Mirai represents the future of sustainable mobility.  
You may ask yourself, “what makes hydrogen such a 
promising fuel versus all of the other technologies that 
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are emerging?” There are a few reasons. Hydrogen fuel 
cell vehicles are 100% electric vehicles and produce zero 
emissions. To give some brief background, how they 
basically work is that you have hydrogen in the tank and 
when that hydrogen mixes with the oxygen from the air 
in the fuel cell there is a chemical reaction that creates 
electricity. You can then use that clean electricity to 
power your electric motor. So it is essentially an electric 
vehicle but the source of the electricity is different: it is 
not coming from the battery, but from a chemical 
reaction in the fuel cell using hydrogen gas. The only 
thing that comes out of the tailpipe is water vapour, so 
it is 100% emissions free. 
But unlike most of today’s plugin battery electric 
vehicles, which have limited driving range, the Mirai can 
travel almost 500km on a single tank of hydrogen. So it 
is very much on par with what you are used to in a 
conventional vehicle. And while plugin electric vehicles 
can take several hours to charge, the Mirai can refuel in 
as little as three minutes, which is again very similar to 
what people are used to. And as we touched on earlier, 
we think that the success of hybrids is because they are 
very familiar. And we think that the success of hydrogen 
fuel cell vehicles really depends on how familiar we can 
make them to people who are driving vehicles. It makes 
it more likely for them to be willing to adopt the 
technology and makes a much easier transition into a 
new type of fuel. 
The fuel itself, hydrogen, can be made from a 
variety of sources including many clean, renewable 
energy sources. And because there is now an abundance 
of clean electric energy available on board the car in the 
Mirai, it can be used to provide backup power, such as 
backup electricity to power a home in case of 
emergencies for up to a week. So you are starting to see 
these additional side benefits that people may not have 
thought about before the actual technology started to 
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hit the road. And that’s the kind of innovation we 
promote at Toyota, which is what people have come to 
expect from a company that originated in a country 
known for its technological innovation.  
With all these benefits then you ask yourself: “Are 
fuel cells too good to be true? Is there a catch?” Well, 
like any new technology, it is not without its challenges. 
The most obvious one is the need for a hydrogen fuel 
infrastructure to support the widespread deployment of 
these vehicles. And while at Toyota we can bring the 
vehicles to market, it takes a significant amount of 
collaboration between automakers, government 
regulators, energy providers, and other stakeholders to 
really build a dependable and convenient network of 
fueling stations. 
The good news is that that progress is already being 
made in many regions around the world. Many 
countries already have a limited number of stations in 
operation and have plans to expand that network in the 
coming years. While we are still in the early stages of 
infrastructure development here in Canada, already you 
are starting to see discussions happening and programs 
put in place to support the eventual spread of this 
technology. So in Canada we do have a long road ahead 
of us but the important thing is that progress is 
happening. So we are going to continue to work hard 
and work with our partners to hopefully make that 
technology something that will happen and that will 
help in the future. 
The question often arises of how Toyota decides 
what technology to develop. Is it a gamble on one 
versus another? The truth is, we believe that there is a 
role for each technology in the future of mobility. But 
one common theme that overshadows all of them is 
that there is definite electrification of the automobile. It 
has already begun with the widespread adoption of 
hybrid technology, and it is continuing with plugin 
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hybrids, with battery electric vehicles, and, as we have 
just seen, hydrogen fuel cells. The key though is to build 
the right car for the right place at the right time. That is 
kind of a mantra we always follow at Toyota. It is 
important to choose the right technology for a specific 
application. For larger vehicles that travel longer 
distances, fuel cells are a great option. Gas-electric 
hybrids or plugin hybrids are great choices for 
conventional-type vehicles. And battery electric vehicles 
are ideal for short distances, maybe small urban 
community-type vehicles. 
Some of you may have had the opportunity to see 
the Toyota i-Road at the Toronto auto show just last 
month. It is a personal mobility device that combines 
the convenience and the maneuverability of a 
motorcycle with the comfort and the safety of a car. It is 
fully electric, can seat two people, and travels about 
50km on a single charge. The i-Road is already being 
tested in several car-sharing programs in Japan and in 
Grenoble, France. While this type of vehicle certainly 
will not meet the needs of every customer, it does 
represent the way that Toyota is thinking outside the 
box when it comes to mobility options. 
The truth is that today’s commute times are ever-
increasing. The Toronto Board of Trade issued a report 
recently that ranked several Canadian cities among the 
worst in North America for transportation, congestion, 
and commute times. More congestion means more 
pollution, more time and resources wasted, and a higher 
potential for accidents. This congestion, along with all 
the environmental challenges that we have discussed 
already, really forces us as automakers to rethink how 
we can continue to provide mobility to people all over 
the world but in a way that is much more efficient. We 
often take inspiration from nature around us. We see 
things like flocks of birds and schools of fish that can 
move in dense packs with great speed and not run into 
 
The Economy Under Abe and Looking Ahead 
69 
 
each other, and we take this inspiration and turn it into 
innovation. 
Now, mobility does not just mean driving to a 
destination, although that is what comes to mind much 
of the time. For many people, mobility just means very 
simple human mobility, which can be a challenge. And 
that is why at Toyota we are also developing what we 
call partner robots. And I think that some of you were 
waiting for that. Of course there’s a link between Japan 
and robots, but those we are working on at Toyota are a 
bit more specialized. 
With an aging population, especially, as you have 
already heard, in areas like Japan, Toyota believes that 
we can help improve people’s mobility, independence, 
and quality of life by relying on highly advanced 
technologies. So we have our human support robot, 
which operates by voice command or by a tablet. It can 
pick up objects, suction up thin objects, retrieve objects 
from high locations, open curtains, and perform other 
household tasks. We have our Walk Assist robot, which 
assists a person who has lost the use of a leg and which 
is attached to the leg to help the user walk more securely 
and more naturally. And we have Robina, which is 
designed to provide medical and nursing care or 
perform housework. It is able to think and move for 
itself, carry and move objects, and even converse with 
people. 
Just this week, Hirobo, one of two robots Toyota is 
working on, received two Guinness World Records; one 
for being the first companion robot in space (it arrived 
on the International Space Station with the Japanese 
astronauts in August 2013), and the other for being the 
robot to have a conversation at the highest altitude 
(414km above sea level in December 2013). For Hirobo, 
the main goal is to see how well robots and humans can 
interact, hopefully leading the way to robots taking a 
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more active role, not just in assisting astronauts on 
missions, but in everyday life as well. 
Toyota spends $1 million every hour of every day, 
365 days a year, on research and development. We do 
that because of the work which has led us to 
continuously improve our vehicles and powertrains, but 
also because of the work that helps us to lead the 
industry in the development of things like intelligent 
transportation systems, autonomous vehicle technology, 
plugin hybrid and electric cars, hydrogen fuel cell cars, 
personal mobility devices like the i-Road, and advanced 
robotics as we have just seen. Since its beginnings as a 
Japanese company making automatic fabric looms, 
Toyota has always been a company that looks forward 
to the future and tries to make things better. And we 
will continue to innovate new ways to bring sustainable 
mobility to people all over the world. 
It’s good to see the macro view of what is 
happening in the economy, but also to see some 
examples of what that is turning into in real life. So I 
hope this has given you a bit of insight into the type of 
technology just one Japanese-global company is working 
on. 
Under-acknowledged Heroines of the 
Japanese Economic Miracle 
Odmaa Sod-Erdene 
 
Introduction 
 
Japan is well-praised for its successful industrialization 
and economic growth. Its transformation from a poor 
nation wrecked by a devastating war to the world’s 
third-largest economy in only a few decades (specifically 
from 1950-1973), is known as the Japanese “Economic 
Miracle”.1,2,3 
There are a vast number of studies in various 
disciplines, mostly by Western scholars, looking at the 
factors that facilitated this great accomplishment. Many 
of these studies suggest that it was the permanent 
employment policy that distinguished Japan from other 
industrialized countries and acted as a catalyst for its 
astonishing economic prosperity and growth.4 As the 
permanent workers were predominantly men, this 
explanation often eliminated women from the equation.  
In general, Japanese women were perceived as 
delicate, obedient, and caring housewives who belonged 
at home. They were perceived as irrelevant and were 
mostly invisible in the tale of the recovery and 
                                                          
1 Dorothy Robins-Mowry, The Hidden Sun: Women of Modern Japan 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1983). 
2 Yoko Kawashima, “Female Workers: An Overview of Past and 
Current Trends,” In Japanese Women: New Feminist Perspectives on the 
Past, Present, and Future, Kumiko Fujimura-Fanselow and Atsuko 
Kameda (eds.), 271-293 (New York: The Feminist Press at the City 
University of New York, 1995). 
3 Larry S. Carney and Charlotte G O’Kelly, “Women’s Work and 
Women’s Place in the Japanese Economic Miracle,” In Women 
Workers and Global Restructuring, Kathryn Ward (ed.), 113-145 (New 
York: ILR Press, 1990). 
4 Representative examples include: Ouchi (1981), Vogel (1979). 
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reindustrialization of their country. Only recently, due to 
its post-growth demographic issues, has the Japanese 
government started to publicly welcome women in the 
labour force and to encourage them to contribute their 
skills and knowledge to help save their country from 
economic stagnation.5 
Were Japanese women ever present in the 
development of their economy throughout history? Are 
they starting to contribute only now because they are no 
longer old-fashioned and uneducated? In this literature-
based research paper, I investigate the role of Japanese 
women in the rise of their national economy from the 
end of World War II (WWII) to the 1970s. The findings 
from this study suggest that their role can be explained 
by both their direct participation in the labour force as a 
source of inexpensive labour supply and by their 
indirect role as human capital developers and consumers 
associated with their housewife identity. 
What is understood as an “Economic Miracle” is, as 
defined by Valdes, “an economy that experiences high 
rates of per capita income growth for a long, sustained 
period of time that enables it to move from being poor 
to being rich in only a few decades”.6 In the aftermath 
of WWII, Japan was considered a poor nation that 
lagged in technology, and, moreover, one whose 
economy relied solely on unskilled labour. The 
magnitude of wartime destruction both on its 
productive capacity and social well-being was extensive. 
According to data in the Hundred Year Statistics of the 
Japanese Economy 1966, Japan lost one quarter of its 
                                                          
5 Michael Auslin, “Japan’s Gamble on ‘Womenomics’,” The Wall 
Street Journal, February 26, 2015, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/michael-auslin-japans-gamble-on-
womenomics-1424998266. 
6 Benigno Valdes, “An Application of Convergence Theory to 
Japan's Post-WWII Economic “Miracle”,” Journal of Economic 
Education 3, no. 1 (2003): 61. 
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capital stock during the war.7 However, in the following 
years Japan’s economy grew so dramatically that it 
became the third largest economy in the world.8 
One explanation for this miracle is that Japan had 
the opportunity to generate a huge amount of income 
from the Korean and Vietnamese wars as well as by 
receiving a great deal of assistance from the Americans 
– motivated by a mix of their anti-communist foreign 
policy and guilt for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
bombings.9 
Additionally, some economists argue that Japan’s 
high savings rate was partially due to the 
intergenerational generosity motive – people value 
future consumption (their children) more than present 
consumption (themselves) – and that its rapid 
technological improvement was due to the 
government’s increased emphasis on human capital 
development.10 
Regardless, most scholars agree that along with 
destruction and humiliation, WWII also brought new 
information to Japanese people concerning how far 
behind they were in terms of development.11,12 This eye-
opening experience further fuelled the emergence of 
high motivation, high productivity, and hard work by 
Japanese workers. Over a period of 25 years (1948-
                                                          
7 Hundred Year Statistics of the Japanese Economy, Tokyo, Japan: 
Statistics Department of the Bank of Japan, 1966. 
8 Carney and O’Kelly, “Women’s Work and Women’s Place in the 
Japanese Economic Miracle,” 122. 
9 George Mikes, The Land of the Rising Yen (London: Andri Deutsch, 
1970). 
10 Valdes, “An Application of Convergence Theory to Japan's Post 
WWII Economic “Miracle”.” 
11 Mikes, The Land of the Rising Yen. 
12 Valdes, “An Application of Convergence Theory to Japan's Post-
WWII Economic “Miracle”.” 
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1972), Japan’s per capita income grew at an average rate 
of 8.2 percent.13 
 
Direct Role as Cheap, Flexible Labour 
 
High productivity in Japan’s labour force is often 
praised for its role in economic achievement. A low 
absenteeism rate of 1-2% and low rates of strike activity 
were the primary explanatory factors.14 Also, there is a 
great deal of equality among workers; but this is not 
extended between women and men. Brinton’s 1993 
study reveals that there was not much variation in the 
wages of Japanese blue-collar male workers who worked 
in similarly sized firms. Additionally, high productivity 
was maintained by the nature of the permanent 
employment system as there were almost no layoffs 
within a business cycle.15 Japanese life-long employment 
creates a strong sense of commitment and a shared 
community between employers and workers. The 
permanent employment system that rewards continuous 
work was gradually stabilized in Japan during the early 
postwar period.16 
There was a shortage of skilled labour when heavy 
industries were introduced in Japan. This shortage 
provoked the owners of large companies to offer firm-
specific training and a seniority-based wage system that 
would discourage inter-firm mobility.17 
As men were attracted to and absorbed by the heavy 
industry companies, temporary employment became less 
and less common among male workers.18 In many small-
                                                          
13 Ibid. 
14 Mary C. Brinton, Women and the Economic Miracle: Gender and Work 
in Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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scale companies that relied on temporary workers, 
women provided extra support in the absence of male 
employees. Yet these enterprises remained crucial to the 
economy. The growth and productivity of the 
oligopolistic firms increasingly depended on the 
maintenance of their networks of intermediate and 
small-scale suppliers, subcontractors, distributors, and 
dealers whose flexibility, dependence, and market 
vulnerability permitted large conglomerates to 
externalize their short-term risks, costs of competition, 
and structural transformation.19 In order to maintain 
lifetime employment among core male workers, large 
numbers of women were hired for peripheral temporary 
positions. Thus, the dual labour market was created.  
Around 37% of working women were employed in 
small firms and 19.3% in family enterprises.20 
Temporary employment increased more for women 
than for their male counterparts from the 1950s and 
became overwhelmingly female-dominated by the end 
of the 1960s.21  
Women also dominated part-time, or paato-taimu, 
working positions in the rapidly changing economy of 
postwar Japan. As Brinton (1993) and Gottfried and 
Hayashi-Kato (1998) further explain, the main 
difference between paato-taimu employment and full-
time employment was not in the hours – in fact the 
weekly hours of paato-taimu were almost equivalent to 
those of full-time employment – but rather the nature of 
the contracts and subsequent wages, benefits, and job 
protection. The hiring of paato-taimu female workers 
benefitted companies as they saved on wages and fringe 
                                                          
19 Carney and O’Kelly, “Women’s Work and Women’s Place in the 
Japanese Economic Miracle.” 
20 Heidi Gottfried and Nagisa Hayashi-Kato, “Gendering Work: 
Deconstructing the Narrative of the Japanese Economic Miracle,” 
Work, Employment and Society 12, no. 1 (1998). 
21 Ibid, 25-46. 
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benefits. However, the nature of the work tasks was no 
longer to “assist” full-time workers. These women were 
fully integrated into the standard assignments of work 
tasks in their firms and were employed continuously for 
years at a single firm, albeit without health insurance, 
benefits, or holiday pay.22 
The permanent employment system was irrelevant 
in the peripheral context where part-time or temporary 
workers were the norm. The job security provided by 
the permanent system was only for a portion of male 
workers, around one-third of the total workforce, in 
large corporations and government sectors.23 Only a 
slim portion of women were employed in large firms 
and most of them were administrative assistants. These 
secretariat or clerical work positions were considered as 
essentially supplemental and were mostly regarded as 
temporary positions for young women before their 
marriage.24  The women who filled these positions, 
often young new graduates, were known as “office 
flowers” and their positions were commonly projected 
as a means of enhancing one’s marriageability by 
providing a better opportunity to be found by better-
educated and higher status mates.25 
In Japanese society, women were hired for a fixed 
number of years and expected to find a husband, retire 
for marriage, and raise a family. Even though large 
numbers of women were receiving a university 
education and entering the job market, this norm was 
still persistent. Those who did not get married but had a 
few years of solid administrative experience and skills 
were captured by companies as temporary workers. 
Despite their high productivity and effort, no benefits, 
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bonuses, or advancement opportunities were given to 
them.26 
Moreover, from the corporate boardroom to the 
factory floor, Japanese work culture requires extended 
hours of work and internal after work socialization 
which only those who are free from familial 
responsibilities can fulfill. Thus, the opportunity cost for 
women to be lifetime employees was high. The age-old 
concept of ryosai kenbo, signifying “good wife and wise 
mother,” in postwar Japan meant that a good wife 
should work until marriage, quit her wage-earning job to 
raise a family, and re-enter the paid workforce as a 
temporary worker when her children had grown up.27  
This pattern was explicit in the M-shaped age 
distribution curve of women’s employment: high at ages 
between 20 and 24, lower between 25 and 34 and rising 
again from 40 to the early 50s.28 This socio-cultural 
norm laid the basis for men’s advantages and women’s 
disadvantages in the paid labour market and women’s 
predominance in the part-time and temporary 
employment market. The Japanese women’s labour 
participation model served the needs of capitalist 
production and to preserve the patriarchal gender 
contract. Their low-paid, flexible work sustained the 
employment system in which a select core of male 
workers reaped benefits at the enterprise-level.29 
Women’s dominance in some transitioning 
industries was crucial in Japan’s postwar growth. One of 
the biggest industries that employed large numbers of 
women was the textile industry. The industry is well 
known for its heavy recruitment of young female short-
term labour. Its exploitation of cheap female labour has 
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been criticized vastly in academic literature.30 During the 
late twentieth century, many young women from rural 
areas were joining the textile industry under family 
pressure for a fixed number of years. They were housed 
in dormitories, worked extensive hours in the factories, 
and were paid minimally. Many of these young women 
suffered from bad health conditions and a vast number 
of them died of tuberculosis. According to a survey in 
1910, only about forty percent of these young women 
returned home after their term.31 
This monstrous image of the textile industry 
exploiting young women changed after WWII as Japan 
entered a new era of development. Macnaughtan’s 
(2005) study of the textile industry in postwar Japan 
provides a brighter and less oppressive image of the 
industry. Although the textile industry was gradually 
declining due to the introduction of heavy industries in 
the economy, its role in the development of the early 
postwar Japanese economy remained important. The 
working conditions of the textile industry improved 
significantly as the economy was transitioning to a new 
era with rapidly growing technological advancement, 
increasing higher education for young people, and better 
labour protection as a result of unionization.32 
Young women remained the core source of labour 
supply in the textile industry, however at this time they 
were employed by their own will, motivated by their 
desire for economic independence and personal 
development. Young women, between the ages of 15-
18, supplied the major part of the labour and were 
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provided dormitory living and few hours of daily 
schooling for their growth and development.33  
Despite improved working conditions and social 
protection, there were substantial wage differentials 
between sexes in the industry. On average, female textile 
workers were earning only around 47% of male wages.34 
The wage gap was wider for older female workers as 
they were earning less than 40% of male wages.35 These 
women were in their forties or fifties re-entering the 
textile workforce after marriage and child-rearing. The 
seniority wage system was not applied uniformly in the 
textile industry as the wage decreased for older women 
while it increased for men. 
Another driving force of the wage differentials came 
from the higher wage allowance allocated to workers 
who had family dependants. In Japanese culture, as men 
were perceived as head of the household, women 
workers generally did not receive such allowances. As 
the textile industry was in decline and being 
restructured, they needed a fixed number of years of 
labour supply and the flexibility of young girls and older 
women was adequate.36 Thus, these women provided 
the backbone for the transitioning of the Japanese 
textile industry during the postwar period. 
Another field where female labour dominated was 
agriculture. Throughout Japanese history, women have 
played a crucial role in agriculture and this role was not 
diminished when the sector became less attractive 
during the industrialization period. In fact, as men 
shifted to permanent industrial and clerical jobs, women 
were left to manage the farming, which was generally 
considered an extension of their housework rather than 
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a job.37 In her ethnographic studies, Bernstein (1996) 
shows the labour participation and the workload of 
Japanese farmwomen in the 1970s. The daily activities 
of the farmwomen not only consisted of taking care of 
the household chores and the children, but of working 
in the rice paddies, hunched over for 8-9 hours a day.38  
On top of that, these women held part-time wage-
paying jobs during the slack period of the rice 
cultivation cycle. These jobs included positions in small 
textile factories and construction work. Women were 
hired for these physically demanding jobs that required 
hauling heavy boulders, shovelling, climbing down into 
trenches, and the like. Although men and women were 
working side-by-side on construction sites performing 
the same work, women were paid much less than their 
male counterparts.39 
The same wage discrimination existed in almost all 
sectors such as blue-jeans factories, tobacco production, 
and nursery care. According to a government survey in 
1973, forty percent of all farmwomen took on an 
outside wage-paying job and contributed to their 
household income.40 
These women successfully and miraculously 
performed their dual role as housewives and farm 
workers at the cost of their well-being, health, and 
leisure time. Therefore, women’s involvement in both 
the textile and agriculture sectors emphasizes their direct 
role in the economy as a source of cheap, flexible labour 
compensating for their male counterparts’ absence. 
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Indirect Role as Caretakers and Consumers 
 
Women played another important role in contributing 
to the national economy associated with their housewife 
identity: they were the core human capital developers of 
the country.  According to the technology diffusion 
theory, which assumes that more human capital allows 
for more absorption of new technologies and further 
contributes to higher productivity, Japan worked hard to 
catch up with countries highly endowed with human 
capital. The percentage of high school graduates 
entering university increased from 17.2% to 38.4% from 
the 1950s to the 1970s.41 Human Capital theory is based 
on an idea that “people are forward looking and invest 
in their education and skills for the purpose of 
maximizing long-run productivity”.42 
The Human Capital Development System in Japan 
is explained in two dimensions.43 The first dimension 
includes the social-institutional context such as 
educational institutions and the labour market. The 
second, more relevant to the purpose of this paper, is 
the structure of exchanges that occur within families. 
This dimension implies that parents, as social actors, are 
responsible for the human capital development of their 
children. 
The intersection of a poor welfare system in the 
postwar period in terms of retirement pensions and the 
deeply rooted cultural norm of intergenerational ties in 
families produced anticipation of both emotional and 
financial help for Japanese parents in their old age. 44,45 
Thus, parents had a strong incentive to invest in at least 
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one child in order to assure their own financial security 
in the future. The traditional notion under the Japanese 
family system that parents could expect to live with a 
son in their old age, along with the gender stratification 
of the workplace, caused the preference to be 
investment in sons’ human capital development rather 
than daughters’. As a result, less young women were 
encouraged to get a university education and mothers 
were appointed to an indirect role in the economy as 
nurturers of their sons. According to Brinton’s (1993) 
study, Japanese women had three times more aspiration 
for their sons’ education than for that of their 
daughters. 
Moreover, since most women were expected to take 
care of the family and the household chores, women 
were also nurturers of their husbands. The long hours 
of the Japanese work system would not have been 
possible if it was not for the women who completely 
shouldered emotional and caretaking responsibility for 
the whole family and left men free from those 
household duties. The distribution of domestic labour in 
Japanese families was highly concentrated on wives and 
barely included husbands. Therefore, women were the 
core producers of and investors in Japanese human 
capital, which is often praised as a crucial ingredient of 
the Economic Miracle.46 The importance of this indirect 
role is summarized in the words of a skilled blue-collar 
male worker: “We’re lucky because we can give up 
almost everything for our work if we have to, and our 
family still hold together. If Americans behaved this 
way, I think the U.S divorce rate would be much higher 
than it already is…”.47 
A second important indirect role played by Japanese 
women was that of consumers. Japan’s economic 
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growth was not as appealing in the daily lives of 
ordinary people as it looked in macroeconomic data. 
There was a cost associated with this great economic 
boom. As Japan entered the league of rich countries, its 
Gross National Product (GNP) continuously rose, as 
did housing and commodity prices. In the timeframe of 
these two decades, the cost of land closer to urban areas 
increased twentyfold.48 There was an increasing 
imbalance in the economy where owning a television set 
was easier than having beef for dinner.49 The food price 
was higher in Tokyo than in any other major city in the 
world.50 
As keepers of the household budget and being 
mostly in charge of shopping, women, particularly 
housewives, were outraged by the inflated price of 
commodities more than their husbands, who were 
occupied by their extended hours of work. This 
frustration incited these women to initiate movements 
and boycotts that eventually established consumerism in 
Japan.51 
The Japan Housewives Association, popularly called 
Shufuren, played a crucial role in pressuring the 
government for better management of economic 
growth and quality of life. In 1950, Shufuren initiated 
product testing for its consumer protection 
undertakings facilitated by a female professor in science, 
Takada Yuri.52 Due to criticism based on scientific 
evidence, the government was forced to establish 
consumer law for quality standards in textiles and 
correct labeling on food and clothing which, for 
example, finally made it illegal to sell a can of rabbit 
meat labelled with a picture of a cow. 
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These consumer boycott movements led by 
housewives achieved consumer protection law, a system 
for hearing consumer complaints, the creation of offices 
and laboratories focused on consumer matters, and the 
full attention to such issues by government officials.53 
Additionally, major corporations such as Toshiba, 
Shiseido, and Nihon Ham created their consumer 
divisions.54 The restraints on producers to set the price 
of their products were tightened and the policy on 
taxing imported food commodities was loosened.55 
Thus, the dedication and hard work of Japanese women 
brought better and healthier economic growth for the 
society.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Women in Japan are usually perceived as kimono-clad, 
tea-serving, compliant women who do not play any role 
in the economy. This perception grossly misrepresents 
the true image of Japanese women, who played an 
invaluable role in sustaining the great Economic Miracle 
during reindustrialization. 
They provided cheap and flexible labour, offsetting 
the high cost and rigidity of the mainstream labour 
force. They filled the spots that became less attractive to 
men yet remained crucial to the economy as managers 
of agriculture. They were the main engine of the textile 
industry and provided a smooth transition for the 
development and restructuring of Japan’s 
reindustrialization. They bolstered the working power of 
Japanese men through their role as housewives as well 
as educated and nurtured the next generation of the 
labour force as human capital developers. They were the 
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creators of the consumerism in Japan that brought 
better economic growth policies in the country. 
Therefore, the rarely mentioned and 
underappreciated role of Japanese women in the 
narratives of the “Economic Miracle” was invaluable. In 
a modern world where the voice of women is heard and 
valued more than ever but is not yet equal to that of 
men, it is crucial to acknowledge the true image of 
women in history. Especially in societies like Japan, 
where intergenerational knowledge is highly valued, the 
best way to empower young women to reach their full 
potential is to show them how their mothers, 
grandmothers, and great-grandmothers contributed to 
the best of their abilities to the development and 
amelioration of their country.  
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POST-GROWTH JAPAN 
AND ITS DOMESTIC 
POLICIES 
 
JAPON POST-GROWTH 
ET SES POLITIQUES 
DOMESTIQUES 
 
Abenomics, Succès ou Échec? 
Bernard Bernier 
 
Lorsque Shinzo Abe est devenu Premier ministre le 26 
décembre 2012, le pays était en difficulté économique. Il 
venait de connaître une autre année de croissance 
négative et la déflation, signe d’une économie en 
décroissance, qui était endémique depuis 1997, s’était 
amplifiée à la suite de la crise de la subprime aux États-
Unis. La triple catastrophe de mars 2011 s’était ajoutée à 
ce triste bilan. 
Abe a voulu redémarrer l’économie en prenant des 
mesures qui devaient redonner confiance aux Japonais, 
découragés par deux décennies de croissance nulle, 
négative, ou faible. Ces mesures, annoncées au milieu de 
2013, ont été regroupées sous l’appellation d’Abenomics 
par les analystes et journalistes. L’objectif fondamental 
de ces mesures était d’en arriver à un taux de croissance 
annuelle du PIB (produit intérieur brut) de 3%. Pour 
cela, il fallait sortir le pays de la déflation. À cette fin, il 
fallait encourager les exportations, l’investissement, la 
création d’emploi, et la consommation. Abe a défini une 
politique à trois volets, qu’il a appelé les « trois flèches »; 
une politique monétaire, une politique fiscale, et des 
changements structurels. 
 
Premier Volet: La Politique Monétaire 
 
La première mesure visait à injecter des liquidités dans 
l’économie. La Banque du Japon s’est mise à acheter des 
actions et obligations afin d’augmenter fortement la 
masse monétaire. Le gouvernement a aussi utilisé les 
fonds de retraite publics pour acheter des actions et 
obligations. Ces mesures avaient pour objectif, 
premièrement, d’augmenter le pouvoir d’achat interne, 
deuxièmement, de produire l’inflation et, troisièmement, 
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d’abaisser la valeur du yen face aux autres monnaies afin 
de rendre les exportations japonaises moins chères et 
donc de les augmenter, et ainsi de favoriser une hausse 
de la production interne. En même temps, le 
gouvernement a encouragé la Banque du Japon à 
maintenir son taux directeur à 0% afin de favoriser 
l’investissement, ce qui aurait pour effet d’augmenter 
l’emploi, donc le revenu et la consommation. 
Il s’agissait d’une politique audacieuse. En effet, 
dans la théorie économique habituelle, l’inflation est une 
conséquence de la croissance. Dans le cas des mesures 
d’Abe, l’inflation devrait servir de moyen pour générer 
la croissance. Autrement dit, la relation causale était 
inversée. Pendant plus d’un an, jusqu’à la hausse de la 
taxe de vente de 5% à 8% le 1er avril 2014, cette 
politique avait l’air d’être un succès. Le taux d’inflation 
sur une base annuelle avait dépassé 2% et le taux de 
croissance du PIB, qui était de 1,6% en 2013, avait 
même dépassé 2% au premier trimestre de 2014. Cette 
politique a aussi entrainé une baisse de la valeur du yen 
de 20% par rapport au dollar américain entre janvier 
2013 et janvier 2015. Malgré tout, les exportations 
avaient diminué en valeur, de 10% entre décembre 2012 
et décembre 2013, et de 3,5% entre décembre 2013 et 
décembre 2014. Les effets de la politique jusqu’en avril 
2014 avaient donc été mitigés, mais la croissance s’était 
néanmoins reprise. 
La croissance de 2013 et jusqu’en avril 2014 
s’explique, premièrement, par les achats des familles, en 
prévision de la hausse de la taxe de vente, 
deuxièmement, par les dépenses pour la reconstruction 
du Tôhoku, frappé par la catastrophe de mars 2011, et 
troisièmement, par les dépenses du gouvernement pour 
les infrastructures. 
Mais dès la hausse de la taxe de vente, et malgré des 
dépenses gouvernementales croissantes pour tenter 
d’atténuer les effets de cette hausse sur la 
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consommation, la croissance est redevenue négative, de 
l’ordre de -0,5% en 2014. La consommation a diminué, 
entre autres, les dépenses courantes pour la nourriture et 
les biens essentiels. Malgré tout, la croissance a repris, 
mais était plus faible que ce qui avait été initialement 
annoncé au dernier trimestre de 2014, et le 
gouvernement prévoit que cette croissance se 
poursuivra en 2015, même si ce n’est pas une certitude 
(les derniers chiffres montrent une faible croissance 
depuis janvier 2015). L’inflation a fléchi plus qu’on avait 
espéré et elle semble retomber autour de 0% (à cause de 
la forte baisse des prix du pétrole). Signe inquiétant, les 
prévisions des dépenses pour les ménages ont diminué, 
étant donné la stagnation des salaires et une baisse des 
revenus réels (-3,4% en un an) dans une période où il y a 
une hausse du prix des biens courants. 
La politique monétaire d’Abe était fondée sur le 
principe selon lequel, en injectant de la monnaie en 
grande quantité dans l’économie, la consommation 
reprendrait. En outre, le faible taux d’intérêt devait 
encourager l’investissement dans la production, ce qui 
créerait de l’emploi, donc des salaires, et enfin de la 
consommation. Mais la politique monétaire, dès la 
hausse de la taxe de vente, n’a pas eu les effets 
escomptés. 
En premier lieu, l’achat des actions et obligations à 
la Bourse par la Banque du Japon a profité surtout aux 
institutions financières, aux entreprises dans d’autres 
secteurs, et aux gens les plus riches, et très peu aux 
contribuables ordinaires. En particulier, les injections de 
fonds ont fait augmenter les cours boursiers et les 
profits, mais seulement pour les grandes entreprises, les 
entreprises de petite et de moyenne taille (PME) ayant 
une très faible hausse. Le prix des terrains dans les 
grandes villes a aussi augmenté. Autrement dit, cette 
injection de monnaie a profité à ceux qui avaient déjà de 
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la richesse. Elle a donc contribué à augmenter les 
inégalités de revenu. 
En deuxième lieu, cette accumulation de richesse a 
fortement encouragé l’épargne des entreprises, qui ont 
hésité (et pour la majorité hésitent toujours) à investir 
dans la production, malgré leurs épargnes et le faible 
taux d’intérêt, étant donné les conditions difficiles du 
marché interne de la consommation. La politique 
monétaire, au lieu de faire augmenter les revenus et 
donc la consommation, a eu plutôt pour effet, en 
absence de nouveaux investissements et donc de 
nouveaux emplois, d’abaisser le revenu moyen. Notons 
cependant une tendance positive dans le marché 
d’emploi avec la création de près d’un million d’emplois 
entre décembre 2012 et décembre 2014, mais la grande 
majorité d’entre eux étant dans des entreprises de moins 
de 30 personnes, donc avec des salaires faibles. En effet, 
si on regarde l’évolution des salaires réels, il y a une 
régression, une baisse de l’ordre de 3,5% entre 2010 et 
2014. Premier Ministre Abe a lui-même reconnu le 17 
mars 2015 que les salaires stagnaient alors que les prix 
(et il faudrait ajouter les profits) augmentaient. Mais, 
signe positif, Toyota et Nissan ont accepté le 17 mars de 
donner des hausses de salaire d’environ 1% à leurs 
employés réguliers. 
Le problème de la politique monétaire jusqu’au 
présent, c’est qu’elle a amplifié les inégalités de revenus. 
Elle n’a pas entrainé les investissements souhaitées par 
les grandes entreprises, qui ont préféré conserver leurs 
réserves ou les utiliser dans des pratiques spéculatives 
(en particulier en jouant à la bourse et en spéculant sur 
les devises et les terrains) en attendant que le marché 
reprenne, donc il n’y a pas eu d’hausse importante de 
l’emploi dans les secteurs les mieux payés (une hausse 
est prévue pour 2016 pour environ 1/3 des très grandes 
entreprises) et que des hausses de salaire faibles, malgré 
des hausses importantes de profit. L’écart entre les 
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salaires des salariés réguliers des grandes entreprises et le 
reste de la main-d’œuvre s’est amplifié. Or, si on veut 
s’en sortir durablement de la déflation, augmenter la 
consommation et, de ce fait, avoir une croissance 
positive, il faut développer des politiques qui visent 
directement à augmenter les revenus de la masse et non 
pas seulement des entreprises et des plus riches. 
Abe comptait sur les mêmes mécanismes que 
Reagan dans son « trickle down economics, » soit, avec 
l’augmentation du capital des entreprises, il y aurait une 
augmentation de l’investissement, donc du travail, donc 
des salaires. Ce qui ne s’est pas passé, ni aux États-Unis 
dans les années 1980, ni au Japon ces dernières années. 
Les entreprises, surtout les plus grandes, celles dans 
lesquelles les salaires sont les plus élevés, sont restées 
frileuses, thésaurisant leur capital et ne l’investissant pas 
dans la production. Ce faisant, elles se nuisent à elles-
mêmes, en ne distribuant pas de revenu qui pourrait 
servir à la consommation et donc à la vente de leurs 
propres produits. C’est cet aspect essentiel de la 
distribution de la richesse qui a été oublié initialement 
dans la politique d’Abe. Autrement dit, la politique 
d’Abe n’a pas encore sorti durablement le pays du cercle 
vicieux de la contraction de l’économie, bien que cela 
puisse survenir en 2015 et 2016. 
 
Deuxième Volet: La Politique Fiscale 
 
Abe avait certaines contraintes dans la mise en place 
d’une politique fiscale expansionniste. Des contraintes 
causées par la forte dette du gouvernement japonais, de 
l’ordre de plus de 200% du PIB annuel. Mais, si on 
voulait relancer l’économie, il fallait des dépenses 
gouvernementales, d’autant plus qu’il fallait reconstruire 
les régions du Tôhoku victimes de la catastrophe de 
2011. Le gouvernement a donc mis en place des 
programmes de dépenses publiques, surtout dans les 
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infrastructures, afin de les rendre plus aptes à résister 
aux catastrophes naturelles. Le mot-clé dans ces 
programmes était la « résilience » (danryokusei). De plus, 
le gouvernement prévoyait des dépenses pour la 
préparation des Jeux Olympiques à Tokyo en 2020. 
Mais, pour tenter de balancer le déficit et donc la dette, 
l’ancien gouvernement du Parti démocrate avait prévu 
une hausse de la taxe de vente de 5% à 8% pour l’avril 
2014. Cette taxe devait en plus passer à 10% en octobre 
2015. Abe a maintenu le premier volet de cette mesure, 
pensant que l’économie japonaise pourrait supporter 
cette première hausse sans nuire à la croissance, surtout 
en tenant compte des dépenses prévues pour les 
infrastructures.  
Comme on l’a vu plus haut, la hausse de la taxe de 
vente, qui a augmenté les prix de la consommation, en 
avril 2014 a eu des effets beaucoup plus négatifs que 
prévu. La croissance s’est avérée plus fragile que l’on 
prévoyait et le pays est entré de nouveau en récession. 
Devant cette situation, le gouvernement a reporté à 
2017 la hausse prévue de la taxe de vente à 10%. En 
même temps, pour tenter de sortir de la récession, le 
gouvernement a encore une fois eu recours aux 
dépenses publiques avec un programme de plus de 50 
milliards $US. Autrement dit, on est revenu à une 
politique expansionniste, après une mesure de 
retranchement (hausse de la taxe de vente), avec pour 
résultat une nouvelle hausse du déficit et donc de la 
dette brute qui s’élève à 230% du PIB. 
Mais en fait, la dette nette du gouvernement 
japonais, quand on tient compte des épargnes des 
administrations et des surplus de la caisse de sécurité 
sociale, n’est que de 145%. En outre, étant donné que la 
dette est détenue en majorité au Japon et que les taux 
d’intérêt internes sont à moins de 1% sur les bons du 
trésor et les obligations, le service de la dette dans le 
budget annuel est plus faible que dans tous les pays 
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développés, sauf le Canada. Le Japon peut donc se 
permettre une politique de dépenses publiques, mais en 
étant prudent. 
Le gouvernement a aussi prévu d’abaisser les impôts 
des entreprises à 31,6 % des revenus d’ici 2016. En 
contrepartie, le gouvernement veut que les entreprises 
utilisent l’argent ainsi économisé pour créer des emplois 
et augmenter les salaires, qui baissent depuis 2013, ce 
qui augmente la pauvreté (plus haut taux de personnes à 
revenu insuffisant selon l’OCDE), entre autres des 
familles monoparentales dont le nombre est en hausse. 
Cependant, des enquêtes auprès des entreprises 
démontrent que seulement le tiers des très grandes 
entreprises prévoient augmenter l’emploi, et qu’elles 
hésitent à augmenter les salaires, préférant redistribuer 
les profits aux actionnaires. Si cela se produit, alors la 
mesure de Abe ne donnera pas les effets escomptés, soit 
une faible augmentation des revenus et donc peu de 
hausse de la consommation. 
Notons que ces mesures font augmenter les revenus 
des entreprises, au moment où celles-ci bénéficient déjà 
d’une hausse des cours boursiers. En même temps, les 
familles subissent une hausse de leur fardeau fiscal, à 
cause la hausse de la taxe de vente, donc une diminution 
de leurs revenus. 
 
Troisième Volet: Transformations Structurelles 
 
Plusieurs transformations structurelles étaient prévues 
dans la politique de Abe, d’autres étaient suggérées par 
des analystes. Premièrement, les grandes entreprises et 
les gouvernements étrangers demandent une ouverture 
plus grande du marché japonais, en particulier pour les 
produits agricoles. Le Japon importe annuellement 
environ 60% de sa consommation totale de produits 
agricoles. L’ouverture du marché ferait augmenter cette 
proportion. Les coopératives agricoles, qui appuient en 
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majorité le Parti libéral-démocrate d’Abe, se sont 
opposées farouchement à cette ouverture. Malgré cette 
opposition, le gouvernement s’est engagé à ouvrir 
davantage le marché interne des produits agricoles. Il a 
aussi éliminé certaines prérogatives de la Fédération des 
coopératives agricoles. La libéralisation devrait aussi 
toucher les produits pharmaceutiques et les services. 
Deuxièmement, les entreprises, en plus de bénéficier 
d’une baisse des impôts, demandent un assouplissement 
des règles régissant le marché du travail. Elles veulent 
plus de latitude pour congédier des salariés en période 
de crise. Ce genre de mesure rendrait le marché de 
l’emploi plus fluide, entre autres, en diminuant le 
nombre de salariés ayant la sécurité d’emploi. 
Cependant, une telle mesure, décriée par les syndicats, 
risquerait d’abaisser les salaires et donc les revenus, ou 
bien ferait augmenter les épargnes des ménages pour 
faire face à une perte d’emploi éventuelle, nuisant ainsi à 
la consommation nécessaire pour relancer l’économie 
(les épargnes des ménages ont atteint des sommets en 
mars 2015).  
Troisièmement, un assouplissement de la politique 
d’immigration a été proposé. L’objectif de cette mesure 
est d’assurer un approvisionnement en main-d’œuvre 
pour les secteurs délaissés par les japonais, comme les 
tâches les moins qualifiées dans la construction et dans 
la production manufacturière, ou bien dans le service 
aux personnes âgées. Il s’agirait d’ouvrir les portes à un 
nombre limité d’étrangers avec des contrats de durée 
déterminée et non pas d’une immigration permanente. 
Cette politique est motivée par la baisse de la population 
au Japon, et surtout par la baisse de la proportion de la 
population active par rapport aux couches qui ne 
travaillent pas, surtout les retraités, la natalité faible 
entrainant une baisse de la proportion d’enfants. Malgré 
la récession, le Japon a un taux de chômage (sous-
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évalué) de 3,6%, ce qui fait que des emplois restent sans 
candidat.  
L’ouverture aux immigrants n’est pas facile au 
Japon, bien que des sondages récents montrent qu’un 
plus grand nombre de Japonais sont ouverts à une 
immigration accrue mais limitée. Malgré tout, il y a 
résistance, en particulier dans les milieux les plus 
conservateurs. Par exemple, une chroniqueuse du Sankei 
Shinbum a proposé des mesures semblables à l’apartheid 
en Afrique du Sud avant 1990, parce que, selon elle, il 
est impossible pour les immigrants de s’intégrer à la 
société japonaise qu’ils ne manqueraient pas de ternir.  
Il faut ajouter à cela une réforme du système de 
pension qui n’entre pas dans les mesures de relance de 
l’économie comme tel, mais qui fait partie des mesures 
mises en place par Abe. Une première réforme avait été 
adoptée en 2004, qui avait abaissé les montants payés 
aux retraités. La nouvelle réforme de 2014 abaisse 
encore ces montants. En outre, pour assurer le 
financement du système, le gouvernement a changé les 
règles de fonctionnement du fonds de pension 
gouvernemental, afin d’assurer un plus fort rendement 
des investissements. Le fonds devra diminuer fortement 
ses achats de bons du trésor, à faible rendement, et 
augmenter ses achats d’actions et d’obligations, qui sont 
moins sûres mais qui ont en général des taux de 
rendement plus élevés.  
Enfin, le Premier Ministre Abe a proposé un 
changement dans les politiques économique touchant 
les femmes. En effet, il a encouragé les entreprises à 
embaucher plus de femmes dans des postes réguliers. 
Pour ce faire, il a proposé aux entreprises de faire des 
ajustements pour augmenter la possibilité pour les 
femmes de chercher les emplois dans les grandes 
entreprises. Il s’agit d’une volte-face importante de la 
part non seulement du Premier Ministre, qui, au cours 
de son premier mandat en 2006-2007, avait demandé 
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aux femmes de rester à la maison afin d’augmenter le 
taux de natalité, mais aussi pour le Parti libéral-
démocrate. Il faut souligner que les grandes entreprises 
sont toujours réticentes à changer leurs coutumes et 
donc de faciliter l’embauche des femmes.  
Abe propose des changements dans cinq domaines; 
meilleure conciliation travail/famille, avec une 
augmentation des postes en garderie et une 
augmentation de la durée du congé parental sans perdre 
son emploi; augmentation de la participation des 
femmes au marché du travail, surtout dans les tranches 
d’âges de 25 à 40 ans, celles où les femmes quittent leur 
emploi, souvent de façon permanente; une hausse 
importante du nombre de femmes cadres supérieures; 
l’équité salariale; et la suppression de l’avantage fiscal 
pour les épouses qui restent au foyer sans travailler ou 
en ayant un revenu inférieur à l’équivalent d’environ 
$10,000 US. Il s’agit là de mesures quasi-
révolutionnaires dans le cas du Japon. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Il est trop tôt pour dire si les mesures d’Abe sont un 
succès ou un échec. Jusqu’à maintenant, ces mesures ont 
eu des effets positifs pendant environ un an, mais la 
hausse de la taxe de vente a renversé cette tendance et le 
pays est entré de nouveau en récession en 2014 avec un 
maintien de l’inflation. La croissance faible semble 
reprendre depuis octobre 2014, mais il faudra voir 
comment l‘économie évoluera en 2015 et 2016. Une 
reprise est possible, surtout si l’économie mondiale 
reprend de la force. Les pays étrangers et les organismes 
internationaux poussent le Japon à accélérer les 
réformes structurelles. 
Je ne pense pas que certaines de ces réformes aident 
le Japon à s’en sortir de la récession. Une ouverture plus 
grande du marché japonais risque de faire baisser la 
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production interne, en particulier en agriculture. Une 
plus grande flexibilité du marché du travail risque 
d’abaisser les salaires, donc le revenu et la 
consommation. Seuls des changements à la politique 
d’immigration et les mesures touchant les femmes 
pourraient avoir des résultats positifs. Dans le cas des 
immigrants, les effets ne peuvent être que limités étant 
donné le faible nombre d’immigrants prévu. Quant aux 
mesures touchant les femmes et le marché du travail, 
elles ne font que commencer à se mettre en place et 
elles font face à la résistance des grandes entreprises, 
mais si elles sont appliquées, même partiellement, elles 
devraient avoir pour effet d’augmenter le revenu moyen 
des ménages, à condition que les grandes entreprises 
changent leurs pratiques d’embauche. 
Le pronostic pour le Japon pour les prochaines 
années est mitigé. Le Japon ne peut se sortir de cette 
récession que si l’économie mondiale se rétablit. Les 
signes encourageants du côté des États-Unis vont dans 
ce sens, et si cela se produit, la croissance de la Chine 
pourrait reprendre à des taux plus élevés que ceux que 
ce pays connaît maintenant (mais vraisemblablement pas 
avant 2016). Par contre, l’Europe ne semble pas près de 
sortir du marasme. Malgré tout, une reprise limitée en 
Amérique du Nord et en Chine pourrait permettre au 
Japon d’augmenter ses exportations, qui ont baissé dans 
les dernières années. Une hausse des exportations 
permettrait d’améliorer la balance commerciale négative 
et d’augmenter la production, donc l’emploi et le 
revenu. 
À mon avis, la croissance ne peut survenir sans des 
mesures pour redistribuer la richesse, donc pour hausser 
le revenu moyen et atténuer les inégalités. Or il n’y a 
aucune mesure, sauf celles touchant les femmes, allant 
vraiment dans ce sens dans Abenomics. Sans cette 
redistribution, je ne pense pas que le pays va pouvoir 
connaitre une croissance de l’ordre de 2%, sans parler 
 
Bernier 
102 
 
de 3%, qui est l’objectif du gouvernement. Comme en 
Amérique du Nord, le taux le plus élevé auquel on peut 
s’attendre me semble plus proche de 2%. Les économies 
d’Amérique du Nord, du Japon, et de l’Europe de 
l’ouest sont des économies à maturité, pour lesquelles 
les possibilités de croissance sont limitées. La 
production industrielle diminue au profit des pays dits 
émergents, dont la Chine, et la croissance fondée sur les 
transactions financières comporte le risque de la 
création d’une bulle spéculative, comme on l’a connue 
au Japon entre 1985 et 1989 et aux États-Unis juste 
avant la crise de la subprime en 2007. Dans ce cas, une 
période de croissance fondée sur la spéculation foncière 
et boursière a été suivie d’un correctif, donc d’une 
période de récession. Au Japon, cette période dure 
toujours, malgré un faible regain entre 2003 et 2007 et 
en 2013.  
Les cours boursiers pour les grandes entreprises ont 
doublé au Japon depuis 2012, fruit de la politique 
monétaire d’Abe. Mais cette hausse est sans commune 
mesure avec la rentabilité des entreprises, qui amassent 
des profits non pas seulement à travers la vente de leurs 
produits, mais à cause de l’achat par la Banque du Japon 
des actions et obligations en bourse et à cause des 
transactions boursières. Tant que la production et les 
revenus des familles n’augmenteront pas, les dangers 
d’une nouvelle bulle spéculative sont toujours présents. 
Educational Policy in Japan 
Julian Dierkes 
 
Thanks, first of all, to the organizers, to the student 
committee, and to all the volunteers! It has been a great 
day. Very impressive organization! It is really lovely to 
see that undergraduates can put this sort of thing on as 
well. I am going to tell my graduate students how they 
need to take a page out of your book. Thanks to all of 
you in the audience. What is the phrase Air Canada 
uses? “We know you had many choices of different 
airlines today?” You chose not to go to the panel on 
Godzilla, instead you came to fiscal policy, educational 
policy, and old age care. Thank you very much! I 
suspect there are about 120 people in the other room 
but we are very happy with this turn out given the sort 
of topics that we cover here. 
Maybe I’ll start where Bernard left off, which is that 
it is a bit too early to tell on a lot of these things. When 
we talk about post-growth Japan, we know that the 
high-growth era is over. That is pretty clear and it has 
been 25 years now. But I don’t think we are entirely sure 
what the new era is. So when that day comes that I am 
benefitting from great long-term care insurance as Dr. 
Tiessen discussed, sitting there in my hospice being 
long-term cared for, I think at that point I will know 
what era we are at in Japan. But for now I don’t think 
we know. And we see a number of areas where there 
seem to be changes going on but we cannot quite tell 
whether they are going be to successes or failures. But 
there are also many areas where we see institutions that 
have been built for the high-growth era struggling with 
adjusting to a non-high-growth era. 
Education, I think, is one of the examples where we 
see lot of that. But before I get to the post-growth era, I 
will briefly talk about what education looked like in a 
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high-growth era just to give you a little bit of a 
background. Then I will talk about some specific 
challenges that I see in the educational system and how 
they are being approached. The sort of ‘traditional 
order’ goes from little kids to big kids. I am going to go 
the other way around starting with universities and then 
talking about primary and secondary education. I will 
also talk about an area where I have done lots of 
research, which is supplementary education. That is out 
of school, private, for profit, education. Then I will see 
if I can get all the way to a little bit of an outlook. 
Just as a reminder, a quick overview of what exactly 
high-growth era education looked like. I am doing this 
really quickly just as a quick overview and only touching 
on a couple of facets here. If we looked to the prewar 
era, obviously the education system in Japan was very 
much state dominated, structured around elitist 
selection into higher levels of education, and motivated 
by some notion of service to the country. The 
educational system was very much built around that.  
When we look at the postwar period, we see a 
different trend which is the massive expansion of 
education and enrolment in education. So the high-
growth era does not only mean economic high growth 
but it also means that education is growing in a huge 
way in Japan. It started in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 
all the way through. And of course it parallels what 
happened in other OECD countries like Canada or 
elsewhere, where we have seen expansion of education 
everywhere. In this period in Japan, there was a very 
strong sense that the only way to move up socially, 
whether that’s intergenerationally, so the only way for 
your kids move up, or intragenerationally, the only way 
for you yourself to move up, was through education. 
Some of that is rooted in very high inheritance 
taxes. There was virtually no inheritance of wealth in 
Japan because the taxes are so high upon death. So 
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education is the agreed-upon way towards social 
mobility. If you want to do something good for your 
kids, education is going to be that thing because that is 
the only way they are actually going to be better off.  
During this period, public institutions continued to 
dominate the education system. That is, the most 
prestigious institution at all levels were generally the 
public ones whether that was for primary school, 
secondary school, or university. It is very much a public 
education system even though, of course, there are 
private education institutions at all levels. But at least in 
the high-growth era, we saw the system dominated by 
the public institutions. These were ranked in a prestige 
hierarchy that was generally totally agreed upon. There 
was very little doubt during the high-growth era which 
institution was the most prestigious, whether talking 
about the local primary school or middle school, high 
school, or university. There was no sense of questioning 
of those hierarchies and they were very clear to 
everyone involved. 
Educational policy then kept a little bit separate 
from the educational system itself. Obviously it was 
reformed massively during the American occupation 
just after the end of the Asia Pacific war. One of the 
results of that is that cryptic formula “6-3-3-4”: 6 years 
of primary, 3 years of junior high, 3 years of high 
school, and then 4 years of university. The system was 
fairly rigidly built around the sequence of stages in 
education. There has always been, in part instilled by the 
US occupation, but there is a very strong egalitarian 
ethos to high-growth Japan’s education. Comprehensive 
high school with no tracking and no ranking other than 
at the moment of entry, but within the school the 
classroom, which may be as big as a university lecture 
for some schools, or may have been at the time at least, 
addressed the entire group and did not address 
individual students and their abilities. The real tracking, 
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if you will, and the selection occur during the movement 
from one institution to the next, whether that was from 
primary to secondary, or from secondary to tertiary 
education. That was where people were tracked and 
ranked according to some kind of meritocracy.  
If we look at the post-growth era, so roughly since 
1990, but basically saying if we look at today, here are 
some of the features that I am going to talk about 
briefly. I am going to go back to the declining number 
of students which is going to be one feature. I will look 
at the different areas of education in the different parts 
of the systems one by one to see what particular 
features are examples of the tension between high 
growth era institutions that are now operating in a post 
growth situation.  
First, if we look at universities, I will separate this 
roughly into things that are going on domestically within 
Japan and then how Japanese institutions are interacting 
with the world and with global education. First, what 
declining birth rates mean for universities is that there is 
a declining number of students. So there are fewer kids, 
which means fewer kids who are growing up to be 
young adults and potentially going into universities. 
Keeping in mind that high school completion is now 
nearly universal in Japan and some kind of tertiary 
education is not quite approaching universality, but we 
see big numbers of students going into tertiary 
education. But institutions are facing a decline in 
enrollment. I have already told you we have a strong 
hierarchy of institutions. So the lower-tier universities 
are already beginning to see situations where they are 
not getting as many applicants as they could 
accommodate. Consequently, universities are beginning 
to admit without admission criteria because they have to 
take everyone who wants to enroll. We see a real shift 
there where the selection mechanisms, at least into 
university, are disappearing to some extent.  
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The perception of higher education, which is one of 
the biggest changes to education in the post-growth era, 
is changing very much. We have already heard from Dr. 
Bernier that some of the structural transformations have 
meant precarious employment, for example. The notion 
that dominated during the high-growth era, that if you 
go to the right school, you end up in the right company, 
and that provides lifelong employment, that perception 
is gone. Those jobs still exist in smaller numbers. But 
that connection people made to study hard, go to the 
right school, and get the right job, that automatic 
transition no longer holds in people’s lives. 
This has changed the outlook on higher education 
and education generally such that people are very 
uncertain now what exactly different levels of education 
are going to buy them in terms of employment later on. 
What that means is that even if you go to the most 
prestigious and the most highly selective higher 
education institutions, you are not guaranteed a job 
anymore. So now graduates of universities that we have 
all heard of, whether public universities or private ones, 
do not necessarily find jobs anymore in the way that 
they used to in the high growth era. 
There is also, in the general concern with the end of 
high growth, a concern about the sources of growth. In 
the 1990s, for example, one of the reasons people 
thought that Japan was not growing anymore, 
particularly during the first dot com boom in the United 
States, was a lack of creativity and entrepreneurialism. 
To some extent higher education was being blamed for 
that all along and some of that continues today. There is 
a sense that what the education system broadly, but 
especially higher education, is doing is not preparing 
Japanese students for the kind of economic realities that 
they might be facing on the job later on. I emphasize 
that this is a perception of higher education not 
supplying these kinds of roles or not fulfilling these 
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kinds of role rather any kind of reality. It is mostly about 
perceptions. The reality looks slightly different in some 
of these areas.  
Of course, Japan does not quite exist in a vacuum 
anymore the way it meant to in the 1980s. These days, 
things look a little bit different. Higher education now is 
a field that is internationalizing rapidly and that holds 
for Japan just as much as for anywhere else. Take, for 
example, university rankings. University rankings for 
Japan used to be entirely meaningful domestically. No 
one ever cared in Japan whether York University existed 
or UBC (University of British Colombia) or anyone else. 
Because the only rankings that mattered were the 
Japanese rankings. 
Since roughly the 1990s, for all universities, at least 
in OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development) countries, we are now operating in a 
situation where we are looking at international rankings, 
particularly our university presidents. Those of us in the 
faculty trenches are not so concerned with the rankings, 
I don’t think, but our presidents seem to be very 
concerned as far as we can tell. And that includes 
Japanese university presidents. They are now looking at 
York as a potential competitor whereas 20 or 30 years 
ago York would never have been on the radar. So we 
certainly see internationalization in that regard. 
One of the other things we see in Japanese 
universities is what I call here (a little facetiously) the 
University of the Galapagos Islands. And that refers to 
the broader discussion in Japan of lots of innovation 
occurring in Japan. Just like in the Galapagos Islands, it 
only exists there. And that holds for the quality of 
Japanese universities. For most of us in a Canadian 
context, what makes the University of Tokyo a top 
Japanese university is fairly meaningless. It does not 
score well on the criteria that we rank universities on. 
Because its main feature is that it is difficult to get into. 
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But no Canadian students try to get in. So this is not a 
particularly meaningful criterion to anyone here. The 
University of Tokyo in a way is the University of the 
Galapagos Islands because its excellence, such as it is 
defined, is only meaningful within that context and it 
does not translate internationally. So we see some of 
this in the tertiary education sector where we really see a 
focus on the domestic market only.  
English education. It is just dreadful. It is a huge 
waste of public resources in the sense that there is so 
much money invested and there is so little result. One 
of the ways the Japanese government has tried to 
address this is the so-called privatization of the national 
universities, for example, where they have been liberated 
in term of their budget but decision-making is now 
localized within a university. We haven’t really seen 
much of a response in terms of innovations from these 
universities. It is really difficult to tell from abroad 
whether they look any different now than they did when 
they were not privatized. They pretty much looked the 
same as far as I can tell. 
One of the challenges the Japanese economy has 
seen in the past is the lack of innovation. At least that 
has been identified as a challenge. Often times people 
say that one of the things that has been going on is that 
we don’t have enough graduate students in Japan or 
enough PhDs or enough innovation at the university 
level. At the same time of course, lots of innovation 
happens in the corporate sector in Japan and it has 
always happened in the corporate sector, even during 
the high-growth era. Patents that were being filed were 
primarily filed by corporate researchers, not by 
university-based researchers. In aggregate there is 
nothing wrong with that at all. But that discussion really 
is not happening very much: what it means is that the 
research is primarily happening in the corporate sector 
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not at the universities. So we do not see much of an 
attempt to address that. 
We do see a number of programs, most recently the 
super global universities that have been designated. We 
have seen centres of excellence, global universities, they 
have all kinds of fancy names. They are generally very 
ambitious, sort of like the immigration plans we have 
already heard about (200 thousand immigrants to Japan, 
really? 300 thousand foreign students in Japan, really? 
This decade?) They are generally over ambitious and 
they are also massively underfunded, in part because the 
Japanese government is facing such fiscal constraints 
these days that even when they are trying to address the 
obvious they find themselves in situations where they 
are not able to do very well. 
Moving on to other levels of education, let us look 
at primary and secondary education. Again, declining 
student numbers are a factor. One of the impacts they 
have had, especially in rural areas now, is that schools 
are closing. So you have lots of rural areas in Japan 
where there is no more competition to enter any high 
school because there is only one high school. The whole 
notion of competitive selection as a principle that 
structured and organized Japanese education is 
disappearing to some extent. 
We see, particularly in the past 20 years, a succession 
of moral panics of education. Whether it’s bullying, or 
the so-called breakdown of classroom discipline, you 
can read the Japanese media and you would think that 
mayhem is happening in schools and kids are being 
murdered in large numbers and it turns out they are not. 
Most Japanese kids survive school. They all learn how 
to read and write in Japanese which is really kind of cool 
for those of us who have had to do that in our lives. It’s 
pretty cool that ten-year olds can do what I cannot or 
am still struggling with. There are big successes to 
Japanese education. But the public perception is one of 
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moral panic. And of decline. “Education these days is 
just not what it used to be.” There are all kinds of 
professors my age who talk a lot about that in Japan. 
But it is a series of moral panics that do not necessarily 
lead to policy change but which have led to great decline 
in the confidence and trust of educational institutions in 
Japan. Schools are looked upon quite suspiciously these 
days where education is not delivering what it is meant 
to deliver to the public. In that process, we have also 
seen a reversal of this public private hierarchy. 
Now in some areas, Tokyo is a great example of 
this, locally the private institutions at the secondary level 
are more prestigious than the public institutions in a way 
that was unthinkable 15 years ago. We also see a lot of 
tensions emerging within the system that are perhaps 
being exposed to some extent by the critical perception 
of education. One of the ones that is the most 
interesting to us, academics, is that when you look at 
primary education in Japan, it’s very creative and quite 
hands-off. Math education for example, is very much 
focused on problem solving skills where teachers really 
let kids do things on their own more or less. Something 
happens on April 1st when they enroll in grade seven 
middle school where that is all gone. Japanese education 
becomes very rigid. It turns very much towards a lecture 
style. But the pedagogy turns even more rigid in junior 
high and high school. That is one of the tensions that is 
still really not addressed, or that we are still trying to 
understand anyways. We have the free will primary 
system to some extent at least and much more rigid 
lower and upper secondary systems. 
We also see big trends these days towards 
individualization in education. This notion that teachers 
addressing a classroom of 35 kids of different abilities 
will teach them all the same things at the same pace has 
disappeared more or less in Japanese schools. That was 
one of the founding principles of postwar education 
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policy. Now parents are demanding more individual 
attention to students and schools are grappling with 
how they can supply that in a system that is not funded 
in a way to really address that necessarily. But in the 
end, the system is driven by standardized exams that do 
very little to encourage critical thinking skills. In 
educational policy meanwhile, there is a general sense of 
the failure of reforms in the past. 
Most prominently, the so-called yutori education 
which was introduced in 2002 with a reduction of 
content and the textbooks shifting towards project-
based teaching in schools was perceived as a massive 
failure by lots of people and lots of actors, I think, with 
very little evidence. But it was part of one of these 
moral panics saying “oh no, there are 20 pages less in a 
textbook, kids are not learning anything anymore.” Now 
these reforms have been superseded since 2012 by new 
textbooks that are more rigid again and focus much 
more on content in the way that they did before. 
More importantly we also see an absence of 
education politics. Note for example in Dr. Bernier’s 
presentation, we talked about structural reorganization 
of the economy. You would think that education might 
be part of that discussion. It is not. Japanese politicians 
generally do not say a whole lot about education at all. 
When they do it tends to be, something we also see in 
other areas, as backlash. When politicians become 
active, it is very conservative and tends to be backlash 
rather than anything else. 
That was a quick overview of higher education and 
primary education. I will turn briefly to supplementary 
education as a different sector in this whole system. It is 
a sector that we do not have so prominently in Canada 
so it has been interesting to me. By supplementary 
education I mean out-of-school, afternoon programs 
that supplement education. Some people call them cram 
schools. These are both exam preparation schools and 
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remedial education programs to help kids learn. Lots of, 
in fact most, Japanese children attend these kinds of 
schools. Certainly at a high school age. There are 
interesting things going on in that as you get fewer 
customers, these businesses are actually thriving. These 
are all for-profit, not public institutions. So fewer kids 
oddly means more customers. That is in part because of 
this individualization trend I have talked about. These 
cram schools used to teach classes of twenty kids and 
now do one-on-one teaching. If you think of yourself as 
an education entrepreneur, you sure can charge a lot 
more for one-on-one teaching than you can for the class 
of twenty. 
This is working out quite well as an economic model 
because these moral panics that I have mentioned keep 
the demand high for supplementary education as people 
are turning towards alternatives. Parents are willing to 
pay for anything that will help their kids move into 
different sectors. The other demographic thing has been 
happening is that operators are retiring. Cram schools 
are often run by individuals and many of them started 
predominantly in the 1970s. So they are now retiring 
and the owner operated or mom and pop cram schools 
are beginning to disappear. What that is leading to is 
corporatization. 
We see the emergence of an entire service sector in 
this stream now that is devoted to education. In that, 
you see large corporations that have tens of thousands 
of students. Publicly-listed companies are beginning to 
form lobbies to talk to the government more directly 
about these issues, are investing massive amounts in 
communications technologies for distance teaching and 
learning, and big data is just on the horizon because 
often times they give out customized apps or whatever 
it is for their students to use, which means the collection 
of data on education is just in sight. So we see a huge 
sector emerging, even more corporate in Japan than it 
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was in the past, and which is becoming very much an 
industry of its own. That is a quick run through on the 
different parts of education. It was very quick and I can 
only touch on some aspects. I just wanted to give the 
overview of the post growth area for education at least. 
In conclusion, I would say that I see parallels 
between what I have described here and what we heard 
about earlier. Whether it is in the health care sector, or 
economic policy, or elsewhere, we see this tension 
between high growth era institutions that continue to 
operate and to some extent to dominate Japan. But very 
different circumstances are demanding different kinds 
of approaches and politicians are having a very hard 
time grappling with those challenges and tensions. The 
potential for educational policy at least, is that 
educational policy in Japan remains highly centralized 
and the state is playing a very prominent role. So if at 
some point there were more of a discussion of 
educational policy and the decision were made to enact 
reforms, it would still be relatively possible in this sector 
in a way that is much more difficult for other sectors.  
There is potential, I would say, for much more 
dynamic development and perhaps the corporatization 
of supplementary education will be one factor in this 
where you could see innovation. Communications 
technology or the use of big data might actually make 
this a forerunner business in Japan in a way that does 
not exist elsewhere. 
Understanding the Ainu Identity 
Kelly Lui 
 
The concept of identity has always been intriguing – 
what distinctively distinguishes one nation from another 
or individuals within a collective? Is identity constructed 
or innate? What is the purpose of identity and is it 
static? By raising these questions, identity provides an 
essential perspective on international relations, touching 
on concepts such as citizenship, social justice, and 
community engagement as well as contributing to 
understanding individualism within a collective. 
In the case of Japan, a homogenous identity has 
emerged through the transitions of historical periods 
due to certain visible changing variables of international 
and domestic influence branding Japan as a “mono-
ethnic” population.1 It is no surprise that the kozoku 
kokka (family-state) ideology has endured amidst 
historical and political economic changes to shape 
Japan’s identity as a consanguineous community with 
the illusion of being nationalistic, including the rise of 
the nihonjinron (theories on “Japanese”). This misleading 
clarity of a uniform identity has raised many queries, 
which has brought the ambivalent and “invisible” 
minority groups into the spotlight through critiquing the 
processes of assimilation and social Darwinism. 
Despite the strong and direct impact of domestic 
internal forces, the effects of international influences, 
such as Sinocentrism from China in the Tokugawa era 
and the Allied Occupation in the Shōwa era, have acted 
as significant catalysts to the evolution and shaping of 
the “nationalistic” identity of Japan. By applying 
Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony to the 
stabilisation of Japan’s “mono-ethnicity” and 
                                                          
1 In this paper, I hold the assumption that identity is indeed 
constructed if not at least built upon. 
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acknowledging the advent of globalization as 
precipitating the abundance and accessibility of the 
sharing of knowledge, this paper aims to focus on the 
Ainu community and to explore the significance and 
nuances of the impact of the international community2 
on the progression of the Ainu identity through its 
history, suppression, and resurgence in the public 
sphere. 
 
The Nature of Identity 
 
How is identity created? And for whom is it created? 
Robert Cox argued that “theory is always for someone 
and for some purpose”.3 The same critical lens will be 
applied here to show that Japan’s identity has been 
constructed by certain individuals for the purpose of 
creating national unity (kozoku kokka). Michael Weiner 
argues that the lasting kozoku kokka adapted to 
historical changes to recreate iconic symbols as seen in 
historical and modern references in Japanese popular 
culture (e.g. manga and anime) and through institutions 
alongside intellectual and cultural exchange during the 
organization of modernization in the Meiji Period.4 
By the early 20th century, this reinvented 
“nationalism” had infiltrated all levels of society, which 
created a distinction between “self” and “others.” The 
obvious indicator of difference between the two was 
material inequality since the “lack of material 
                                                          
2 I see the international community as a community with history, 
resources, support, acknowledgement, and space accessibly 
enabling minority groups. 
3 Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond 
International Relations Theory,” Millennium – Journal of International 
Studies 10 (1981): 128, accessed: 20 December 2014, DOI: 
10.1177/03058298810100020501. 
4 Michael Weiner, “The Invention of Identity,” in Japan’s Minorities: 
The Illusion of Homogeneity, ed. Michael Weiner (New York: 
Routledge, 1997): 1. 
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development provided indisputable evidence of 
inferiority”.5 
To sustain this ideology of nationalism, the social 
sciences provided a sufficient platform for academically 
proven information justifying the organization of 
paternalistic policies and administrative processes.6 
Gramsci explains these dynamic forces by emphasizing 
that major historical developments or the emergence of 
a new ruling society are based on a change in intellectual 
or moral reform – the consciousness. Consciousness 
can be defined in two ways; either as intersubjective – 
the nature of norms preserved by social relations; or as a 
historical structure – the collective images of a specific 
social group.  There may be various collective images 
that can cause conflicts, thus institutionalization is used 
to maintain and control internal conflict. 
Historical structure is the interrelation of three 
factors: the organization of production and the causal 
social forces, forms of state, and world order. As Cox 
puts it: “changes in the organisation of production 
generate new social forces which, in turn, bring about 
changes in the structure of states; and the generalisation 
of changes in the structure of states alters the 
problematic of world order”.7 Institutionalization can be 
seen as the root of cultural hegemony in that the 
creation of these institutions is for the purpose of 
collective good for the community. However, one must 
be wary of them since “institutions are particular 
amalgams of ideas and material power which in turn 
influence the development of ideas and material 
capabilities”.8 Through understanding Gramsci, we can 
effectively analyze the growth to hegemony of the 
Japanese identity and the forces behind it. 
                                                          
5 Ibid, 8-11. 
6 Ibid, 12. 
7 Cox, “Social Forces,” 138. 
8 Ibid, 137. 
 
Lui 
118 
 
Prior to Japan’s resurged “nationalism,” 
Sinocentrism was the dominant ideology, with China as 
the foundational civilized core and all other groups as 
the “barbaric” periphery. The dominance of China 
obliged the barbarians, such as Japan, to pay tribute. 
Masazumi Maruyama discusses Japan’s application of 
the mimesis of this structure of hierarchy as an act of 
defensive definitive power for the “Other” in the way 
that Japan applied it to its relationship with the Ainu.9 
As Maruyama explains: “the criteria used in this process 
of coconstitutional identity stress physical, cultural, 
spiritual, geographical, and linguistic differences, 
denigrating the Other as not only different but 
inferior”.10 The Sinocentric ideology was later displaced 
with the introduction of Western influence, particularly 
in the situation of territorial clarification of Hokkaido 
with Russia. 
It was there that Japan adapted to acknowledge the 
Ainu as Japanese in hopes of absorption for spatial 
advantages.11 This particular situation illustrates the 
strategic fluidity of the self-preservation of identity 
when faced with unanticipated external forces whether 
they are domestic or international. 
 
The Oppression of the Ainu 
 
Before getting into the discourse on the Ainu and the 
Japanese identity, it is important to discuss the 
contextualization of Ainu history as Japanese history. 
David Howell finds himself at odds with whether or not 
the Ainu’s history is subject to that of Japan: risking 
                                                          
9 Masazumi Maruyama, “The Ainu: A Discourse on Being 
Japanese,” in The Emerging Monoculture: Assimilation and the “Model 
Minority”, ed. Eric M. Kramer (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 
91-92. 
10 Ibid, 92. 
11 Ibid, 92-93. 
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“privileging the state-nation” and “historical 
imagination” on one hand, and contributing to “a 
monolithic view of Japanese ethnic and cultural 
identity” on the other hand.12 Though an answer may 
not be directly found, Howell notes three challenges 
remaining to be resolved; (1) acceptance of Ainu 
history, (2) lack of sources, and (3) the framework of 
discussion on minority issues in Japan.13 
Are these challenges limited to domestic forces? In 
this section I argue that the influence of international 
pressure in contextualizing these challenges, as well as 
the international community, in manifestations such as 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, provide a viable transnational 
solution in overcoming these obstacles. 
Before we can begin to question who the Ainu are, 
we must first ask who the Ainu were. It is essential to 
acknowledge the origins of the Ainu as well as to take 
note of the placed territorial and existential borders of 
their community in order to understand the significance 
of its transcendence amongst the historical and political 
economic shifts of Japan. The Ainu, from the 
perspective of the wajin (Japanese people), were a 
hunter-gatherer community with distinctive cultural and 
religious traditions that inhabited the northern tip of 
Honshu, Hokkaido, and the Kuriles territory. It is 
necessary to note the external construction of the Ainu 
as having one language and one culture – in reality, the 
placement of different Ainu communities resulted in 
variable ecological and habitual adaptations as well as 
language dialects. As in reality they had ranging levels of 
mobility and modes of life, Ainu as one clump is a wajin 
                                                          
12 David L. Howell, “Is Ainu History Japanese History?” in Beyond 
Ainu Studies, eds. Mark J. Hudson, Ann-elise lewallen, and Mark K. 
Watson (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2014), 103. 
13 Ibid, 113-114. 
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misconception.14 Keeping in mind the holistic 
intelligence of the Ainu (in comparison to typically 
being identified as “unsophisticated”), “the lack of a 
notion of ownership and property, along with the 
absence of a written system of language […] proved to 
be disadvantages for the Ainu in their historical struggle 
with the encroaching Wajin”.15 
The settlement of wajin in Ainu communities began 
trade relations and eventually led to the implementation 
of the official trading posts and regulations of a market 
system. These trading posts instigated a biased 
relationship that discouraged the Ainu from trading 
freely, increased exploitation, and integrated Japanese 
norms into the Ainu community – colonialism had 
taken place. 
These trading posts were later monopolized by the 
Matsumae family, furthering dictated regulations such as 
limiting trading partners and trading rates. These 
regulations perpetuated an exclusive system exploiting 
the Ainu as a labour force rather than a partnership as 
the market became a hegemonic system.16 In response, 
the Ainu retaliated for the purpose of ending the 
monopoly, only to be defeated. The division in political 
and socio-economic standing did not allow the Ainu to 
truly challenge their oppressors until much later.17 
 
The Evolution of the Ainu Identity 
 
Centralized in a border region, the Ainu were of spatial 
significance to Japan in the context of political 
economics and international relations. International 
                                                          
14 Ibid, 89-90. 
15 Ibid, 89. 
16 Ibid, 94. 
17 Richard Siddle, “Ainu: Japan’s Indigenous People,” in Japan’s 
Indigenous Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity, ed. Michael Weiner 
(New York: Routledge, 1997), 18-24. 
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pressure provided a major push in changing Japan’s 
perspective on the Ainu and created a need to absorb 
the community for its spatial importance. Alexander 
Bukh comments that the Ainu were categorized at the 
very bottom of the “cultural hierarchy” in a trilateral 
relation with Japan and Russia.18 Changing from the 
policies of the Matsumae, the purpose behind the new 
policies implemented was to assimilate the Ainu 
community in order to assert their Japanese origins as 
much as they were resisted. As Maruyama notes: 
 
The Japanization of the Ainu included 
encouraging Buddhism by founding temples 
while prohibiting Christianity; using Japanese 
language; wearing Japanese-styled clothes; eating 
Japanese rice while prohibiting the traditional 
meat diet; changing names to Japanese style; and 
prohibiting mustaches, the Iomante, and tattoos, 
which were all essential to traditional 
assimilation policies over the Ainu.19 
 
Again, the spatial self-preservation of the Japanese 
identity due to external international pressures is 
apparent as a force behind implementing boundaries 
upon the “Other” through forces of absorption, 
assimilation, and naturalization, which could be better 
categorized as exclusion and exploitation. 
At the end of World War II and during the Allied 
Occupation, Japan found itself in a period of 
reinvention in which it was bonding modernity and 
nationalism. This placed Japan in an unusual situation 
where it struggled to balance a “love-hate” relationship 
with the Western states that pushed for liberalisation 
                                                          
18 Alexander Bukh, “Ainu Identity and Japan’s Identity: The 
Struggle for Subjectivity,” The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 28 
(2010): 36, accessed: 7 November 2014. 
19 Maruyama, “The Ainu: A Discourse on Being Japanese,” 96. 
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and modernization while attempting to transcend the 
“Western-defined inferiority” as experienced by its East-
Asian neighbours. Yumiko Iida makes the comment: 
“To embrace modernization, however, was also to 
pursue the goal implicit in the universal narrative of 
‘civilization,’ and that meant, among other things, 
accepting a lesser identity in the international political 
representational scheme as a non-Western other”.20  
Interestingly enough, despite the “achievements” of 
this period of post-war Japan in economic growth and 
liberalisation, there were prominent Japanese voices 
which discarded this new “native spirit”.21 Iida explains 
this response by arguing that Japan’s realization of its 
identity and “self” through the imposed “Western gaze” 
created a paradox: “this is nothing but the posing of 
Japan’s identity in Western terms which in turn 
establishes the centrality of the West as the universal 
point of reference”.22 Iida continues by explaining the 
struggle for Japan’s self-validation by means of 
“nationalism” in the following passage: 
 
Here, if we are to speak of ‘nationalism’ we 
should distinguish this version from varieties 
rooted in simple expressions of one’s 
attachment to the nation as a common polity 
wherein some sense of community is still intact. 
What characterized Japanese national hegemony 
at the historical juncture of the 1930s was the 
exhaustion of the links formerly capable of 
absorbing and channelling popular sentiments 
back into the national hegemony as its source of 
legitimacy. It was only in this context of the 
                                                          
20 Yumiko Iida, Rethinking Identity in Modern Japan, London: 
Routledge, 2002, 12, accessed: 20 December 2014, URL:  
www.tandfebooks.com/doi/view/10.4324/9780203996386. 
21 Ibid, 2. 
22 Ibid, 15. 
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troubled relations between knowledge 
production and the subject, on the one hand, 
and between knowledge and the historical 
world, on the other, that the emperor mythology 
could play the potent ideological role of 
transcending the historical ills generated by 
modernity in a vision of a ‘true Japan’ existing in 
an alternative time and space outside of 
modernity.23 
 
Within this context, the advent of modernization 
brought about the temporary importance of the Ainu 
community, as they were a “relic” of the past and a 
connection to the environment.24 However, not only 
were the Ainu thought to be racially barbaric, but also, 
their socio-economic inequality contributed to the 
justification of their subordination on the basis of 
existing “innate natural differences” against the 
backdrop of external pressures to become a modernized 
Japan.25 
Though they were oppressive, the main mode of 
thought among the Ainu was to remain compliant with 
the methods of modernization and assimilation since 
the impression was that it was the only way to preserve 
the Ainu community.26  
 
Ainu Identity in Modern-Day Japan 
 
At what point is an individual integrated into a 
community and to what extent does the governing body 
have to protect its citizens? The concept of citizenship 
in Japan has evolved and adjusted from its origins of 
being subjects of the state. Siddle makes the distinction 
                                                          
23 Ibid, 21-22. 
24 Bukh, “Ainu Identity and Japan’s Identity,” 37. 
25 Siddle, “Ainu: Japan’s Indigenous People,” 17. 
26 Bukh, “Ainu Identity and Japan’s Identity,” 39. 
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between citizenship (shiminken), as fake and constructed, 
and nationality (kokusei), that instigates the authentic 
“blood-connection”.27 With the support of scholars and 
academia during the Meiji Period to support the 
hegemonic ‘mono-ethnic’ culture through literature and 
other mediums, assimilation was practiced upon the 
Ainu in hopes of either terminating the culture through 
integrated education or ‘diluting’ the blood through 
intermarriage. 
It was not until after World War II and during the 
Occupation that the United States of America authored 
a new constitution and implemented a different concept 
of citizenship as seen in Article 14: “All of the people 
are equal under the law and there shall be no 
discrimination in political, economic or social relations 
because of race, creed, sex, social status or family 
origin”.28 This direct pressure due to Western influence 
and gaze received a positive response from Japanese 
communities. However, despite the establishment of 
these new freedoms, the Ainu were not included and 
continued to be victims of discrimination because the 
“essentialized notions of inferior Ainu ‘blood’ served to 
deny Ainu individuals the opportunities afforded to 
ordinary Japanese in the period of high economic 
growth”.29 
How does a minority group find support amidst 
inequality at all levels within a nation? The phenomenon 
of globalization and the development of the 
international community have proven to provide a 
platform for such groups to find resources, support, and 
acknowledgement. Contrary to the Western influences 
                                                          
27 Richard Siddle, “The Limits to Citizenship in Japan: 
Multiculturalism, Indigenous Rights and the Ainu,” Citizenship 
Studies 7 (2003): 448, accessed: 7 November 2014. DOI: 
10.1080/1362102032000134976. 
28 Ibid, 453. 
29 Ibid. 
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of modernization, the international movement to 
address the rights of indigenous groups, such as the 
formation of the United Nations Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations (UNWGIP), which called for 
the full implementation of a radical agenda of 
indigenous rights”,30 became a positive force for the 
resurgence of the Ainu community, leading them to 
fight for their right to be acknowledged as an 
indigenous community in the 1970s. It is through the 
acknowledgement of, participation in, and support from 
international forums that the Ainu found a new 
platform from which to assert their rights as an ethnic 
minority – a phenomenon which has allowed certain 
groups to provide resources and support to one 
another. 
In contrast, on the domestic front Ainu land had 
been nationalized since 1872, and the implementation of 
the Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act, which 
tried to reorganize the Ainu community from one 
heavily invested in hunting into a community of 
farmers, was passed in 1899.31 Starting in the 1930s, the 
Hokkaido Utari Association attempted to balance co-
existence with multiculturalism, however it only served 
to show the dominance and power of the state to 
provide resources and maintain control over the 
community as well as display the unequal distribution of 
resources.32 It was not until the 1970s that a generation 
of radical youths began to challenge these attempts at 
integration. 
In 1984, the Ainu New Law, which encompassed 
“key rights and guarantees to enable Ainu to gain full 
citizenship,” political participation, a self-reliance fund 
that would be handled by the Ainu themselves, “and the 
                                                          
30 Ibid, 454. 
31 Ibid, 452. 
32 Ibid, 454. 
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rights to cultural identity, in particular the use and 
revitalization of the Ainu language”,33 was adopted by 
the Utari Kyōkai. However, it was the Ainu Cultural 
Protection Act (CPA) in 1997 that expressed the 
government’s new openness to multiculturalism.34 
However, Siddle argues that policies such as the CPA 
have been targeting only the preservation of the culture, 
rather than focusing on the protection and sustainability 
of the Ainu people – working as tools of de-
politicization rather than as tools to improve the 
situation of the Ainu people.35 
As we can see, there is a constant need to remain 
critical and to question the intention and purpose of 
policy – for whom is the policy made? And for what 
purpose? Even questions as basic as these should not be 
taken for granted. 
When questioning what it means to be Ainu today, 
cultural tourism is a common theme in responses. Lisa 
Hiwasaki states that in “a study conducted in 1980, 42.6 
percent of university students living in Tokyo answered 
“tourism” to the question: “Which occupation do you 
think Ainu people are engaged [in] now?””.36,37 The 
integration of the recognized Ainu community as kanko-
ainu (Ainu in tourism) has been controversial in the 
discussion of maintaining the authenticity of the culture 
due to the implications of introducing an economic 
objective as well as the questionability of its preserving a 
culture which induces and sustains stereotypes and 
generalizations. Contrary to this thought, Hiwasaki 
                                                          
33 Ibid, 455. 
34 Ibid, 455-456. 
35 Ibid, 449. 
36 The study also showed that the same students acquired their 
knowledge of the Ainu community via the media and tourism. 
37 Lisa Hiwasaki, “Ethnic Tourism in Hokkaido and the Shaping of 
Ainu Identity,” Pacific Affairs 73 (Autumn, 2000): 402, accessed: 13 
November 2014, URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable2672026. 
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argues for the boons that tourism has brought to the 
Ainu community by listing the following five 
advantages: (1) economic stability, (2) conservation of 
culture, (3) increased awareness and accessible 
educational information, (4) “creative” responses to 
Ainu culture, and (5) political visibility. 38,39 Hiwasaki also 
elaborates on domestic information exchange through 
the medium of museums. These cultural hubs allow for 
the preservation of culture as well as increase its 
accessibility, both to waijin and to new generations of 
Ainu.40 
Despite the “preservation” and acceptance of the 
Ainu culture by these means, it is evident that Ainu 
individuals still struggle with discrimination in their very 
own country.41 During an interview with Hiwasaki, an 
Ainu shopkeeper repeated stereotypical questions asked 
to Ainu individuals: “Do you go to the mountains to 
chase bears in your free time?”; “My, your Japanese is 
very good. Where did you learn how to speak that 
well?”; “Do you pay taxes?”; “What do Ainu people 
eat?”42 
Imposed borders, both spatial and existential or 
social, as a tool of absorption, exclusion or assimilation, 
and naturalization remain implicit throughout the 
discourse. As seen in the case of ethnic tourism in 
Hokkaido, the Ainu are still given a very limited sense of 
identity in the socio-economic sphere. Mark Watson 
questions the political geography of the undocumented, 
“hidden” Ainu outside of their historical situation in 
Hokkaido.43 It illuminates the issue of why the Ainu are 
                                                          
38 Ibid, 397. 
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42 Ibid. 
43 Mark K. Watson, “Tokyo Ainu and the Urban Indigenous 
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not properly represented anywhere outside of Hokkaido 
and contextualizes two concepts; (1) “localization or 
regionalization of Ainu issues”, and (2) the plurality of 
identity dependent on local perspective.44 Moving 
beyond the placed domestic borders that create spatial, 
socio-economic, and existential barriers seems to rely on 
Japan’s ability to acknowledge the history and urban 
progression of the Ainu that extend past ethnic tourism. 
Building this domestic political placement and 
understanding of the Ainu calls for a transnational 
perspective to provide the Ainu with the resources 
needed to find acknowledgement, ideas, and support in 
solidarity independent of barriers and borders. 
 
Ainu Identity from the Ainu Perspective 
 
The questions we ask concerning the Ainu should no 
longer rely solely on how we presently understand them 
from an external viewpoint, but rather on 
acknowledging and respecting the Ainu identity through 
their narrative. This section will consequently aim to 
understand the Ainu identity from the Ainu perspective. 
Tin Tin Htun provides an alternative perspective by 
introducing the social identity theory which posits that 
individuals choose their identity within, and in response 
to, their position in a given social system. This strategic 
essentialism allows identity to be fluid as individuals 
choose from the options of varying social relations for 
any given moment and place. 
Though the struggle remains present, the theory can 
be seen in Htun’s conclusions from comparing three 
minority groups (the three groups being the Ainu, 
Buraku and Zainichi Koreans) by conducting interviews 
                                                                                                         
lewallen, and Mark K. Watson (USA: University of Hawai’i Press, 
2014), 81. 
44 Watson, “Tokyo Ainu and the Urban Indigenous Experience,” 
82. 
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with fourteen individuals. The compelling quotations 
from the interviewed individuals illustrate the impact of 
having direct agency in their experience. One Ainu 
female participant expressed it as follows: “It’s a part of 
me and it’s my root. I can’t live separately from it [being 
Ainu]. It is very important for me and I don’t want 
anyone to defile it. Well, what can I say, except that it is 
very important”.45 Another Ainu participant commented 
that “Although I [jibun]46 want to forget about it [being 
Ainu], the other people [other Ainu] didn’t let me”.47 
It is evident then that the often unresolved 
complexity of identity provides substantial rhetoric on 
existence and agency as seen here in present-day Ainu. 
Htun’s study provides understanding of the relationship 
between minority groups and the majority through the 
lens of socio-historical relations rather than political 
economics.48 By looking from this perspective, we are 
able to validate the agency and activism that is occurring 
at the individual level and in relation with the collective. 
This concept of fluidity and complexity in identity 
and self-agency is further explored in Sunazawa Kayo’s 
“As a Child of Ainu,” where she reflects upon her 
coming-of-age experience as an Ainu by recounting 
memories of her childhood, when she was raised by her 
Ainu great-grandmother, and as an active transnational 
Ainu living in Malaysia. Dealing with judgement from a 
young age, Kayo’s great-grandmother passed on wise 
and uplifting advice: 
 
                                                          
45 Tin Tin Htun, “Social Identities of Minority Others in Japan: 
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Don’t feel bitter about that person, perhaps 
there was a bad spirit near you then. Bad spirits 
test in difficult times. And these bad spirits give 
us an opportunity to think about how to 
overcome obstacles around us. A person who 
can overcome these trials will be emotionally 
charged and will gradually become stronger and 
more passionate in her life.49 
 
These words have influenced Kayo with the mindset of 
transcendence bringing about a unique personal account 
of transnationalism. Her travels abroad illustrate the 
undeniable differences between the Ainu experience and 
those of other indigenous communities; however, the 
similarities in experience and the progress of these 
communities provide hope and support. Kayo revels at 
the introduction of Māori education in schools and 
community centres: “I could see the children’s eyes light 
up and the way they absorbed the knowledge about 
their culture, language, and their right to live as Māori 
motivated me to reflect on my own situation as an Ainu 
person”.50 Contextualizing her specific experience as an 
Ainu person within the international community, Kayo 
was able to actively support the Ainu community from 
abroad by organizing workshops, holding discussions 
revolving around the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and campaigning for the 
protection of Ainu ecology.51 
Following in her great-grandmother’s footsteps, 
Kayo ends her account with motivating words for the 
next generation: 
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In the future, many enemies will appear before 
you. You may not recognize or even see them, 
but you will be frightened or anxious. Try to 
look around you because you already have many 
friends who will protect and support you. These 
friends and allies may not be near you or within 
your own homeland, but look harder because 
sometimes they are in distant lands, ever ready 
to support you. But most important, look deep 
within to find the strength to fight for 
yourselves and your people, because you must 
not forget that you are Ainu.52 
 
The invaluable significance of recognition and 
support independent of borders is indubitable, but at 
the core remains the individual and the opportunity to 
transcend those borders within. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The historical structure that provided the foundation for 
the hegemonic “mono-ethnic” identity of Japan can be 
critiqued by analyzing the intellectual and cultural 
institutions that sustain it as well as by being conscious 
of its international point-of-reference. This can be 
prominently seen in the majority of biased academic 
information produced, the terminology which is used, 
and in established institutions providing evidence for 
unity under the false pretence of social Darwinism. This 
desire to be seen as a uniform whole based on the value 
of kazoku kokka has transcended and adapted to the 
shifts in historical structure that have come about due to 
modernization. 
It is evident that international relations have 
significantly influenced the evolution of both the 
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Japanese identity and the identity of the Ainu. From the 
resurgence of Japan’s nationalism to absorption of 
territory to the pressures of modernization for 
assimilation and social Darwinism to the 
acknowledgement of indigenous status, it is more than 
clear that international relations directly impacts the 
fluidity of a nation’s identity and that of a group. 
Political economic relations were also identifiable as 
forces of influence on the Ainu and Japanese identities 
in that they drew the distinction between the useful 
productive “self” and the incompetent primitive 
“others” as well as reinventing the culture of 
nationalism. 
However, there are alternatives to viewing identity 
and its construction, which is seen in Htun’s findings, 
which utilize the social identity theory, and which is also 
visible in Kayo’s experience. By adopting relevant 
systems in which policies and administrative processes 
place a larger focus on individuals, the ability to 
acknowledge the Ainu identity and its importance within 
the Japanese identity can prove to be less daunting. It is 
important to remember that people constitute the 
foundation for any nation; this represents the continual 
challenge of individualism within collectivism and its 
significance for domestic and international relations. 
After critiquing the placement of the Ainu and the 
borders on their identity, hope seems to lie with the 
influence of the international community. 
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POP CULTURE AND 
IDENTITY: 
Anime, Angura, and Japanese Abroad 
 
LA CULTURE POPULAIRE 
ET L’IDENTITÉ: 
L’Anime, l’Angura, et les Japonais à l’Étranger 
 
The Cultural Odor of Astro Boy 
Sandra Annett 
 
Good afternoon! Today, I’d like to read you a slightly 
edited excerpt from a chapter in my book Anime Fan 
Communities: Transcultural Flows and Frictions. This chapter 
is on Tezuka Osamu’s classic 1963 anime Tetsuwan 
Atomu, better known in the West as Astro Boy. For many 
years, Astro Boy was credited in animation scholarship as 
the “origin of anime.” That’s not quite accurate: there 
were hundreds of animated films made in Japan before 
World War II and Japanese animators kept busy 
throughout the 1950s doing feature films and 
commercials for television. 
But Astro Boy was the first example of a particular 
kind of anime that we know well today: the televised 
serial, or children’s TV cartoon. Before and during 
WWII, theatrical animation in Japan and the United 
States wasn’t meant just for children: it was for general 
audiences, including adults. It was also highly 
nationalized, especially during the war, when 
propaganda films were the order of the day. But in the 
post-war period, advertisers began to see the new 
medium of television as a way to target their products 
particularly at children using cartoons. When Astro Boy 
began airing in 1963, it became part of a growing global 
media system that used animation to attract child 
audiences. Astro Boy may not have been the first anime, 
but it can be seen as a major early step in the media mix 
system that would produce global mega-hits like 
Pokémon in the late ‘90s. It did this by working through a 
discourse of globalization as “postnationalism.”  
Postnationalism, as scholar Kenichi Ohmae put it, is 
the idea that “traditional nation states have become 
unnatural, even impossible, business units in a global 
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economy”.1 Economically and culturally, national 
borders were thought to be collapsing, leading to a new 
world of “global flows” and “mediascapes” where, in 
theory, information should be able to circulate free from 
the hindrances of cultural specificity. Now in practice, 
globalization has never flowed that smoothly. The 
cultural frictions that result when anime are translated 
and fans raise a ruckus are just as important as the way 
anime flows from nation to nation. Through Astro Boy, I 
will show how Tezuka tried to make a postnational 
program that was “culturally odorless” and accessible to 
children all over the world, and ended up with a work 
that did impact children in Japan, the US, and Canada – 
but each in different ways.   
To start, let’s go back to the source: the production 
and distribution of the show. 
There have been three separate Japanese television 
versions of the Astro Boy anime; there was the 1963 and 
1966 black and white television series, there was the 
color series produced in the 1980s, and there was an 
additional series produced in the early 2000s. All three 
of them have been translated into dozens of languages 
from Arabic to Tagalog and they have aired all over the 
world. 
But today, I want to focus on the 1963 and 1980 
versions; on the English versions along with the 
Japanese. And just to make things more fun, there have 
been two separate English dubs just for the 1980 series 
alone. There was a version produced by Nippon 
Television with American voice actors that ended up 
being broadcast mostly in Australia and didn’t get to be 
shown (or didn't appear) in a lot of places in the United 
States, except for few areas. The second version was a 
separate Canadian version produced in the early ‘80s by 
                                                          
1 Kenʼichi Ōmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional 
Economies (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 5. 
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a Montréal-based distribution company called Via le 
Monde for the CBC (Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation), which was in English and French. To 
keep these versions straight, I’m going to follow fellow 
anime scholar Frederick Schodt in calling the Japanese 
version of the program “Mighty Atom,” which was 
Tezuka’s own preferred English translation of his title 
“Tetsuwan Atomu.”  I will call the American and 
Canadian versions by their official title, which is “Astro 
Boy.” Then I am going to call the Japanese-speaking 
little robot boy character “Atom” and the English-
speaking character “Astro.” That way, we will always 
know which version we are talking about at any 
moment. 
The production of Mighty Atom began when Tezuka 
saw American cartoon series like the Flintstones and the 
Jetsons that were being aired in Japan and said, “Hey! I 
can make television cartoons like that too. I can export 
these. I have all of these vastly popular manga that I can 
base my new series on and everyone will want to see 
this.” Schodt recounts that Tezuka had anticipated a 
possible sale to the United States when making the first 
pilot episode of Mighty Atom. And he wasn’t wrong to 
do so. 
The program premiered on January 1st, 1963, and by 
February of 1963, lawyers had put together a draft 
contract giving NBC Enterprises the option to 
broadcast 52 episodes of Mighty Atom in the United 
States for a minimum guarantee of around $520,000 
dollars. That was quite a bit in the ‘60s. It was localized 
by New York producer-director Fred Ladd and it was 
broadcast in the United States beginning September 7th, 
1963. So, just 8 months after its first Japanese airing, it 
was airing in the United States in English. As an anime 
fan, I think that’s a pretty good turnaround even today, 
to get a show out in less than a year. Hence, it’s easy to 
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see Astro Boy as a prime example of post-national anime, 
an anime that’s just meant to go global from the start. 
In this case though, we have to ask: “what does it 
mean to be ‘post-national’?” What is a post-national 
anime actually like? In the case of Mighty Atom, it would 
be easy to argue that post-national is just another term 
for “Americanized.” NBC Enterprises’ Jim Dodd 
explicitly noted that his company didn’t plan to 
advertise the fact that the series was being animated in 
Japan, in part due to lingering post-war animosity. And 
Schodt reports that Tezuka himself tried to make the 
show as culturally neutral as possible. He deliberately 
tried to anticipate the feelings of foreigners and to avoid 
any imagery that they might regard as too oriental or too 
exotic. This meant using English lettering in printed 
papers and on signs and exchanging Buddhist and 
Shinto imagery for Christian motifs such as churches 
and crosses. Some American censors thought Tezuka 
played it way too loose with the Christian imagery and 
they in fact cut out a lot of the churches and crosses 
that he put in because they said, “Oh no! This is 
sacrilegious.” Some episodes, in fact, were refused 
altogether. While Americans said that these were not 
suitable for children, in Japan, they had different ideas 
of what was suitable for children to watch. 
Nevertheless, Tezuka’s intention was to produce a 
global text by making it less identifiably Japanese and 
more palatable to the global audience, tacitly imaged as 
Anglophone and Christian. Tezuka described this style 
as mukokusekiteki or “denationalized,” a term that would 
become a catchword for the appeal of anime abroad in 
the post-national period. That said, I think it’s a bit of 
an oversimplification to call any incorporation of 
Western imagery into a non-Western text 
“Americanization.” That’s what scholars always go for: 
“Oh, it's all Americanization.” Well, it’s true that it’s not 
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uncommon for anime creators to aim for cultural 
neutrality by erasing Japaneseness from their works.  
Tomino Yoshiyuki, the creator of the popular 
Gundam franchise, has claimed that he purposely tried to 
avoid having ethnicity and tried to remove all cultural 
elements from his science fiction epics. Scholar Koichi 
Iwabuchi has also cited Oshii Mamoru, the director of 
the famed Ghost in the Shell films, as claiming that 
“Japanese animators and cartoonists unconsciously 
choose not to draw realistic Japanese characters if they 
wish to draw attractive characters.” This leads Iwabuchi 
to argue that cartoons are culturally odorless 
commodities or goods in which the producing countries 
bodily, racial, and ethnic characteristics are erased or 
softened. The Japanese term for this culturally neutral 
quality is mukokuseki, which is the same kind of term 
that Tezuka had used, literally meaning something or 
someone lacking any nationality or ethnicity. 
According to Iwabuchi, the desire for cultural 
odorlessness comes partly from the incorporation of 
Japanese and other non-western media products into 
the Western-dominated global distribution network. 
Thus, it can be seen as a kind of cultural 
homogenization. But at the same time, Iwabuchi 
stresses that the Japanese practice of making culturally 
odorless commodities isn’t just an imitation of 
American media homogenization. It’s not induced by 
that kind of “domination” of American media, or a uni-
directional flow of culture from the States to Japan. He 
says that it’s actually the result of de-centered and re-
centered integration of production and distribution 
industries in many nations; each different nation 
contributed something, however asymmetrically, to the 
process of making animation global. 
Iwabuchi calls this “transculturation” or uses the 
term “transnationalism” to describe Japan’s approach to 
media globalization, but in practice, it is a form of post-
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nationalism. And that’s because this new form of power 
is based on overcoming a nation-centric view of global 
cultural power and instead re-centering globalization on 
multinational corporations and regional trade units. So, 
just like Ohmae was saying, the nation isn’t really our 
business unit any longer. The nation is going to be a 
corporation or it’s going to be a text, in this case, Astro 
Boy. 
When it comes to Astro Boy, scholars like Brian Ruh 
have followed Iwabuchi in stating that Astro Boy 
supports the argument against the idea that the 
globalization of television and popular culture is 
necessarily a one-way flow from the United States to the 
rest of the world. Instead, Ruh argues that Astro Boy 
represents a new localized form of media industry. 
Looking at the show itself, it does seem like the global 
circulation of Astro Boy involved more than just 
Americanizing in the show. In practice, every time it 
was translated it picked up new cultural elements, new 
influences, or new odors depending on its path of travel.  
I’d like to compare the Canadian translation with the 
American and Japanese versions, and in that way, we 
can see how deodorization isn’t just erasing cultural 
elements but a process of negotiation, or friction, or 
even adding things that happens when producers are 
trying to make something for particular distributors who 
are concerned with audiences in a particular place. Now, 
I’m going to look at one simple incident from very early 
in the series. This is the story of the “Robot Circus.” 
The 1963 Japanese “Robot Circus” story actually 
contains references to some really contentious social 
issues of that day. In this episode, little Atom is sold by 
his disillusioned scientist trader Dr. Tenma to a circus. 
Dr. Tenma says, “I made you to replace my son but you 
can’t grow up. You’re a robot! I don’t want you 
anymore.” And he sells him into a circus (Great little 
narrative logic there!). Astro Boy is then forced to fight 
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in this robot gladiatorial arena and there are all these 
parallels with slaves in Roman times. His ownership 
papers, which Tezuka had carefully written out in 
English, declared Astro Boy to be the property of the 
circus master. But he is rescued from this state of 
slavery by Dr. Ochanomizu, following the declaration of 
a Robot Bill of Rights, which is announced on a 
television news broadcast. You can see this hand 
turning on a television and there’s the Robot Bill of 
Rights protest. A hundred thousand robots out cheering 
for their rights. An actual real, timely image of 
television, given that in August of 1963, just one month 
before Astro Boy aired in the States, television news 
broadcasts were showing the historic march on 
Washington in support of Kennedy’s Civil Rights Act. 
Therefore, audiences at that time would have been 
recognizing the parallels between the robots and 
contemporary civil rights protests. The 1963 American 
dub of this episode kept the protest scene, so Americans 
would have actually been seeing that image, but they 
took out the shot of the ownership contract that had, 
again, been written in English. And they did that 
because the director Fred Ladd had explicitly stated that 
it evoked associations with slavery and they didn’t want 
that to stay in the finished product. But without any 
tangible reference to slavery in the show, the protest of 
the robots in the American version had less resonance 
with the civil rights movement and the struggles against 
racial segregation and discrimination that Tezuka was 
trying to build in.  It kind of makes the protest more 
fantastic, just like western science fiction movies with 
robot uprisings. There’s always a robot uprising and so 
westerners are going to see that as a “science fiction 
thing” and not as a social commentary. 
We can say the American version does kind of 
deodorize the issues of racial discrimination that Tezuka 
was trying to critique originally. The 1980 colour remake 
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strays even farther from any kinds of social issues. It 
avoids any slavery or any protests. In the Japanese 
colour version, Atom is kind of tricked into signing 
away his own freedom. He joins a Disney-like circus 
instead of a gladiatorial arena and there are all these 
Fantasia-style robot hippos and mechanical flying baby 
elephants; it is very much a dig against Disney. But, 
even this apparently more benign version still had to be 
censored every time it was transported to a different 
country. 
The Canadian adaptation is kind of the blandest of 
the bland. The Japanese episode had that satirical jab at 
Disney, and it also had a subtle geopolitics of 
competition. The deceptive Circus is stated to be in 
America, Atom is described as an example of super 
advanced technology, and when Dr. Ochanomizu  
comes to free him, he says he’s “a Japanese scientist” 
(“Nihon no kagakusha”). So we know that the Japanese 
are the good guys and the Americans are commercial 
and corrupt. In the American version, they didn’t want 
that in, obviously, as it made the Americans look bad, so 
they changed the circus to be in Chicago and built a 
connection with gangsters. This meant that the circus 
people are tied in with gangsters and it’s the underside 
of American culture, but that’s okay, they can be the 
bad guys. And the renamed scientist, Dr. Elefun, is no 
longer from Japan. He just says, “In my country, we don’t 
accept this.” It’s a really awkward unnamed “my 
country.” 
Finally in the Canadian version, there’s no America, 
there’s no Chicago, and there’s no country. Japan 
becomes a city called Futuropolis. And this is where 
Astro Boy comes from: Futuropolis, a high tech global 
capital in a stateless post-national world as so many 
globalization scholars of the 1980s and 1990s forecast. 
The Canadian version also removes a lot of footage, to 
the point that the Robot Circus episode begins at what’s 
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nearly the halfway mark of the Australian-American 
broadcast. Most of the cuts involve violence. The 
Montréal producers were following stricter Canadian 
broadcast regulations. They deleted or altered even 
implied off-screen violence. For example, at one point, 
the circus master threatens Astro. You see a shadow 
falling across him and you can hear the sound of a whip 
snapping off-screen. They took out the whip as it was 
considered too violent. They took out the sound effect. 
The end result was that anything that was deemed 
potentially disturbing was cut so the program would 
flow smoothly on young Canadian’s screens without 
ruffling any feathers, either public or commercial. In 
this light, it’s easy to see Astro Boy as an example of 
post-national globalization that depends on cultural 
odorlessness. 
But when we look at adaptations of anime, it’s 
important to look not just at what’s cut out but also 
what’s added in. Heather Hendershot, who wrote a 
really good book called Saturday Morning Censors, argued 
that the use of censorship is a social process in which 
the politics of class, race, gender, violence, and other 
potentially problematic issues are deconstructed and 
reconstructed. Censorship also adds things that 
emphasize divergent understandings of texts. And in 
this way, the Canadian version of Astro Boy can be seen 
as both removing and adding cultural odors, evoking a 
different set of viewers and different physical practices, 
different bodies in the act of spectatorship. 
To illustrate how this works, I want to conclude 
with a look at Via Le Monde’s most significant addition 
to Astro Boy, which is an educational segment called 
“Geronimo’s Report.” If anyone watched this in the 
‘80s as a child you might remember “Geronimo’s 
Report.” It happened at the end of every episode and 
went something like this: “Oh, it’s you Astro,” Peabody 
says. “Hurry, Geronimo is waiting for your report.” 
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Then a computer: “Good day. I am ready to record your 
report for the archives of the institute. Make it short. 
Thank you.” Following this prompt Astro Boy recaps 
everything that happened in the episode and a narrator 
says: 
 
Have you watched carefully and listened 
carefully to Astro Boy’s report? Yes, I’m sure 
you have. Take out a pencil and piece of paper 
to write down which error, I repeat, which error 
Astro made on purpose in his report to his 
computer Geronimo in order to play with you. 
Did he make a mistake on a name? A place? A 
detail of the adventure which you’ve just seen? 
Can you remember what it was? Compare your 
answer with those of your friends and may the 
best player win.  
 
Finally, Astro Boy himself says, “And remember friends, 
our game will continue in the next episode.” 
So there’s a little game introduced, followed by the 
next episode preview. After that, Astro Boy looks 
directly at the camera and addresses the children who 
are watching the show. This kind of fourth-wall-
breaking segment lasted nearly five minutes in a 
program that only ran half an hour: five minutes’ worth 
of basically filler material recapping the episode and 
previewing the next episode. And the reason for that, 
first and foremost, was to keep the show in compliance 
with the broadcasting regulations in Canada and 
especially in the province of Québec where the French 
language version of the program was broadcast. 
While American children's broadcasting in the 1980s 
was increasingly deregulated and market-driven under 
the Reagan administration, Canadian broadcasting 
worked under a dual public-private setup. So official 
bodies like the Canadian Radio-television and 
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Telecommunications Commission, the CRTC, worked 
together with coalitions of commercial broadcasters and 
public organizations to create children’s programming 
policy. And along with codes of content regarding 
ethics, violence, and stereotyping, the CRTC and self-
regulating networks created policies that reduced or, in 
Québec, completely cut commercials during children’s 
programming. 
So, when they showed kid’s cartoons, there could 
not be any commercials. This meant that Via Le Monde 
had to take out all footage that was contrary to the 
moral and ethical standards of contemporary Canadian 
society. At the same time they had to fill up five to 
seven minutes every week that was commercials in 
Japan and the United States; they created this segment 
to fill up all that time. But in doing this, they also 
created a direct personal address to children using a 
Canadian cultural vocabulary of cooperation and 
friendship. Thus, in a subtle way, it addresses children as 
consumers. It creates a sense of playful intimacy with a 
brand new character so that kids want to own Astro Boy 
stickers, Astro Boy lunch boxes, Astro Boy pajamas, Astro 
Boy bedspreads, everything you could possibly want. But 
at the same time, the game itself isn’t a commercial. It’s 
not a pitch for Astro Boy in the same way that the 
Japanese Mighty Atom actually had Meiji Seika’s marble 
chocolate candy show up in the episode.  
Rather, “Geronimo’s Report” is designed to teach 
media literacy and to build community among children. 
After enjoying the show, they’re told to watch and listen 
carefully, to critically compare two versions of the same 
story and then to share their interpretations with a 
group of peers. “Geronimo’s Report” makes the 
practices of spectatorship visible in order to let children 
use them consciously and reflexively. It also encourages 
them to build a community of viewers by asking them 
to compare their answers with those of their friends. So 
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this community is both physical and virtual since the 
imaginary Astro Boy calls his viewers his friends and he 
seems to be watching the episode and commenting with 
them. The overall aim is participation and education. 
The ideal of the child is a creative, cooperative student 
of TV. Such pro-social messages are in keeping with the 
dominant ideology of cooperation that public-private 
coalitions of Canadian broadcasters themselves 
attempted to demonstrate. I have to say, though, that 
this prosocial attempt to promote good Canadian 
cooperation did have some unforeseen consequences in 
the area of reception. Kids were encouraged to think 
critically and talk amongst themselves and some 
children were critical of the segment. 
I surveyed hundreds of anime fans while I was 
preparing this book and the Canadian fans I spoke to 
who remembered “Geronimo’s Report” mainly 
remembered being frustrated because the little mistakes 
that he made could be really minor, and the program 
never gave the right answers. There was no way to 
prove who got it right. I remember watching the 
English CBC broadcast when I was eight or nine with a 
group of children my age and I knew that Astro Boy 
had misquoted the surface temperature of Venus. The 
episode was Atlas vs. Astro: Terror on the Comet. But my 
friends didn’t believe that I could actually remember 
that. They would say, “Well how would you know that’s 
the answer? Prove it!” And we didn’t have the internet, 
so we couldn’t just go magically replay the episode. 
There was no way to prove it. So while “Geronimo’s 
Report” was aiming to create beautiful cooperation, it 
didn’t always hit the mark. 
In another way though, our cross-talk – and this is a 
term that’s used in culture theory a lot, cross-talk or 
debates over the practice of interpretation itself – can be 
seen as the foundation for more advanced methods of 
textual exegesis found in fan readings. After all, even as 
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little kids we were being told how to detect the on-
purpose errors made in a representation of a show that 
was in itself filled with deviations from its Japanese 
source material. “Geronimo’s Report” was saying that 
once the story is broadcast, it can be edited, it can be 
retold. You have to watch and listen carefully to the 
changes. 
One of the key practices of early Western anime fan 
culture, and one of the first practices I engaged in when 
I first found out anime is from Japan, was identifying 
differences between the Japanese and American 
versions. I loved Sailor Moon. I went on the early 
Internet and found out that this female character was 
originally a man and that these two characters were 
lesbian lovers. I thought, “Wow, in Japan this show is 
completely different.” This is what fans do: they look 
for the cultural differences from within their local 
experiences of foreign animated programs. 
From our sense of their scent in Canada, we’ve 
began to look outwards for other bodies of cultures that 
seem to be missing. The act of cultural comparison is 
the beginning of a sense of global flow and friction and 
the beginning of anime fandom through the media mix. 
So today, I’ll end where I started by saying that while 
Astro Boy wasn’t the first anime, it was an important first 
step in the spread of anime and anime fan culture 
through the media of globalization. Thank you. 
Anime アニメ and Popular Culture 
© Jay Goulding 歐陽劍 
 
First of all, I want to thank everybody for being here. 
It’s been nearly 20 years actually. Last time I was at the 
Symposium was the China Symposium of 1996-97 
listening to Dashan 大山 (Mark Rowswell), a Canadian 
who is still a famous stand-up comedian in China. At 
that time, since I’m mostly a China expert (I do ancient 
China), I became very interested in anime アニメ as a 
way of studying ancient East Asian cultures. My good 
friend, Professor Vincent Shen 沈清鬆—he has 
hundreds of students taking Ancient Chinese 
philosophy with him at the University of Toronto—
wishes he could use popular culture to teach the ancient 
Far East, and wonders how I do it. I don’t have so 
many students here at York University but I have a lot 
of people who really know about anime, so this is one of 
the reasons I got involved in it. 
Some 30 years ago, I helped start the first courses at 
York that were called Popular Culture. I wanted to do a 
course on Star Trek. I didn’t get Star Trek through, 
although I suggested there were almost 100 universities 
in the United States that had courses on Star Trek and 
they said: “Well, that’s too much fun; you have to have 
something that’s educational.” My response is that you 
can have education and fun at the same time. 
Popular Culture, especially Science Fiction Popular 
Culture, became a genre that I started with a couple of 
other people, including the late Professor Ioan Davies at 
York. And what I’ve done today is hand everybody a 
copy of a paper from which we’ll refer to a few quotes. 
Miyazaki Hayao 宮崎駿 did a number of animated 
films. I’m going to talk a bit about Miyazaki and also 
Kawajiri Yoshiaki 川尻善昭, who did a movie and a 
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television series called Ninja Scroll (Jūbēi Ninpūchō 
獣兵衛忍風帖). I did a report a few years ago for the 
Japan Foundation in Tokyo. There were a plethora of 
countries that did reports. The one that was liked the 
best was Canada. 
A Japan Foundation official from Tokyo told me: 
“Well, from what you wrote, people in Japan think that 
people in Canada really know what’s going on because 
they understand anime.” And I said: “Well that’s a very 
good thing because it’s a tremendous educational tool.” 
I tend to see things with a little bit of a Chinese eye, so 
I’ve seen a lot of Japanese anime references of very old 
ancient Chinese themes that look back deeply into the 
Kojiki 古事記 (Record of Ancient Matters of 712) and 
Nihon Shoki 日本書紀 (Chronicles of Japan of 720) from 
the Nara Period 奈良時代 (710-794). So, those are 
some of the references that I have today. Here is a 
quote from my essay in Wochi Kochi 遠近 (Near and 
Far):  
 
One day in 1989, something intriguing 
happened. I was watching an episode of one of 
the most popular television series in the world, 
Star Trek: The Next Generation. I had previously 
written a book on the original series entitled 
Empire, Aliens and Conquest: A Critique of American 
Ideology in Star Trek and Other Science Fiction 
Adventures [Goulding 1985] …. In this episode, 
“Where Silence Has Lease” 闇の住人, I was 
surprised to hear the name Yamato 大和 used 
to refer to a starship, recalling the WWII 
battleship and famous anime starship in Space 
Ship Yamato (Star Blazers) 宇宙戦艦ヤマト. In 
a 1989 episode, “The Icarus Factor” 
イカルス伝説, where Riker and his father 
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engage in a contest of futuristic martial arts, 
anbojitsu 暗棒術, Japanese writing appears in the 
background on banners and on the deck of a 
battle platform in the Enterprise’s gymnasium. 
The Chinese character for “star” 星 appears on 
the mat of the battle deck. One name on the 
deck read Yuri ユリ. More discerning eyes can 
also find the name Kei ケイ (Yuri’s partner), 
Akira アキラ, Tonari no Totoro 
となりのトトロ and Urusei Yatsura 
うる星やつら. I said to myself, “this is 
amazing!” Star Trek is advertising Japanese manga 
漫画 and anime アニメ… As it worked out, Star 
Trek’s set designers [Michael Okuda] were rabid 
otaku オタク who were repaying the favour to 
anime such as Dirty Pair ダーティペア that 
utilizes Star Trek insider references. In several 
Trek episodes, various anime code words 
appeared in Japanese script. In retrospect, Star 
Trek, a leader in popular culture from the 1960’s1 
to the 1990’s, broadcast in a hundred countries, 
was obviously playing up to Japanese fans. At 
the same time, it was unconsciously introducing 
its successor, Japanese anime, which has far 
eclipsed just about everything in Canadian 
popular culture in the last decade[s]”.2 
 
Japanese anime and manga 漫画 are the most popular 
of popular cultural elements. The anime revolution began 
                                                          
1 Jay Goulding, Empire, Aliens and Conquest: A Critique of American 
Ideology in Star Trek and other Science Fiction Adventures (Toronto: 
Sisyphus Press Inc., 1985). 
2Jay Goulding, “Canada: The Soul of Japan Through Anime and 
Manga” カナダアニメとマンガで教える日本の心 (in 
Japanese), Wochi Kochi 遠近 (“Near and Far”) 13 (2006a): 27. 
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in the late 1990’s with Pokémon’s ポケモン arrival in 
North America followed by a tidal wave of anime. Just 
fifteen years ago, you would have to go to a comic or 
science fiction specialty store to find any manga at all. I 
did, at the request of the Japan Foundation for their 
Tokyo magazine Wochi Kochi (Near and Far), go around 
to a bunch of shops and asked them how much anime 
they had. Suspect Video “Toronto’s underground video 
store” would be one of the few places at one time to 
find anime. Now both manga novels and anime are found 
in all the mainstream stores. When we had the World’s 
Biggest Bookstore, they had some 1700 anime DVDs in 
stock at one time. 
What I understand from my PhD student and 
associate, Christopher Premdas, who is teaching in 
Toronto high schools, is that they have shelves and 
shelves of anime and manga now in their libraries. The 
smallest of Chapters stores might carry 350 manga titles 
and 1,000 volumes. Some of these stores are gone now. 
We still have the Silversnail. I’m sure that Hairy Tarantula 
is still going. Then there’s CyberCity Comics, Sci-Fi World 
and The Beguiling, some of which are still going, which 
carry anywhere from 500 to 2,000 manga titles.3 
In Japan, serialized manga in comic books is still the 
starting point for novice authors hoping for 
novelization, and perhaps a contract for making an 
anime movie. This sequence flows from Japan into 
Canada. What’s popular in Japan becomes popular in 
Canada. At one time in the 1990s, Canada was a leader 
in animation before MIT (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology) got into it with lots of money, so people 
would come to school to learn about animation here. 
We developed a style called ray tracing. You see this in 
movies like Ghost in the Shell (Kōkaku Kidōtai 
攻殻機動隊) (1995) and other anime of that era. It gives 
                                                          
3 Goulding, 2006a, 27-31. 
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the effect that as you’re moving forward, it allows you 
to see a proportionally shifting vanishing point behind 
you. Although few of the original Japanese comics are 
available in Canada, English edition novelized versions 
of manga are as abundant as anime movies and television 
series. 
What allows specialty stores across Canada to 
compete with gigantic chains is their ability to sell 
complete sets such as full seasons of television series or 
of manga series. Up until 2003, the Bloor Cinema (well, 
today all this has changed) used to show anime on the 
weekend. We still have YAMA (York Anime and Manga 
Association) who usually show those films weekly. Its 
name yama 山 means mountain and alludes to the manga 
fan expression yamanashi ochinashi iminashi 山無し, 
落ち無し, 意味無し (no climax, no punchline, no 
significance), and also the yamabushi 山伏 mountain 
warriors of manga and anime folklore. Likewise, the 
University of Toronto’s anime club is called UTARPA 
(U of T Anime Role Playing Association). Last year, I 
had several senior students who were actually a part of 
that. There are also lots of conventions.  
In Canada, the blockbuster films of Miyazaki Hayao, 
Princess Mononoke (Mononoke Hime 物の怪姫) (1997) and 
Spirited Away (Sen to Chihiro no Kamikakushi 
千と千尋の神隠し) (2001) are key departures for 
discussing the significance of anime, and in some cases, 
introducing Canadians to anime for the first time.4 In all 
due respect for the brilliance of Miyazaki’s work, 
Kawajiri Yashiaki’s Ninja Scroll (1993) movie and 
subsequent television series Ninja Scroll: The Series (Jūbēi 
Ninpūchō Ryūhōgyoku Hen 獣兵衛忍風帖 <龍宝玉篇>) 
                                                          
4 Jay Goulding, “Crossroads of Experience: Miyazaki Hayao’s 
Global/Local Nexus,” Asian Cinema 17, no. 2 (2006b): 114-123. 
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(2003) were the ones that really caught my students’ 
attention. 
My purpose is to get through the popular culture 
and have a step back down to the depths of things. 
Popular culture itself is a portal to the past and the 
future, to the ancient world and the world of science 
fiction, and a bridge between Eastern and Western 
civilizations. Miyazaki and Kawajiri’s work together 
represent ways of explaining the intricate relationships 
amongst Shinto 神道, Buddhism, Confucianism and 
Daoism, and certainly other philosophical overlays.5,6 
They do so to a wide audience with examples for young 
and old. 
Mononoke whisks viewers away to ancient times 
where samurai 侍 (士), peasants, artisans, merchants, 
brothel workers, demons, and gods walk the earth 
together. Spirited Away takes us to a Buddhist hell where 
Shinto gods come to replenish their spirits at a bath 
house. Ninja Scroll reveals a mythical time when the 
retainers of Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉 (1536-1598) 
scheme to resurrect the Muromachi Bakufu 室町幕府 
against a perceived corrupt Tokugawa 徳川幕府 (1600-
1868) government. Now, York often teaches Tokugawa. 
I’ve kind of fallen back into Kamakura 鎌倉幕府 
(1185-1333), shifting from Norinaga 本居宣長 (1730-
1801) to Morinaga 護良親王 (1308-1335), from 
Genroku 元禄 (1688-1704) to Gentoku 元徳 (1329-
                                                          
5 Jay Goulding, “‘Three Teachings are One’: The Ethical 
Intertwinings of Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism,” in The 
Examined Life—Chinese Perspectives: Essays on Chinese Ethical Traditions, 
ed. Xinyan Jiang (Binghamton: Global Academic Publishing, 
Binghamton University, 2002). 
6 Jay Goulding, “Beginnings: The Global Crossings of Classical 
Daoism,” in Globalization Dynamics: Psychological, Economic, 
Technological, and Cultural Intercourses, ed. Wu Kuang-ming (New 
York: Nova Science Publishers, 2012). 
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1332), and hence from Tokugawa to Kamakura—so 
that happens after a while, but both eras are so very 
popular.7 
As such, these anime stories address questions of 
ecology, peace and war, loyalty and honour, propriety, 
and righteousness that touch everyone. From Tezuka 
Osamu’s 手塚治虫 original idea for Wan Wan 
Chūshingura わんわん忠臣蔵 (1963)—Miyazaki’s first 
artistic creation as an in-betweener—to all anime 
discussed here, the five Confucian virtues jin 仁 
(benevolence), gi 義 (righteousness), rei 禮 (propriety), 
chi 智 (wisdom), and shin 信 (faith) are omnipresent. 
Anime and manga illustrate valuable lessons in 
philosophy and religion while promoting 
Japanese/Canadian inter-cultural understanding. 
I would go as far as saying that all anime have some 
reference to the loyalties and intrigues of Chūshingura 
忠臣藏 (The Treasury of Loyal Retainers): Lord Asano 
Naganori 淺野長矩 (1667-1701) and Lord Kira 
Yoshinaka 吉良義央 (1641-1703), Lord Oishi 
Kuranosuke 大石内蔵助 (1659-1703) and the 46 rōnin 
浪人, Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠 (1666-1728) and Hayashi 
Nobuatsu 林信篤 (1644-1732), bushi 武士 (the warrior) 
and bushi 節 (katsubushi 鰹節, dried Bonito fish).8 The 
fifteenth year of Genroku 元禄 generates dozens of 
volumes written about the incident at the time and 
thousands of other commentaries in the last 300 years. 
All of these characters appear time and time again 
throughout anime. One of the pioneers of Japanese 
                                                          
7 Jay Goulding, “Chūshingura’s 忠臣藏 Innovation: From Kaishaku 
介錯 (Executioner) to Kaishakugaku 解釋學 (Hermeneutics),” in 
Japanese Studies Association of Canada 2014 Conference Proceedings, ed. 
Jim Tiessen (Forthcoming 2015). 
8 Ibid. 
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popular culture, Tsurumi Shunsuke 鶴見俊輔 remarked 
to Henry D. Smith II that “if you study Chūshingura long 
enough, you would understand everything about the 
Japanese”.9 
The 1961 film Akō Rōshi 赤穂浪士 was followed in 
1964 by 21 television productions of Chūshingura in 
Japan alone. That was 50 years ago. There are dozens of 
films on Chūshingura. We (York University) often use the 
famous samurai actor Satomi Kotaro’s 里見浩太朗 
version because it has debates with the lawyers and 
scholarly advisors. Federico Marcon and Henry D. 
Smith II have written an intriguing analysis entitled “A 
Chūshingura Palimpsest: Young Motoori Norinaga Hears 
the Story of the Akō Rōnin from a Buddhist Priest” 
(2003). They suggest that the “truth” of Chūshingura is 
always shrouded in interpretation or subsequently: 
 
recast into a series of narrations that, passing 
through successive retellings in the forms of 
rumors, diaries, memoirs, moral debates, 
historical tales, oral sermons, theatrical and 
pictorial representations, novels, movies, and so 
on, become blurred with fictional imaginaries. 
This is one way of explaining what Miyazawa 
Seiichi [宮澤誠一] has described as the 
‘capacity’ of Chūshingura, which Henry Smith has 
defined as “the ability of a single story to root 
itself into the national psyche in a way that 
encompasses so many issues for so many 
audiences in so many media.”10 
                                                          
9 H. D. Smith II, “Chūshingura in the 1980s: Rethinking the story of 
the forty-Seven ronin,” in Revenge drama in European renaissance and 
Japanese theatre: From Hamlet to Madame Butterfly, ed. K. J. Wetmore Jr. 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 187. 
10 F. Marcon, & H. D. Smith II, “A Chūshingura Palimpsest: Young 
Motoori Norinaga hears the story of the Akō rōnin from a 
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When the first American occupying forces arrived in 
Japan in 1945, they frowned upon public performances 
of Chūshingura (films, puppet plays, theatre). However, 
any time you try to suppress popular culture like that, it 
becomes more popular. By 1947, the kabuki 歌舞伎 
play Kanadehon Chūshingura 仮名手本忠臣蔵 was once 
again performed. 
In the West, popular culture usually invents new 
things, new expressions, new trends, especially in 
science fiction, although it has a healthy look back to its 
past. It moves in a linear fashion. Star Trek is a good 
example. You need a timeline to figure out where you 
are at any moment.11 In the East, popular culture often 
re-invents things drawn from a richer and more diverse 
past. You never need to know where you are because all 
roads lead to yourself. 
The poet Ruan Ji 阮籍 (210-263) of the Wei-Jin 
魏晋 said: “If the sage has no house, Heaven and Earth 
will contain him; if the sage has no master Heaven and 
Earth will own him; if the sage has nothing to do, he is 
free to walk under Heaven and on the Earth”.12 This is 
not a motion of linearity but instead a ‘reversibility’ of 
time, a ‘retrograde’ temporality as the Martin Heidegger 
scholar Kuki Shūzō relates: “...each instance, each 
present is an identical moment of different times...what 
is of the past can be of the future, what is of the future 
can be of the past”.13 If you go to U of T, you can 
                                                                                                         
Buddhist priest,” Monumenta Nipponica: Studies in Japanese Culture 58, 
no. 4 (2003): 440-441. 
11 Goulding, 1985. 
12 Ruan Ji, quoted in Zhang Shi-Ying, “Heidegger and Taoism,” in 
Reading Heidegger: Commemorations, ed. John Sallis (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1992), 308. 
13 Kuki Shūzō, quoted in Jay Goulding, “Kuki Shūzō and Martin 
Heidegger: Iki (いき) and Hermeneutic Phenomenology,” in Why 
Japan Matters! vol. 2, ed. Joseph F. Kess and Helen Lansdowne 
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actually see a facsimile of an original 1632 book of 
Yagyū Munenori’s 柳生宗矩 (1571–1646), The Book of 
Family Traditions and the Art of War (Heiho ̄ kadensho 
兵法家伝書) (1982), and some of the samurai sword 
manuals from the Tokugawa era. Some of those images 
of samurai sword fighting appear in almost every anime. 
And as I’ve always maintained, you see kanji 漢字 
strings of traditional Daoist characters in these 
manuals—thus confirming subtle Daoist origins of 
Japanese Zen 禪 sword fighting styles.14 
Your mind is like silk. It takes the colour of things 
around you, so if you distract it by anything, then you’re 
going to be defeated. If you allow your mind to be 
absorbed by the void (ku 空), then you become your 
opponent’s wrists before they draw the sword.15 It’s 
easier said than done. We saw two people that were 
practicing swordplay earlier today at lunch who showed 
you how to do that. Notice that when you have these 
katana 刀 sized swords, you usually have to draw them 
from a kneeling position, unless you’re 6’7” in which 
case you can simply draw. As I describe in my essay 
“Tokugawa Traces in 21st Century Japan: Culture and 
Language in Flux”: 
 
In May of 2000, China and Canada launched a 
joint produced cartoon of Journey to the West [Xi 
                                                                                                         
(Victoria: Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives, University of Victoria, 
2005), 682. 
14 Jay Goulding, “John O’Neill’s Phenomenology: The Copper 
Rule,” In Scholarship as a Re-source of Hope: John O’Neill’s Body of Work 
Re-Joyced, ed. Mauro Buccheri and Livy Visano, (Toronto: Founders’ 
College, forthcoming 2016). 
15 Munenori Yagyū, “The Book of Family Traditions on the Art of 
War,” in The Book of Five Rings: A Classical Text on the Japanese Way of 
the Sword, original by Miyamoto Musashi, trans. Thomas Cleary, 
(Boston and London: Shambhala, 2005), 142, 146. 
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You Ji 西遊記], adventures of Tripitaka [Xuang 
Zang 玄奘] and the Monkey King [Sun Wukong 
孫悟空], which is popular amongst children on 
both sides of the Pacific. Although its 
expressions are modern, its sensibilities are 
ancient. Japan scooped this many years ago with 
Doraemon [ドラえもん] the blue cat-robot, the 
most popular manga of the last fifty years 
(Shiraishi 1997, 235). Coming “back from the 
future,” Doraemon has spawned numerous 
movies, imitating Journey to the West and Star Wars 
(McCarthy 1997, 20, 27, 76). Certainly the 
resilient Dragon Ball Z [Doragon Bōru 
ZettoドラゴンボールZ] is also modelled after 
Journey to the West (McCarthy 1997, 39).16 
 
The longstanding series (2002 to present) Naruto 
ナルト provides us with many references to Journey to 
the West. First of all, there is the sage Zhuangzi’s 莊子 
(369-286 BCE) Daoist image—the butterfly theme 
throughout. Philosopher becomes butterfly; butterfly 
becomes philosopher. Basically, you have to put a 
restraining collar on Naruto, because the nine tailed fox 
(Kitsune 狐) is captured within him—sounds similar to 
Sun Wukong 孫悟空, the Monkey King. 
After 1945, many Chinese characters which were 
forbidden in Japan emerged again in anime; so what 
happens is the forbidden elements become fashionable. 
Naruto is a very interesting series. You have the hokage 
                                                          
16 Jay Goulding, “Tokugawa Traces in 21st Century Japan: Culture 
and Language in Flux,” in Japan in the Global Age: Cultural, Historical 
and Political Issues on Asia, Environment, Households and International 
Communication, ed. Masao Nakamura, (Vancouver: The Centre for 
Japanese Research, University of British Columbia Press, 2001), 
161. 
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火影, that is the fire shadow of hidden ninja 忍者 
leaders, and they develop a ninja martial arts called 
Shadow Cloning (kage bunshin no jutsu 影分身の術). 
How a shadow shadows itself is really interesting in 
Naruto. Now obviously, Naruto plays on other ninja 
series like Ben Dunn’s manga series, Ninja High School 
and so forth. As I have illustrated: 
 
In Japanese anime, the past doubles into the 
present, a rift in time allowing the past to 
become present. The backbone of Japanese 
civilization pokes through layers of popular 
culture. Language and culture are 
phenomenologically interwoven. So, we have a 
‘corrupt picture’ (manga); how do we get the 
whole picture? The awakening of watching anime 
is suddenly being in sync with it, like Hisamatsu 
Shin’ichi’s [久松 真一] Buddhist en [縁], ‘the 
moment,’ ‘the right condition at the right 
time’… or Dōgen’s uji [有時], being-time which 
might compare to the Western idea of kairos 
[καιρός], the ‘right time’ or Walter Benjamin’s 
Jetztzeit, ‘nowtime’, the augenblick, the blink of an 
eye, an instance, the passing through historicity 
to fragments of redemption… In 1995, while 
working on his film Princess Mononoke [Mononoke 
Hime もののけ姫, 物の怪姫], Miyazaki Hayao 
promised that his anime would explore the 
“unchanging basis of humanity, by overlapping 
the current era of change as we move toward the 
twenty-first century with the confusion of the 
Muromachi era [Hence, moving toward a 
future’s past]” (quoted in McCarthy 1999, 185).17 
 
                                                          
17 Goulding 2001, 161-162. 
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You see bathhouses; you see Shinto purification 
rituals over and over again in Miyazaki. You see 
Buddhist monks. You have layers of these things that 
you can still teach by watching anime. Miyazaki was 
intrigued with the 14th to 16th Centuries, a time of war 
when forests were destroyed and iron ore was smelted 
in gigantic quantities.18 He brings Chaos Theory into 
practice19 causing cataclysmic changes through minute 
disturbances as he folds ancient time into the vortex of 
that warring period to create an arena of ghosts, goblins, 
Shinto deities, sword and sorcery:  
 
Mononoke is a ghost term popular in anime, 
referring to a pestilence wielding entity. [There 
are a hundred terms in Japanese for ghost]. It is 
as dangerous as kodama [木魂, 木靈 tree spirits, 
echo dryads] are harmless. In this film, we see 
clans of boars, apes and wolves (metaphors for 
ninja) as kami [神] trying to preserve their sacred 
forest against the onslaught of Lady Eboshi’s 
[Eboshi Gozen エボシ御前] progress and Lord 
Asano’s [Asano Naganori 淺野長矩] war. The 
latter is possibly a reference to Chūshingura. 
Miyazaki had once attempted an animation of 
the Heian period [平安時代 (794-1185)]. 
Eboshi’s medieval courtesan robes conjoined 
with a noble’s black hat [eboshi 帽子] seem to 
leave traces of that project (McCarthy 1999, 193, 
200). The Forest Spirit [Shishigami 鹿神] tries to 
prevent peaceful forms from turning demonic 
                                                          
18 Helen McCarthy, Hayao Miyazaki: Master of Japanese Animation, 
(Berkeley: Stone Bridge Press, 1999) 185. 
19 Jay Goulding, “Wu Kuang-ming and Maurice Merleau-Ponty: 
Daoism and Phenomenology,” in China-West Interculture: Toward the 
Philosophy of World Integration, ed. Jay Goulding, (New York: Global 
Scholarly Publications, 2008). 
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but we see massive transformations of mitama 
[御靈] (souls of the dead) as they battle the 
cruelty of humankind. The all precious iron 
pellet as a shintai [神体] (receptacle for kami) 
becomes an instrument of harm. Even the sly 
Buddhist monk [Jiko-bō ジコ坊], dawned in a 
bear’s skin, wants to possess it all. Recalling the 
ancient story of the Nihon Shoki (Chronicles of 
Japan), the monk is on a mission for the 
emperor who wants to capture the head of the 
Night Walker [Daidarabotchi ダイダラボッチ] 
as it transforms. The treacherous monk gets 
more than he bargains for, just as the emperor 
does in the original story (Ross 1965, 39). The 
ecological and humanist themes fold the past 
into the present throughout Princess Mononoke 
which was [and still is] the top box-office draw 
in Japanese history... (McCarthy 1999, 47).20 
 
I actually gave a talk some 15 years ago and we had lots 
of people to see the first Mononoke. Everybody sat 
spellbound until the credits rolled. 
The Tokugawa Shogunate has mostly glorified the 
ronin 浪人 from Chūshingura to the greatest swordsman 
Miyamoto Musashi’s 宮本武蔵 (1584–1645) Book of Five 
Rings (Go Rin No Sho 五輪の書) but also harbours tales 
of ninja jonin 上人, chunin 中人 and genin 下人. The ninja 
scholar Stephen Hayes explains: “The deeds of ninja-
bandit heroes such as Sasuke Sarutobi [猿飛佐助], 
Saizo Kirigakure [霧隠才蔵], and Goemon Ishikawa 
[石川五右衛門] are glamorized in the children’s tales 
of Japan, just as the stories of Robin Hood, Zorro, and 
Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid are told in the 
                                                          
20 Goulding 2001, 163. 
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West today”.21,22 Ranging from Sampei Shirato’s [白土 
三平] pay library comic of 1950’s Ninja Bugeicho 
忍者武芸帖 (Chronicles of A Ninja’s Military 
Accomplishment) to Ben Dunn’s 1990’s Ninja High School, 
the shadow warrior seems to have materialized in every 
aspect of popular culture.23,24,25 
So again, I said Ninja Scroll was one of the important 
ones for shifting into the culture of kagemusha 影武者 
(shadow warrior, political decoy). Although the 
beginnings of ninja are legendary, Jeff Yang illuminates 
the ‘shadowy’ Lin Gui 林鬼 clan of the Shang Dynasty 
商朝 (1700-1100 BCE) who were clandestine assassin 
mercenaries, later wiped out by the very Daimyo 大名 
who hired them.26 The secrets of Sunzi’s 孫子 Art of 
War (bingfa 兵法) is a possible source. Both Chinese 
martial arts and mysticism converged with the Buddhist 
monks warriors (sohei 僧兵) who resided in caves and 
forests of the Kii Peninsula 紀伊半島 in 1024. These 
were the legendary ancestors of Shugendo Yamabushi 
修験道山伏 (mountain warrior priests), sennin 仙人 
(Buddhist wizards), and gyoja 行者 (wilderness warrior-
ascetics).27 
                                                          
21 Stephen K. Hayes, The Ninja and Their Secret Fighting Art, (Tokyo: 
Charles E. Tuttle, 1990), 31. 
22 Donn F. Draeger, Ninjutsu: The Art of Invisibility, (Tokyo: Charles 
E. Tuttle, 1989), 92-122. 
23 Frederik L. Schodt, Manga! Manga! The World of Japanese Comics, 
(Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1986), 70. 
24 Frederik L. Schodt, Dreamland Japan: Writings on Modern Manga, 
(Berkeley: Stone Bridge Press, 1996), 327. 
25 Gilles Poitras, The Anime Companion: What’s Japanese in Japanese 
Animation?, (Berkeley: Stone Bridge Press, 1999), 95-96. 
26 Jeff Yang et al., Eastern Standard Time: A Guide to Asian Influence on 
American Culture: from Astro Boy to Zen Buddhism, (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 109. 
27 Hayes 1990, 18. 
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Kawajiri Yoshiaki’s Ninja Scroll is my favourite for 
teaching because people who watch it, and who have 
never seen anime before, say they feel transformed. 
Kawajiri owns one of the four original animation 
studios and still works on image boards, so he’s still 
doing things by hand, and of course it takes him a long 
time. So, there is a film apparently coming out soon 
which will be Ninja Scroll 2. Anime shares revelatory 
imagery akin to the Nara Period’s (710-794) Man’yōgana 
万葉仮名 script of the Man’yōshū 万葉集 (Collection of 
Ten Thousand Leaves), and the Chinese phoneticization of 
the Kojiki (Record of Ancient Matters), deciphered by 
Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長.28 
Ninja Scroll explores the sexual fantasy/demonic 
characteristics of Tokugawa. Names are important in 
anime because they connect ancient Chinese and 
Japanese images. Kibagami Jūbei 牙神獣兵衛 is the 
main character. Kibagami Jūbei’s family name Kibagami 
牙神 means ‘divine tusk’ or ‘divine fang.’ One of his 
opponents is a snake woman who possesses a cast off 
skin, poisoning both him and his partner/lover Kagero 
陽炎. Jūbei has three characters: Ju 獣 meaning bestial, 
Hei 兵 soldier (pronounced Bei), and Ei 衛 guard. He is 
a divine tusk, beastlike sentinel. Obviously Jūbei’s name 
plays off of the famous samurai Yagyū Jūbei Mitsuyoshi 
柳生十兵衞 三厳 (1607-1650). 
Now, this is what I’ve called a polyphonic textuality.29 
Kagero has a male register for her name that means 
literally “the scorching sun,” popularly nicknamed “heat 
haze.” She has the hitodama 人魂 or balls of fire around 
her—indicating imminent death—and fireflies that burn 
                                                          
28 Jay Goulding, “Pioneers of Globalization: Tokugawa’s Cross-
Cultural Communications,” in Japan in the Age of Globalization, ed. 
Carin Holroyd and Ken Coates, (London: Routledge, 2011). 
29 Goulding 2001, 165. 
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at night. What you see is a character whose name often 
leaks metaphorically into the context of things around, 
and into the nearby background; if you’re attentive to 
language, it is one of the ways you can look at this. 
 As a plot set against the bliss/anguish backdrop of 
the tenuous Tokugawa peace, we see Tozama Daimyo 
外様大名 employing ninja to quell uprisings in their 
territories. This is the story of Ninja Scroll. On one such 
reconnaissance mission to investigate a plague, Kagero, 
a female ninja (kunoichi くノ一) battles Tessai (鉄斎) 
one of the Eight Devils (hachinin shu八人衆) who 
emerges through the Demon Gate (Kimon 鬼門). 
Kunoichi (a secret ninja name) is composed of a stroke 
from the hiragana (ku く), a stroke from the katakana 
(noノ), and the kanji for one (ichi 一). Assembled, it is 
the Chinese character for woman (nü 女 or Japanese 
onna). The “Demon Gate Eight” (Kimon hachinin shu 
鬼門八人衆) are known as such because they come 
through the torrent of the North-East which is bad 
luck. Kagero’s coincidental joining with another 
homeless wandering ninja Jūbei ends up revealing an 
elaborate ruse by retainers of Toyotomi Hideyoshi to 
depose Tokugawa 徳川 and resurrect the Muramachi 
Bakufu, all orchestrated by the clandestine and ruthless 
Shogun of the Dark, Himuro Genma 氷室 弦馬. As I 
have previously stated: 
 
This story is a vanguard for an East Asian 
communicative body, an endless intertwining of 
visibility and invisibility, bringing cartoon 
characters to life—more real than real. None of 
the characters have a home but are united in 
life/death struggles, the very landscape 
becoming their abode, disappearing into 
shadows or in the swirl of leaves or seeing Pure 
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Land Buddhists disappear from cast off skins. 
Kagero wishes to embrace what she cannot—
the spirit of hagakure [葉隠] (Yamamoto’s [1983] 
samurai code, ‘hiding in leaves’) in her loyalty to 
her Daimyo. Kagero herself is a double edged 
sword, a beauty who cannot know physical love 
for her very touch is deadly poison. Her only 
glimpse of happiness is at the moment of her 
death: Jūbei’s antidote to his own poison is 
making love to her while she perishes. Her 
sacrifice is both her salvation and his. [These 
would otherwise be pretty testy themes for the 
Western world, as these are getting into hard-
core Tokugawa philosophy]. The characters of 
this story have no homes, no physical 
possessions, no resting spots. What holds them 
together as persons or persons between heaven 
and hell (ningen [人間] in Japanese or renjian 
[人間] in Chinese) is the duty or the obligation 
[gi 義] of their own honour.30 
 
In the 1990s, three Ninja Scroll prequels appeared: 
Ninja Resurrection, Ninja Resurrection: Jūbei’s Revenge, and 
Wrath of the Ninja. None are from Kawajiri 
unfortunately. The first two are set in the early 1600s in 
a mountain monastery fortress and during Tokugawa’s 
Christian witch hunt, so you see many religious themes. 
Set in 1581, Wrath of the Ninja explores the civil war of 
Sengoku Jidai 戦国時代 (1467-1603), when Oda 
Nobunaga 織田信長 (1534-1582) decrees a pogrom on 
ninja villages. Ayame 綾女 a kunoichi (preincarnation of 
Kagero?) joins with fellow dispossessed ninja to 
challenge the Prophecy of the Enchanted Sword. Each 
                                                          
30 Goulding 2001, 166. 
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wield magical swords which render them invisible but at 
a horrible cost. 
A doppelgänger (kagemusha 影武者) as shadow double 
to Ninja Scroll is Mamoru Oshii’s 押井守 Ghost in the 
Shell (Kōkaku Kidōtai 攻殻機動隊)—attack shell (cast-
off skin) mobile unit/team/force. This is an example of 
older Chinese characters Kōkaku 攻殻 (ghost in the 
shell) resurrected to imitate the sound of a 
contemporary word for ‘turtle shell’ or ‘carapace’ 
(kōkaku 甲殻). When it first came out, it was known as 
Bladerunner 2 because it shared a lot of imagery with 
Phillip K. Dick’s story Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep 
(1968).31 What is remarkable about this story is the 
mundaneness of the invisible through a melding of 
traditional East Asian culture, religions and philosophies 
on one hand, and the embrace of high-tech and its 
contemporary mores on the other.  
 
Again, we see the double folding of time as 
exemplified by Miyazaki. Everyone in this 
society [portrayed in Ghost in the Shell] relies on 
thermoptic camouflage to bend light in such a 
way as to render themselves invisible—a 
personal cloaking device. Ironically, the desire 
for artificial invisibility becomes useless when 
various characters realize they are already 
invisible: no identities, no memories, no 
aspirations, no desires. They are already unreal 
and hence learn to fear neither simulation nor 
personal possessions. In policing a society of 
invisibility, the cyborgs Major Kusanagi 
[草薙素子; cf. Kusanagi-no-Tsurugi 草薙の剣 
(Grass Cutting Sword) of Kojiki legend] and her 
partner Bateau [Batou バトー], search for their 
                                                          
31 Goulding forthcoming 2016. 
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own ‘ghosts,’ face their worst enemies—
themselves—and adjust to the new 
programming. The English term ‘ghost’ is used 
in the Japanese language version. Kusanagi tries 
to find her way through various forms of 
floating meditation. The arch enemy, the Puppet 
Master [Ningyō-zukai 人形使い], merges with 
Kusanagi as she discards her own physical body 
and enters the thickness of the invisible while 
looking at her true self—a childlike emptiness 
appearing through a blissful originary gaze. Even 
a surveillance society which blurs the distinction 
between visibility and invisibility is lame against 
the ancient wisdoms of Buddhist inspired 
emptiness. Against the backdrop of a 
technopolis of excess, we see crowds of Chinese 
workers carrying umbrellas and their hidden 
stowaways (hungry ghosts tucked neatly 
underneath them).32 
 
In Ghost in the Shell, you see lonely town squares where 
there are no people, town squares that you would never 
see empty in Hong Kong where the film is set. Then 
you see a path of people carrying umbrellas, 15 or 16 
people. The hungry ghosts (Japanese gaki 餓鬼 or 
Chinese e gui) hide under the umbrellas. This is a society 
where the visible disappears into the vague and the 
murky. One image, in particular explores the idea of the 
Buddhist interval (ma 間). 
Now in martial arts, what you do is use a bit of 
Daoist strategy before fighting, by placing your 
opponent in an imaginary space called ma. In Ghost in the 
Shell, a corridor surveillance camera is rewound and 
freeze-framed on the space between an automatically 
closing door, and the people who have just walked 
                                                          
32 Goulding 2001, 167. 
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through it—a space where a person with thermoptic 
camouflage might be hiding, the ma 間: 
 
As the wind rustles through her hair, Kusanagi 
thinks: ‘The net is vast and infinite.” Is she 
referring to the living internet of Ghost in the Shell 
or to Laozi’s [老子] ‘heaven’s net’ (tian wang 
[天網]): “Heaven’s net casts wide. Though its 
meshes are coarse, nothing slips through” (Lao 
Tsu 1972, Poem 73) [so you’re between heaven 
and earth, and that’s all you need]. The anime is 
replete with ghost-like images of fragmented and 
vetoed reflection through splinters of glass and 
body parts. Nothing slips through anime and 
manga. Fractal, chaotic bits of myth and legend, 
the vortex of language and culture, intertwine 
through a ‘web which has no weaver’ 
(Kaptchuk, 1983).33 
 
Fitting of Ghost in the Shell, our own human centre is 
hollow yet replete with possibilities and as Zhuangzi 
relates “hollows are made empty” (qiao wei xu 竅為虛).34 
 
Fierce wind relieved, then multitudes of hollows 
are made empty. 
Do you alone not see them waver, wavering, 
quiver, quavering? 
Tzu Yu [Yan Cheng Ziyou 顏成子游] said, 
‘Earth pipings - these, then, are multitudes of 
hollows only. 
                                                          
33 Goulding 2001, 168. 
34 Jay Goulding, “‘Visceral Manifestation’ 藏象: Chinese 
Philosophy and Western Phenomenology 現象學,” in Chinese 
Philosophy and the Trends of the 21st Century Civilization 
中国哲學和21st 世紀文明走向, ed. Fang Keli 方克立, (Beijing: 
Commercial Press Inc., 2003), 393. 
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Men’s pipings - these, then, are rows of bamboo 
tubes only. 
I venture-to-ask-about heavenly pipings.35 
                                                          
35 Wu Kuang-ming, The Butterfly as Companion: Meditations on the First 
Three Chapters of the Chuang Tzu, (Albany: SUNY, 1990), 136. 
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Marie Antoinette, Latex & Hegemony 
Akané D’Orangeville 
  
Today I will be talking about the Lolita and Angura 
communities, sub-culture communities in Tokyo. I will 
go into detail over the little things but I would just like 
to mention that I am an anthropologist so I am not 
going to focus so much on the fashion style itself and its 
symbolics. Rather, I will focus on the community as that 
was really the main focus of my research. The 
community itself, how the members operate, how they 
relate to each other, how they create bonding, and 
basically the reason why they are part of that sub-
cultural community. The community I will be talking 
about is a pretty large community that includes two 
large sub-cultures – one is the Lolita sub-culture and the 
other is Angura. Then, I will talk about the discourses, 
the stigma that they experience, and what it is to be 
Lolita or Angura. I will end speaking on the Cool Japan 
culture. 
So the two sub-cultures I have studied and will be 
talking about today: one is Lolita, the other is Angura. 
You will probably realize that these two groups seem 
very distant from each other. Lolita is very cute, very 
childish and on the other side you have Angura, which 
also includes S&M and fetishes. It is highly sexualized, it 
is very mature in terms of culture, and the image that is 
projected is very different from Lolita. But interestingly, 
that is what I expected too. When I started with the 
Lolita sub-culture, and as I discovered and learnt more 
about them, I realized that these two sub-cultures are 
really tight together within one big community. So I will 
start off with the Lolita. 
The Lolita, although the name comes from 
Nabokov’s novel Lolita, is not sexual, interestingly. The 
name Lolita refers only to the childishness of the 
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fashion style subculture but it does not refer to the 
sexualized idea we have of the girl in the novel. It is 
fairly interesting because, in my opinion, it seems very 
much sexualized as a name that they chose for 
themselves, but it is not at all. The definition of Lolita is 
individuals (usually women) whose fashion style, 
sometimes lifestyle, values, and ideas are inspired by the 
European aristocracy. The whole image is of the 
Victorian era in England and also the Rococo era in 
France. These two project different, contradicting 
images. The Victorian era is more prudish whereas the 
Rococo era has this very extravagant image. 
People make different choices in what kind of style, 
in what kind of living they want to embody, and people 
make choices between these two extremes. They also 
particularly like fictional characters such as Alice in 
Wonderland and Marie Antoinette. The variation of 
Marie Antoinette comes from Roses of Versailles, which is 
a very famous manga and anime from the 1970s. Its 
whole story is Marie Antoinette and this fictional 
character who is actually a female but acts like a male. 
The Lolita style kind of embodies that French 
aristocratic style. The style includes frills, dresses, etc. 
This really expressive way of dressing. 
The style itself started in the 1980s. It doesn’t look 
at all like the Lolita style we have today, but at the very 
beginning, they were starting to dress more 
extraordinarily, different from the normative Japanese 
feminine identity, and that slowly evolved into a 
subculture that today is much more defined. Dresses 
and outfits resemble vintage European clothes, which 
are modified to add some cuteness. The Lolita 
population started around the 1980s and mostly grew 
throughout the 1990s. And its high point was the movie 
Kamikaze Girls (2002) that was released (the novel first 
and then the movie), which is a story of a Lolita girl and 
Yankee girl, who is more of a bad girl, becoming friends 
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and going on adventures. That was kind of the peak, the 
culminating point, of the Lolita subculture and since 
then it has been declining slowly. 
They have a lot of activities in common with other 
subcultures; they include, obviously, dressing up in 
Lolita, shopping, just walking around in the Harajuku 
area or the Shinjuku district to show themselves off, and 
also gathering and meeting other Lolita people. They 
also have numerous music and dance events that take 
place in Shinjuku. And those events are in common 
with the fetish subculture. They are localized around 
Harajuku and Shinjuku. For those of you who travel a 
bit, around Tokyo you probably saw a lot of Lolita 
around the Harajuku district, especially on the bridge 
outside Harajuku station though they are not there 
anymore. 
It is interesting actually how the Lolita subcultures 
have been more and more policed by authority. The 
bridge outside Harajuku station used to be a meeting 
place, a gathering place for the Lolitas and other 
subcultural community members, but it was considered 
by authorities to be sort of threatening to the image of 
Tokyo, the ‘clean’ Tokyo. There was also the concern 
that it could turn into some kind of ‘deviant activity.’ So, 
they have basically been kicked out from the bridge and 
that is why they had to move their activities from 
Harajuku to Shinjuku. Consequently, they are much 
more active in Shinjuku nowadays. 
With that, I’d like to add that there is a law in Japan 
called Fueihô, which was written in the 1920s and 
forgotten for the longest time, which forbids dancing in 
public spaces in Japan. That is why dancehalls and 
dance classes are technically illegal. A few years ago, 
Shintaro Ishihara, the former Governor of Tokyo, 
brought it back to clean Tokyo and wanted to get rid of 
a lot of the illegal activities going on in clubs and in 
extension of that also began policing music events. So a 
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lot of events in which Lolita and Angura people take 
part were either shut down or had to be postponed for a 
few years. 
Some men do participate in Lolita subculture. I will 
talk about gender identities in a moment, but basically 
gender identities in Lolita subculture are very flexible so 
some men do dress up as Lolitas with a feminine figure 
or feminine dresses. Some men act like a butler or 
prince and dress up as a butler or prince to accompany 
girls in their activities. 
Now the Angura. Angura (アングラ) comes from 
the word “underground” (アンダーグラウンド) 
actually, which has nothing to do with the underground 
subcultures we see in England or in North America. 
They simply took the name and it is kind of a Japanese 
mistranslation of the word. They took it as meaning 
‘different.’ Angura is basically S&M, fetish, body 
modification, gothic, steam punk, cyber punk, so a 
whole cluster of little subcultures and fashion styles, and 
it is very fluid. Membership is very fluid so people from 
the Lolita group go to Angura and within Angura, 
people often experience and experiment with different 
fashion styles. 
In both subculture styles, Lolita and Angura, there 
are a lot of subculture tastes. Lolita first has Ama-loli, 
which means ‘Sweet Lolita’ and which has been growing 
in popularity since the second half of 2000. Within 
Lolita subcultures, this very sweet, very girly, very 
childish, very juvenile taste is becoming more and more 
popular. It is a very extreme expression of cuteness, 
girlyness, and childishness. On the other hand, we have 
Goth-loli, or Gothic Lolita, which is another one of the 
most popular subculture tastes. It is Lolita-style dresses 
with frills, corsets, etc., but with dark colours and 
imagery of Christianity, which often relates in the 
Japanese popular mindset to something dark and 
something deviant. There is also fake blood and 
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bandages, etc. And of course you have the Cla-loli, or 
Classic Lolita, which is the most basic form of Lolita. 
Classic means looks are more prudish, so girls who like 
classic Lolita tend to also like the Victorian era and 
English imagery. Lastly, there is the Ouji style. An ouji is 
a prince and as I mentioned the Lolita subculture is very 
flexible, so girls can dress as princes in ouji-style, or guys 
can dress as ouji to accompany Lolitas. 
And now more into the Angura subculture. The 
Angura subculture, as I said, has many different styles 
and the fashion lines between Angura tastes are not as 
clear as in Lolita. In Lolita, it is very funny and amusing 
in a way because, as I will explain later, although it is 
really a movement of resistance to normative cultural 
references, yet among themselves they are very much 
codified and very strict in how they have to define 
themselves within the subculture. They are trying to get 
out of moulding and end up moulding themselves in the 
end. However, the Angura community is different. They 
are not as strict in terms of the affiliation and style each 
member has. So one can be a gothic style as long as it 
looks dark and gloomy. It is very flexible and very free 
so they have a lot of diversity in how they express their 
style. 
The gothic genre itself is obviously not exclusive 
only to Japan. The subculture started in England in the 
1980s and the style inspiration comes from 19th century 
gothic fashion. It then developed slowly into having its 
own kind of sub-branch in Japan. The gothic Lolita is 
kind of like the bridge that unites or brings together the 
Lolita subculture and the Angura subculture. 
Another Angura style is the Shironuri. Shironuri is 
rather recent. There is basically no style associated to it 
in terms of fashion, but they paint their faces white so 
they can use them as canvases and be more elaborate 
with their decoration and make up. I have interviewed a 
few Shironuri including M, an extremely popular and 
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well-known Shironuri artist, to see if it has anything to 
do with standards of beauty of white skin and seemingly 
it does not. For them it is not about whitening their skin 
for beauty, it is really about having pure skin so they can 
draw better on it. 
There is also the fetish subgenre of Angura, which 
tends to be sexually suggestive. They have a fetish S&M 
subculture and it encompasses a lot of different styles. It 
technically refers to fetishes and sexual deviances, but in 
Japan the way they use it, it is not about the fetish itself. 
Rather, people who have these fetishes call themselves 
fetish and this is ‘their’ style. It is a bit of a versatile term 
and includes S&M and bondage. There are others, but 
those two are the most popular fetishes in the 
subculture. And obviously these are private matters so it 
should not be visible on the outside, but they tend to 
dress using accessories, goods, colours, and types of 
clothing that allude to these subcultures. 
And lastly, the Steampunk style. Steampunk, just like 
fetishes and gothic, is not exclusive to Japan but it is 
growing in popularity in Japan. Steampunk, for those 
who do not know, comes from science fiction novels 
and is basically inspired by industrial steam power 
technology. It is a post-apocalyptic style that started in 
the 1980s, partly coined by an American science fiction 
author. 
So these two subcultures, Lolita and Angura, the 
reason why I studied them together and put them 
together is because they share a common space of 
subcultural activity and a local economy which is very 
interesting. I am going to talk later about this space 
being a space of recovery for the members to resocialize 
themselves. But before that, they have a number of bars 
and cafes that are created by members of the 
community for members of the community. So the 
members work in these places, consume food there, and 
obviously they gather there. 
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These places are really central. These little cafes and 
bars in Shinjuku are central places for them to gather, 
get to know each other, and feel safer together for 
various reasons. These places also host events; music 
events, dance events, fashion events, or fetish events (in 
which Lolita girls participate as well just to watch and 
just to be present). They have numerous amounts of 
people who really want to be active. They can have an 
event to attend every week, so it is really an active 
community that has different events of different types 
week after week. 
Different elements are really significant to these 
cultures. The first one is authenticity. This is one thing 
that I have been told over and over, that being a Lolita 
or dressing as a gothic is not a costume and that it is 
really important for them. So I repeat it. Obviously 
since we don’t know these things we, and even Japanese 
people, wrongly tend to see them as a sort of cosplay. 
Lolita is often associated with cosplay but it is 
completely different. Cosplay is costume playing: people 
who dress up as their favourite anime or game or manga 
characters and go to conventions or simply take 
pictures. Lolita tends to be put in the same bracket as 
cosplay, as if Lolitas were also in costume, but a lot of 
Lolita girls specifically told me to not see their outfits as 
costumes but as their daily outfit. If they cannot wear it 
daily for work or for school, it is nonetheless their true 
self. So the clothes they are wearing represent their true 
self and on a daily basis when they have to wear their 
‘normal’ clothes, they are hiding themselves just to fit 
into Japanese society, just because they have to. 
The other element is flexible gender identity, which 
also helps in making this subcultural space a safe space. 
Members are very flexible in terms of how other 
members identify, so there is no pressure to choose one 
gender or another. If someone wants to have a flexible 
gender identity or no gender identity, that option is very 
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open to them and no one questions them. This is also 
true in terms of how one portrays their gender, such as 
dressing as the other. It is no questions asked for that as 
well. And lastly, these subcultural spaces are also very 
flexible and open for LGBT individuals. It is one of the 
rare social spaces in a very codified Japan where 
dressing, identifying, and having sexual orientation that 
is not normative is not questioned and not criticized. 
The last elements are agency and empowerment. 
Particularly women, but also some men, participating in 
these communities have clearly expressed feeling 
empowered, feeling much stronger by wearing Lolita or 
being Angura and by participating in these events. So 
this is not only about a fashion style. It is not only a 
hobby. Rather it is about them becoming stronger and 
learning to become themselves. 
The process of members of the subcultures 
becoming stronger is pretty interesting. I did fieldwork 
in Tokyo for a few months and I interviewed quite a 
few Lolita and Angura members. At first, my research 
was about the discourse that people had about them and 
their reaction to it. Japanese popular discourse about 
Lolita especially, Angura a bit less, is very harsh and very 
mean. The popular discourse simply says that Lolita girls 
are crazy, are out of their minds; a lot of them have 
mental health issues, they cut themselves, etc. It is a very 
negative, very obviously insensitive, discourse that 
Japanese people in general have about that community. 
I wanted to ask them if they had encountered this 
discourse and how they reacted to it and why they kept 
wearing their clothes. Interestingly, the more I talked to 
them, the more I realized that it did not bother them as 
much as you might expect, but that they actually reuse 
this discourse and reappropriate it for themselves as a 
new identity. 
The definition of yanderu (病んでる) is to be sick. 
They often talk about themselves as being sick, saying: 
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“I am different, so it is okay. I don’t have to be or 
respond to Japanese normative values because I’m 
yanderu. I don’t have to listen to what people have to 
say.” It is the same with Angura. The Angura is more 
known for being hentai, which means perverted, and 
they talk about themselves constantly as being hentai. 
They call themselves hentai and once again have this 
idea that “I am special and it doesn’t matter what people 
say about me.” This is a quote from one of the girls I 
interviewed who works as a hostess in a Cabaret, 
basically serving people alcohol: “I don’t understand the 
‘normal’ sensitivity we’re expected to have … We’re 
abnormal and perverted and it’s a compliment. I’m 
proud of it.” 
One thing that is interesting is that to me, the 
women, and also men, who are in the Lolita and Angura 
subcultures seem to be strong. They seem to be much 
more resilient than the common individual, which is 
actually not the case. The more I interviewed them, the 
more I realized they had actually been vulnerable once. 
They had been expelled from school, dropped out from 
school, were not working, had quit work, were having 
issues with their family, having mental health issues, or 
simply having socializing issues. Most of them had been 
going through difficult times in their lives and had 
chosen to pick Lolita as a way to cope with it. As well, 
wearing Lolita clothes is exposing themselves. It makes 
them even more vulnerable, but to them there is this 
kind of opposite reaction so when they make 
themselves even more vulnerable, it in turn empowers 
them to make them stronger individuals. 
To them it is a resistance. It is a resistance visually 
because obviously they are very outstanding. We see 
them, we can recognize them from afar. It is a resistance 
visually, but also culturally and socially, because they 
know they are drop outs, they know they are not the 
normative common Japanese person, but they are okay 
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with it. They learned to be okay with it, and that is 
because of the dress itself. 
They are also extremely critical of Japanese society, 
of the normativeness of Japanese society. However it is 
very interesting. They are critical of normativity and of 
codified Japanese culture and society on one hand while 
on the other hand, their own subculture is structured 
exactly the same way as common normative Japanese 
society. The patriarchal hierarchies are very similar to 
what we find in Japanese enterprises, clubs, and schools. 
The leaders are mostly men and a very few women. Men 
are leaders, women kind of follow that lead and are 
mostly consumers rather than producers. Producers are 
mostly men. So these structures and also the hierarchy 
of who is a senior, who is a junior, are very similar to 
what we can find in other structures in Japanese society. 
The way they expressed why it liberated them is that 
their dress is not normal and I really like this sentence. 
A lot of the girls I talked to said “I know I’m standing 
out and I know I’m special but my dress is my armour. I 
have gone too far for people to criticize me, for me to 
take it personally. I know they don’t understand me and 
this really protects me.” This blew my mind. I am a very 
shy person myself and dressing up in Lolita would really 
kill me. I would hate the attention I would get so I 
thought they would have the same logic. However they 
were confident that nothing could hurt them or move 
them anywhere beyond that. So it is a safe space in that 
sense. The people altogether have suffered a lot. A lot 
of members, as explained, have been vulnerable at some 
point in their life. They all know, they all share this 
sense of being hurt in the past and having to go beyond 
it. And the feeling of being safe comes from this shared 
sense of sensitivity, but also from the fact that they are 
completely against normative values. 
They have learned to resocialize in two ways. One is 
the local economy as I explained: the cafes and bars 
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which offer jobs, for example. So people who have 
completely dropped out of society and who have not 
had jobs in years can try to relearn, to have a job and 
have an income by working in these local spaces, bars, 
cafes, and at events. It is not a lot of money but it does 
create a bit of income. 
The second way is emotional recovery. A lot of 
them have been feeling socially detached or having 
social anxiety. Being in a space where people can relate 
to each other while everyone is being abnormal in their 
own ways is a way for them to slowly learn to relate to 
people, to start talking to people, to start to socialize, 
and to start to slowly move out of it. A lot of the 
members end up moving out of these places. A lot of 
girls will quit Lolita, especially when they get married, 
but it is okay because they have learned in that space 
how to be more socially functional, which was 
something with which they had a lot of issues before 
joining these spaces. 
Now I would like to talk about Cool Japan. Cool 
Japan was a project started by the Ministry of Economy, 
Industry, and Trade. The project was started in 2002 
and became more tangible in 2010. Cool Japan is the 
reason why we hear a lot about manga and anime 
outside of Japan. It was mainly started to export and 
encourage the industry of popular culture and youth 
culture inside Japan and especially outside Japan. There 
were a few reasons for this. One was that they needed a 
new industry to encourage, and with the Japanese 
economy fluctuating a lot, they needed something else 
to push forward. Pop culture and youth culture was one 
industry they targeted for that. Another reason was to 
create a new Japanese identity to the foreigners’ eye.  
The idea of the hard-working Japanese salaryman 
started being outdated, so they needed something 
refreshing, new, different, and something that could 
make Japan stand out from the crowd as the hard-
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working figure is also in other countries rather than just 
Japan. They chose popular culture: Japanese pop manga, 
anime, and street fashion. 
A lot of creative industry that had to be developed 
was encouraged both inside Japan and outside Japan 
and that included the Lolita and Angura subcultures 
which are very creative and very visible. And the 
members were very aware of it. They knew that they 
were part of this new Japanese identity. They knew that 
the media would talk about them in a more positive 
manner than it had in the past, but they did not all 
particularly like that. Three girls were chosen in the 
2000s to be Japan’s ‘ambassadors of cuteness’ and one 
of them is a Lolita. So they knew they were officialised. 
They were part of this project and a lot of them were 
proud that their style, which had been criticized in Japan 
for the longest time as being childish, as being deviant, 
was actually internationally recognized and appreciated. 
That there are actually a lot of Lolita girls outside of 
Japan and also in Canada. 
So they appreciated that on the one hand, but on 
the other hand, the hypocrisy of the Japanese 
population criticizing them for so long and then taking 
their subcultures as something positive because the 
foreigners liked it, this kind of change in discourse really 
hurt and shocked them. One of the girls gave this quote, 
which is really honest: “The medias say that subcultures, 
like us Lolita or manga and anime, are the new symbols 
of Japanese society…. But they still think we’re 
disgusting and revolting.” So despite Cool Japan these 
two subcultures are still very fragile, very volatile, 
floating subcultures. The Lolita population is declining 
year after year. It is probably going to disappear, but 
with international recognition and popularity, maybe we 
will maintain an international Lolita scene. 
That is something that is to be seen, but generally 
the subculture space that seems very meaningless, or 
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very invisible, has definitely operated as a positive space 
for a lot of individuals. Young people in Japan, 
particularly Tokyo actually, have used them to find 
themselves and to feel stronger and empower 
themselves. 
Identity Formation Amongst Japanese 
Canadians 
Andrea DaSilva 
 
Over time, more complex individual identities 
emerge among immigrants through day-to-day 
identity politics in which they seek to clarify who 
they are in a transnational space.1 
 
Introduction  
 
The constant movement of people across national 
borders and resettlement in new communities plays an 
important role in one’s sense of belonging and further 
affects individuals’ ethnic retention and identity. 
Nevertheless, one cannot simply assume that 
immigrants will become detached from their ethnic 
communities, families, or the political matters of their 
home countries as they integrate into another country. 
Alan B. Simmons, a Senior Scholar in Sociology at York 
University in Toronto, notes that while still holding 
onto the ethnic identities of their home country, 
immigrants go through different processes to define 
their ways of belonging in the receiving country.2 
Japanese Canadians, in particular, belong to an 
immigrant population whose first and second 
generations (pre-war Japanese Canadians) have had a 
very unique and complex socio-political history of 
exclusion and marginalization in Canada, which further 
influenced the nature and process of their acculturation 
and identity formation as well as that of the third 
generation (those who were very young during World 
                                                          
1 Alan B. Simmons, Immigration and Canada: Global and Transnational 
Perspectives, (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press Inc., 2010), 171. 
2 Simmons, Immigration and Canada: Global and Transnational 
Perspectives, 196. 
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War II) onwards. The high degree of geographic as well 
as social mobility and of integration as a consequence of 
Canadian immigration policies at the time brought 
about fundamental changes to the Japanese Canadian 
community. 
This paper examines the question of identity 
formation and intergenerational challenges faced by 
Japanese Canadians in Canada as a result of exclusion 
and marginalization during the pre-World War Two 
(WWII), internment, and post-WWII periods. The high 
rate of intermarriage between individuals of Japanese 
origin in Canada, the family ties and structure of 
Japanese Canadian families, Japanese language retention, 
and the sense of belonging are only a few of the 
important factors that contribute to the way that 
identities are formed and shaped amongst Japanese 
Canadians in Canada and will be discussed in more 
detail in this paper. 
 
Ethnic Identity as a Social Construct 
 
When taking into account different historical moments 
along with different kinds of overall societies, we will 
attain different views of the term ethnic identity. Thus, 
before we go any further in discussing the identity 
formation of Japanese Canadians, the threshold issue is 
one of definition: what exactly is ethnic identity? 
In the pre-modern context, identity is understood as 
being deeply rooted in tradition, geographical location, 
and culture or blood bonds. In an advanced modern 
and postmodern context, it becomes more detached 
from its original geographical location and traditional 
roots.3 The constant movement of people across 
national borders, as well as resettlement, play important 
roles on one’s sense of being and belonging and further 
                                                          
3 Ibid. 
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affect immigrants’ ethnic retention and identity. Thus, 
identities are the result of an identification process. In 
other words, they are socially constructed and 
negotiated by both individuals and social groups in an 
ongoing process.4 
The term ‘ethnicity’ refers to the identification of a 
particular group. Ethnicity has been defined by 
demographic denotations such as common language, 
common religion, and common place of origin. 
Defining ethnicity is particularly challenging because its 
characteristics change based on changes in political 
climate. Scholars such as Phinney and Ong (2007), 
Quintana (2007), Noro (2009), and Simmons (2010) 
offer an alternative way of dealing with ‘ethnic identity,’ 
approaching it from the developmental perspective. 
According to this approach, ethnic identity is viewed as 
a multidimensional dynamic construct that develops 
over time through the actions and choices of 
individuals. 
Furthermore, the characteristics of ethnic identities 
may differ amongst various immigrant communities 
depending on many other contributing factors. For 
instance, new environments bring up different 
ethnicities within one’s self/self-view. This means that 
social setting, such as one’s immediate family, as well as 
the above-mentioned community environment, can 
potentially have an impact on how a person with more 
than one background views his or her own identity.5 
When immigrants find themselves belonging to a certain 
community, their individual identities reshape 
                                                          
4 Hiroko Noro, “The Role of Japanese as a Heritage Language in 
Constructing Ethnic Identity among Hapa Japanese Canadian 
Children,” Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development 30, no. 
1 (2009): 1-18. 
5 Noro, “The Role of Japanese as a Heritage Language in 
Constructing Ethnic Identity among Hapa Japanese Canadian 
Children.” 
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accordingly. Some may find a community which 
consists of individuals from their country of origin, 
others may find themselves affiliating with a community 
consisting of individuals whose country of origin differs 
from their own. As a result, people may develop more 
than one ethnic identity or, in other words, a multi-
ethnic identity. This is very characteristic of Japanese 
immigrants and their children in Canada. In order to 
fully understand the process of identity formation 
amongst Japanese Canadians in Canada, we need to 
familiarize ourselves with the historical background of 
this group.  
 
Historical Overview 
 
The first settlements of Japanese migrants are noted in 
British Columbia as early as 1877. In 1901, the vast 
majority of Japanese immigrants lived in British 
Columbia.6 They were welcomed by employers in 
British Columbia as a source of cheap labour, however 
there was pressure from non-Asian residents to limit 
Asian immigration. As a result, the Gentleman’s 
Agreement in 1908 restricted immigration to 400 
labourers and servants.7 Anti-Japanese sentiment in the 
1930s, aggravated by the Great Depression, provided 
fertile ground for Japanese Internment during WWII. 
Canada declared war on Japan on December 7, 1941. 
Japanese and Japanese Canadians were then forcibly 
relocated from the Pacific coast and placed in 
internment camps. 
 
Those of us who were students had to leave our 
schools or universities. Those of us who owned 
                                                          
6 Naoko Hawkins, “Becoming a Model Minority: The Depiction of 
Japanese Canadians in the Globe and Mail, 1946-2000,” Canadian 
Ethic Studies 41, no. 1-2 (2009): 138. 
7 Ibid. 
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property (cars and trucks, houses, farms, fishing 
boats, businesses and so on) had it all 
confiscated by the Canadian government and 
later sold without our knowledge while we were 
still in camps. And our communities (Japanese 
communities) were broken up to disappear 
forever.8 
 
To facilitate Japanese integration into Canadian 
society after WWII and to limit the number of Japanese 
in British Colombia, Japanese were discouraged from 
living on the Pacific Coast and were forced to either 
disperse across Canada or to return to Japan until 1947. 
It was not until March 31, 1949 that the wartime 
restrictions were fully removed and the right to vote was 
given to all Japanese Canadian citizens.9 Due to the long 
history of Japanese in Canada, they are the community 
with the highest proportion of native-born members of 
any ethnic group in Canada.10 
Overall, Japanese Canadians are economically 
successful, educated, and well-integrated in Canadian 
society, particularly considering their historical 
experience of discrimination in Canada.11 Their rapid 
and successful integration may be the result of their 
refusal to see themselves as victims, and instead to show 
endurance and self-determination.12 As Hawkins further 
explains, after WWII “ethnic organizations were 
replaced with more acculturated organizations … [and 
most] Japanese at the time were more concerned about 
keeping a low profile and rebuilding their lives than 
                                                          
8 Frank Moritsugu, “My Experiences During the Second World 
War,” Presentation at the Annual International Studies Symposium, 
Toronto, ON, March 29, 2015. 
9 Hawkins, “Becoming a Model Minority,” 139. 
10 Ibid, 138. 
11 Ibid, 137. 
12 Ibid, 140. 
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lobbying for recognition of their human rights”.13 
According to Kobayashi’s research, just one generation 
after the internment, Japanese in Canada achieved 
incomes and educational levels well above the national 
average.14 
 
Intermarriage 
 
Although Japanese Canadians endured forced 
internment and resettlement after WWII, they 
nonetheless formed communities in Canada, particularly 
in Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal. While more than 
half of Japanese Canadians resided in Toronto and 
Vancouver after the war, living in such large cities they 
accounted for a relatively small portion of the 
population and their settlement patterns were more 
loosely distributed than those of some other ethnic 
groups. 
According to Statistics Canada, in 2006, the 
proportion of Japanese in Toronto – some 19,000 
Japanese among over five million persons – was about 
0.37 percent of the general population.15 More 
important is a decrease in comparison to 2001, when the 
census counted 20,000 Japanese (0.43 percent of the 
general population) in Toronto.16 As the Japanese 
community seems to be shrinking with time, perhaps it 
will become less likely for people of Japanese origin to 
                                                          
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Statistics Canada, Canada’s Ethnocultural Mosaic: 2006 Census, 
Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 97-562-X, Last modified April 
2008, http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-
sa/97-562/pdf/97-562-XIE2006001.pdf, 30. 
16 Statistics Canada, “The Japanese Community in Canada,” Last 
modified August 28, 2007, Retrieved from 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-621-x/89-621-x2007013-
eng.htm. 
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maintain ties and interpersonal relationships within their 
own ethnic group. 
The distribution pattern has continued on a large 
scale up until today and has brought about fundamental 
changes in the Japanese Canadian community, with the 
most notable being frequent marriages outside of the 
community after the resettlement generation. The third 
generation (Sansei) of Japanese Canadians often grew up 
in mixed or mainly Anglo–Canadian neighborhoods, 
thus social interaction resulting in intermarriage is not 
surprising.17 Intermarriages have been occurring more 
rapidly among Japanese Canadians than any other ethnic 
group in the country. In contrast with other Asiatic 
groups with relatively higher single ancestry rates in 
their marriages (Chinese with 86 %, Korean with 94%, 
and Philippino with 81%), the Japanese single ancestry 
rate according to the 2001 census was 62%. This 
signifies that “the Japanese are the visible minority 
group most likely to marry or live common-law with a 
partner who does not share their ethnic heritage”.18 
Maintaining Japanese Canadian distinctive ethnic 
identity may become a concern if the rate of 
intermarriages by Japanese Canadians continues to rise 
as it may reduce interaction within the ethnic group.19 
The common characteristic of the Sansei is their lack of 
ties to other Japanese Canadians and Japanese Canadian 
organizations, mostly marrying Canadians of European 
descent.20 Furthermore, the smaller the group of 
Japanese Canadians, the more intermarriages tend to 
occur, as there is likely to be less pressure to marry a 
member of the same ethnic group. This is especially true 
                                                          
17 Tomoko Makabe, “Intermarriage: Dream Becomes Reality for a 
Visible Minority?,” Canadian Ethnic Studies/Etudes Ethniques Au 
Canada 37, no. 1 (2005): 122. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Hawkins, “Becoming a Model Minority,” 140. 
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since most Japanese Canadians grow up in ethnically 
mixed or mainly Anglo-Canadian neighbourhoods. It is 
a matter of social exposure and consequently it is likely 
that the majority of Japanese Canadians will soon claim 
to have at least one ethnic origin in addition to Japanese, 
identifying themselves as persons of mixed 
backgrounds. 
 
Family 
 
Japanese Canadians belong to an Asian ethnic group 
whose traditional (i.e. first generation) Meiji-era value 
system is similar to the Chinese and Korean value 
systems, but whose current members, according to the 
2006 Census, are largely (63.2 %) Canadian-born, and at 
least one or two generations removed from an 
immigrant experience.21,22 This offers an opportunity to 
examine parent-child relationships in a population 
whose first and second generations have had a unique 
and complex socio-political history in Canada, and to 
explore the influence that this has had on the nature and 
process of acculturation in its third and later 
generations. 
An appreciation of changing structural realities is a 
main focus of the life course perspective, which 
underlines the differential impact that the generation-
specific socio-structural, cultural, and historical forces 
may have had on important familial values. For 
example, Kobayashi argues that the shared experience 
of racial discrimination and marginalization of Nisei 
(second generation pre-war Japanese Canadians) early in 
their life course significantly influenced the way they 
                                                          
21 Statistics Canada, Canada’s Ethnocultural Mosaic: 2006 Census, 14. 
22 Karen M. Kobayashi and Laura Funk, “Of the Family Tree: 
Congruence on Filial Obligation between Older Parents and Adult 
Children in Japanese Canadian Families,” Canadian Journal on 
Aging/La Revue Canadienne Du Vieillissement 29, no. 1 (2010): 85-96. 
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adhere to and understand the traditional Issei (first 
generation pre-war Japanese Canadians) value of the 
filial obligation to their parents and, as a result, the 
parents’ expectations for social support from their 
children in later life. Sansei children, not having 
experienced similar socio-political exclusion as children 
and/or young adults and having grown up in ethno-
culturally diverse Canadian communities may have more 
individualistic (versus familial) perceptions of the idea of 
social support for their parents.23 
According to Kobayashi’s research based on 
interviewing Japanese Canadian families, understandings 
of the filial obligation in contemporary Japanese 
Canadian families were, in many cases, situation-based. 
For example, according to both older parents and adult 
children, filial obligation was dependent to a large 
degree on the health and marital status of the parent (i.e. 
a change in a parent’s health or marital status in later life 
may be perceived as a motivation or trigger for the 
child’s sense of filial obligation and the parent’s 
expectations of the child for support).24 This 
understanding reflects the cross-generational process of 
transformation that this core value has undergone in 
Japanese Canadian families – that is, to the Issei, filial 
obligation was almost entirely based or dependent on a 
child’s obligation from birth to repay their parents for 
all of their efforts in giving birth to and raising them, 
and its enactment was not strongly tied to a parent’s 
gender and/or a change in a parent’s status, be it health 
or marital. 
As we can see, family is an important factor in 
ethnic identification. It helps us understand how identity 
                                                          
23 Karen M. Kobayashi, “The Nature of Support from Adult Sansei 
(Third Generation) Children to Older Nisei (Second Generation) 
Parents in Japanese Canadian Families,” Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Gerontology 15, no. 3 (2000): 185-205. 
24 Ibid. 
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is rooted in experience, upbringing, and the 
environment in which an individual grows up as the 
cultural traditions and values are first practiced at 
home.25,26 For example, a multiethnic person may 
identify himself/herself as having multiple identities at 
home, but when in the environment of their Japanese 
grandparents, they may experience ‘self’ in terms of 
their Japanese heritage.27 In this sense, environment, 
especially the immediate family and upbringing plays an 
important role on one’s development. 
Given the central role played by family, it is even 
more interesting to see how the influence of family 
impacts language retention. Language retention may be 
in question even more so when the parents are of two 
different backgrounds, and a conflict may arise when 
deciding whether a child should follow the maternal or 
paternal ethnic language. 
 
Language 
 
Since language plays an important role in forming 
and maintaining ethnic identity, we need to look at the 
link between the two. Language plays an essential role in 
one’s experiences for pragmatic and social purposes. 
Not being able to communicate effectively can heighten 
systemic and socio-cultural barriers to accessing various 
information and resources. Language is an important 
aspect of communication that cannot be understood in 
isolation from the cultural context, especially when it 
comes to the early stages of life. For example, a child’s 
use of the Japanese language rather than, or in addition 
to, English increases the likelihood that they will identify 
                                                          
25 Kobayashi and Funk, “Of the Family Tree.” 
26 Noro, “The Role of Japanese as a Heritage Language in 
Constructing Ethnic Identity among Hapa Japanese Canadian 
Children.” 
27 Ibid, 3. 
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as Japanese because speaking the language may improve 
the degree of their exposure to the Japanese community. 
Although most parents of Japanese origin may have 
a strong desire for their children to develop their 
Japanese language skills as well as their Japanese 
Canadian identities, living environments seem to be the 
most significant factor when it comes to children’s 
Japanese language proficiency and self-identification. 
Other important factors include whether the parent(s) 
experienced living in Japan prior to the birth of their 
child(ren); the parent’s leadership role in their children’s 
linguistic and cultural development; the adoption of 
Japanese cultural/lifestyle modalities within the family, 
ranging from food preferences and media consumption 
to friendship networks with Japanese-speaking people; 
and the family language use pattern or the use of 
Japanese in the family.28 
 
Sense of Belonging and Integration 
 
The sense of belonging that accompanies successful 
integration is affected by the desire to integrate and the 
level of commitment to the new place or community. 
The primary reason for migration is to seek a better 
opportunity for economic progress in a more stable 
society. Adult migrants leave their past lives behind not 
only to improve their own standard of living, but also to 
ensure a better future for their children. During their 
settlement and integration into Canadian society, 
immigrants encounter many new challenges associated 
with securing employment, managing financially, 
locating housing, accessing medical and social services, 
and language barriers.  
While Japanese Canadians were historically 
oppressed, they are framed as a community that 
                                                          
28 Ibid. 
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succeeded despite their negative experience and held a 
forgiving attitude towards the past. Furthermore, they 
seem willing and able to overcome the challenges above 
in order to find a place in Canada. Consequently, it 
seems that it was around 1991 that the status of 
‘successfully integrated’ was ascribed to Japanese 
Canadians.29 This status, after over one hundred years of 
oppression and opposition marks a significant change. 
One reason for successful integration is that 
Japanese seem to accept their immigration commitment, 
decisively choosing to make Canada their long-term 
home, and successfully achieve economic and 
educational integration. While trying to find or create a 
Japanese community, they nonetheless consider Canada 
to be their new home and strive to contribute to the 
new community that they join when arriving in the 
country. As stated by Magat (1999), their perspective is 
that “wherever you are, that’s your place”,30 a viewpoint 
which certainly helps them in embracing their life in 
Canada. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Ethnic identity is an important aspect of immigrants’ 
ability in today’s transnational world to bridge the gap 
between their new host country and their country of 
origin. Since identity is no longer fixed to a particular 
geography, the approach to ethnic identity is changing 
over time. During the contemporary period, immigrants 
experience more than one geographical place and 
therefore become engaged with different communities; 
their identities changing in the process. For example, 
                                                          
29 Hawkins, “Becoming a Model Minority,” 148. 
30 Ilan N. Magat, “Israeli and Japanese Immigrants to Canada: 
Home, Belonging, and the Territorialization of Identity,” Ethos 27, 
no. 2 (1999): 119-144. 
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they adopt multi-ethnic identities, which give them 
more allowance to self-identify. 
As discussed in this essay, the initial Japanese 
immigrants to Canada, their children, and the 
generations that have followed have had very different 
experiences causing their identities to develop 
differently. In the past, many Japanese faced 
discrimination, dispossession, internment, and even 
deportation. Today, Japanese Canadians contribute 
richly to Canada’s cultural, political, economic, and 
public life. This change is eloquently summarized by 
Frank Moritsugu: “So for today’s young Japanese 
Canadians—that is our children, grandchildren and 
great-grandchildren—there aren’t many doors that are 
still closed to them. And if any door is closed, they 
know how to open it”.31 
Among the other opportunities young Japanese 
Canadians now have is the opportunity to express 
identity. As the community develops in new directions, 
both the culture and the identity implied by the term 
‘Japanese Canadian’ will naturally evolve. 
                                                          
31 Moritsugu, “My Experiences During the Second World War.” 
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Japanese-Brazilian Return Migration: 
Unmet Expectations 
Alexandra Pullano 
  
Introduction 
 
During the early 1900s, beginning in 1909, a number of 
Japanese labourers migrated to Brazil in the face of 
economic hardship in Japan. This was mostly due to the 
fact that the end of the feudal period in Japan generated 
great poverty among the rural populations. 
Consequently, in search of a better life, many Japanese 
farmers agreed (or in some cases were “strongly 
encouraged” by the Japanese government) to move to a 
place where there were better opportunities. Thus, in 
1907, Japan and Brazil signed a treaty allowing Japanese 
migration to Brazil. 
The initial migration turned into a number of 
subsequent waves of Japanese migrants, the largest of 
which was the migration boom following the First 
World War, until almost two million Japanese migrants 
were living in Brazil. Beginning in the 1970s however, 
Japanese and Brazilian fortunes changed, with the 
countries' economic positions reversing. As a result, 
Japan-Brazil migration patterns have also reversed with 
a number of the Japanese migrants to Brazil returning to 
Japan to benefit from an abundance of job 
opportunities and high wages. This new migration has 
been termed the Japanese-Brazilian return migration. 
Presented here is an analysis of the origins of this 
migration and the experience of the migrants once they 
reached Japan. The first section of the paper will outline 
the origins of the migration, describing both the 
reasoning behind the migrants’ decision to move and 
the reasoning behind the government’s decision to 
welcome the migrants. Following this description, the 
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paper will look at the expectations of both parties about 
what this migration would bring to Japan and the 
migrants and what the results would be. The main 
portion of the paper will then evaluate whether or not 
these expectations, both economic and cultural in 
nature, were met and how this affected the experience 
of the migrants and the Japanese population attempting 
to accept the new migrants. Finally, we will look into the 
current state of Japan-Brazil migration patterns. 
The paper follows from the hypothesis that the 
difficulties the Japanese Brazilian migrants experienced 
while living in Japan were a consequence of unmet 
expectations both economically and culturally. These 
unmet expectations also had an effect on deciding 
whether or not to remain in Japan or return to Brazil.  
 
Origins of the Return Migration 
 
Japanese-Brazilian return migration was triggered by 
economic and cultural considerations, both in Brazil and 
in Japan, which produced a reciprocal relationship 
between the two nations that facilitated the initial 
migration. Firstly, Japanese descendants in Brazil were 
pushed into migration due to an economic recession in 
Brazil beginning in the 1980s. At this time, the Brazilian 
economy “crumbled and entered a prolonged severe 
period of crisis, overburdened by foreign debt, 
hyperinflation and high unemployment”.1 Japanese 
Brazilians, who had achieved “urban middle class 
status”2 in Brazil, felt that the comfortable lifestyle they 
                                                          
1 Takeyuki Tsuda, Strangers in the ethnic homeland: Japanese Brazilian 
return migration in transnational perspective (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2003): 84. 
2 Angelo Ishi, “Searching for Home, Wealth, Pride and “Class”: 
Japanese Brazilians in the “Land of the Yen”,” in Searching for Home 
Abroad: Japanese Brazilians and Transnationalism, ed. Jeffery Lesser 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 77. 
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had created would slip away as a result of this volatile 
economic environment. Therefore, some authors have 
argued that for a number of Japanese Brazilian migrants, 
returning to Japan became a way to prevent a decline in 
social status, rather than to seek a better life.3 
Faced with declining prospects for future success in 
Brazil, migration was seen as necessary in order to 
maintain the lifestyles Japanese descendants had created 
in Brazil. This was made possible by the fact that the 
migrants could earn “five to ten times their Brazilian 
salaries in Japan as unskilled or semiskilled factory 
workers”.4 Initially, the goal of migration to Japan was 
to make enough money to maintain a certain level of 
comfort, a goal that was not possible in Brazil at the 
time. 
While economic considerations were the main 
driving force behind Japanese-Brazilian return 
migration, the migrants were drawn to Japan specifically 
due to perceived cultural links with what was called the 
“homeland.” Even though many of the migrants cite 
their economic goals as the main reason why they 
migrated, they also “framed it as a return to the 
homeland that offered the possibility of self-
understanding”.5 For a descendant of Japanese migrants 
in Brazil, or for the original migrant, before leaving 
Brazil, Japan was considered to be the land of their 
ancestors and therefore, “in some place in his mind, he 
[possessed] a sense of belonging with regard to Japan, as 
                                                          
3 Ibid. 
4 Takeyuki Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries: Japanese Brazilian 
Return Migrants and the Ethnic Challenge of Japan's Newest 
Immigrant Minority,” in Multiculturalism in the New Japan: Crossing the 
Boundaries Within, eds. Nelson H. H. Graburn, John Ertl, and R. 
Kenji Tierney, 117-138, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 118. 
5 Joshua Hotaka Roth, Brokered Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Migrants 
in Japan (New York: Cornell University Press, 2002), 3. 
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well as the possibility of the myth of return to his ethnic 
origin”.6 
In Brazil, many Japanese Brazilians had participated 
heavily in Japanese culture through music, cinema, and 
other cultural activities and thus began “looking with 
nostalgia toward Japan as their ancestral homeland”.7 
Researcher Takeyuki Tsuda maintains that “it was 
transnational ethnic connections between the Brazilian 
nikkeijin (those with Japanese ancestry), and the 
Japanese that directed the migrant flow to Japan”.8 In 
other words, Japan was chosen as the destination 
country, as opposed to other prosperous countries in 
Europe or North America, due to the fact that those of 
Japanese descent in Brazil felt an affinity for, and 
connection with, the nation, and thus expected that they 
would connect culturally with the people there and be 
able to easily return to their roots. 
At the same time that Brazil was going through an 
economic crisis, Japan was experiencing an economic 
boom that resulted in an abundance of factory jobs and 
a growing labour shortage. With the economic boom in 
Japan, the population was becoming increasingly 
prosperous and educated and thus was more and more 
likely to refuse to work in factory jobs, leading to job 
vacancies. 
For a while, Japan was reluctant to accept foreign 
peoples into its work force and during the 1970s the 
nation “continued to insist on its ethnic homogeneity 
and refused to accept any unskilled foreign workers”.9 
Yet labour deficiencies continued to increase and by the 
late 1980s, the labour shortage was so severe that the 
                                                          
6 Elisa Massae Sasaki, “Dekasseguis: Japanese-Brazilian Immigrants 
in Japan and the Question of Identity,” Bulletin of Portuguese- Japanese 
Studies 4 (June 2002): 113. 
7 Roth, Brokered Homeland: Japanese-Brazilian Migrants in Japan, 18. 
8 Takeyuki Tsuda, Strangers in the ethnic homeland, 90. 
9 Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries,” 117-118. 
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government and factories were forced to capitulate to 
the pressures of global migration.10 Consequently, firms 
which were experiencing labour deficiencies “became 
dependent on foreign workers as the only realistic and 
cost-efficient source of labour power”.11 With a crisis in 
Brazil decreasing opportunity there and an economic 
boom in Japan producing an abundance of well-paid 
jobs, especially in comparison to Brazilian wages, a 
symbiotic relationship facilitating migration developed 
between the two nations whereby Japanese Brazilian 
migrants filled necessary positions in Japan and 
simultaneously freed positions for workers in Brazil. 
However, this policy was controversial due to the 
fact that the Japanese government, as well as the 
population, hoped to maintain the myth that the 
country was culturally homogenous. An influx of 
foreign workers, with different cultures and different 
values, was seen as threatening to this monolithic myth. 
Consequently, the Japanese government made the 
decision to reform its immigration laws, introducing a 
new visa status which was called “long-term resident,” 
allowing any Japanese descendant, up to the third 
generation, to legally work in Japan for three years.12 
With this change, Japan attempted to protect the 
supposedly homogenous character of Japanese society 
by accepting only foreign workers who, like the 
Japanese Brazilians, were expected to be familiar with 
Japanese culture.13 
It was assumed that, as descendants of Japanese, 
these migrants would have a “closer cultural 
                                                          
10 Ibid, 118. 
11 Takeyuki Tsuda, Strangers in the ethnic homeland, 90. 
12 Ernani Oda, “Ethnic Migration and Memory: Disputes Over the 
Ethnic Origins of Japanese Brazilians in Japan,” Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 33 (2010): 518. 
13 Ibid. 
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background and fewer linguistic barriers”.14 Tsuda does 
well to summarize the motivations behind the Japanese 
government’s stance on welcoming foreign-born 
Japanese Brazilians, stating that the government, by, 
 
appealing to an ideology of transnational ethnic 
affiliation with the Brazilian nikkejin based on 
common ancestry […] was able to acquire a 
much needed and docile migrant labour force, 
without contradicting, at least at the level of 
official appearances, the fundamental principle 
of Japanese immigration policy that no unskilled 
foreign workers [would] be accepted.15 
 
In counterpoint to the assumptions of the Japanese 
Brazilians, Japan welcomed these migrants under the 
assumption that they were connected to the nation and 
that Japan constituted their “homeland.” 
 
Expectations 
 
The construction of Japan as the “homeland” for 
Japanese Brazilian migrants engendered a set of 
expectations for how these migrants would integrate 
into Japanese society. Since this migration was deemed a 
“return migration” to what was considered the ancestral 
homeland by the migrants themselves, they believed 
integration into Japan would be simple, since they 
considered themselves to be Japanese. Japanese 
Brazilians, while being socially well integrated in 
Brazilian society, had continued to “feel culturally 
Japanese and assert a rather prominent Japanese ethnic 
                                                          
14 Hosoe Yoko, “Japanese-Brazilians Seen at First Hand: 
Ethnographic Studies of a New Minority in Japan,” Social Science 
Japan Journal 6 (2003): 255. 
15 Takeyuki Tsuda, Strangers in the ethnic homeland, 92. 
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identity”16 in which they felt a strong sense of pride. 
More importantly, in Brazil, the Japanese Brazilians 
often identified themselves as Japanese rather than as 
Brazilians. For example, a Japanese Brazilian immigrant 
in Japan named Fabio stated: “I had convinced myself 
that I was so Japanese in Brazil and took pride in this, I 
wanted to be seen as Japanese in Japan”.17 
The assertion of the prevalence of this mindset 
among the migrants is reinforced by a study done by 
Lindsey Sasaki which found that since “the majority of 
[her] subjects were 100% ethnically Japanese, they 
believed that the Japanese would perceive them also to 
be Japanese, based on physical appearance and 
ancestry”.18 With such a strong identification with the 
Japanese identity and with their identity being 
constructed as Japanese while in Brazil, it is not 
surprising that when migrating to Japan, this migrant 
group expected “to be accepted as ethnic Japanese 
descendants”.19 When returning to what they considered 
the homeland, it was assumed they would be welcomed 
as members of that society and be able to successfully 
integrate into the culture with which they identified. 
This expectation of successful integration was 
shared by the Japanese society, which believed that since 
they looked Japanese and had Japanese parents, the 
migrants would share Japanese values and act the way in 
which the Japanese acted. When making the changes to 
                                                          
16 Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries,” 119. 
17 Takeyuki Tsuda, “Homeland-less Abroad: Transnational 
Liminality, Social Alienation and Personal Malaise,” in Searching for 
Home Abroad: Japanese Brazilians and Transnationalism, ed. Jeffery 
Lesser, 134, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003. 
18 Lindsey Y. Sasaki, “The Dekassegui Movement: Identity 
Transformation of Japanese Brazilian Dekassegui and Arubaito 
Young Adults to Japan and Upon Return to Brazil,” (Doctoral 
thesis, Steinhardt School of Culture Education and Human 
Development, New York University, 2014), 166. 
19 Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries,” 119. 
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immigration policies in order to allow Japanese 
descendants abroad easier access to the Japanese labour 
market, officials believed that the migrants would be 
culturally similar to the Japanese and would thus be 
assimilated smoothly into Japanese society. This belief 
was based on the Japanese ethnic ideology, which 
“privileges common descent as the basis for cultural 
affinity”.20 This also corresponds to a belief that because 
migrants looked Japanese, they must also be culturally 
Japanese, or as Tsuda puts it, “the 'racially' Japanese are 
assumed to be ‘culturally’ Japanese too”.21 
Therefore, it was presumed that “the cultural 
background of the selected migrants would be closer to 
the Japanese cultural context, implying that they [would] 
have the possibility of greater ease in integrating into 
Japanese society”.22 This belief was a result of the strong 
expectation that since they were raised by Japanese 
parents, Brazilian nikkeijin should have literally 
“inherited a considerable amount of Japanese culture”.23  
The Nikkeijin were supposed to be acceptable 
migrants, ones that did not threaten the social order of 
Japan because “as relatives of Japanese, they would be 
capable of being assimilated into Japanese society 
without considerations of nationality”.24 Evidently, both 
the migrants and the Japanese population expected that 
as descendants of Japanese, integration would not be 
difficult, based on presupposed cultural affiliation.  
 
Reality 
 
When the expectations of both sides were not met, both 
the Japanese and the Japanese Brazilian migrants 
                                                          
20 Takeyuki Tsuda, Strangers in the ethnic homeland, 92. 
21 Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries,” 125. 
22 Sasaki, “Dekasseguis,” 120. 
23 Takeyuki Tsuda, Strangers in the ethnic homeland, 117. 
24 Sasaki, “Dekasseguis,” 118. 
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experienced great levels of disappointment which 
shaped the way in which the Brazilian nikkeijin would 
settle into Japan. Once the Japanese Brazilians came to 
Japan, it was clear that they were not as culturally similar 
to the Japanese as the officials and the population had 
assumed. 
The Japanese population quickly found out that the 
Brazilian nikkeijin, especially those of the second or third 
generation, who made up most of the migrant 
population, were not completely fluent in the Japanese 
language and had essentially become culturally 
'Brazilianized’.25 For the Japanese population this was 
quite shocking and disorienting since there was “a lot of 
sense of incongruity towards those who [had] a Japanese 
face but [were] culturally Brazilian”.26 The fact that 
many Brazilian nikkeijin were unable to speak the 
language properly and the reality of their cultural 
foreignness was “disillusioning and disappointing for 
most Japanese”.27 Therefore, the Japanese population 
was disheartened when they saw that, even though these 
migrants looked Japanese and had been raised in 
Japanese families, they had not completely retained their 
Japanese culture and values. 
Essentially, when the Japanese saw that the migrants 
were not culturally Japanese, as they had expected, they 
became “disappointed when they realized how Brazilian 
they had become”.28 Due to this disappointment, the 
Japanese began to no longer consider the Brazilian 
nikkeijin as culturally similar Japanese descendants in the 
homeland. Rather the Japanese Brazilian migrants were 
eventually deemed to be foreigners.29 Therefore, the 
Japanese Brazilians went from being described as 
                                                          
25 Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries,” 118. 
26 Ibid, 120. 
27 Takeyuki Tsuda, Strangers in the ethnic homeland, 117. 
28 Ibid, 116. 
29 Sasaki, “Dekasseguis,” 125. 
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Japanese in Brazil to being labelled as foreigners in what 
was supposed to be the homeland. The Japanese 
Brazilians, for their part, found it was much more 
difficult to be considered Japanese in Japan, due to the 
existence of “an implicit and tacit level of cultural 
expectations because the Japanese associated race with 
culture and language as necessary factors in what 
constituted a Japanese person”.30  
Being labelled as foreigners by the Japanese was a 
shock to the Brazilian nikkeijin who had defined 
themselves as Japanese while living in Brazil. As stated 
in the previous section, many of the migrants had 
presumed that their Japanese racial features and their 
Japanese ancestry would be enough to be considered 
Japanese in Japan. However, even today, in Japan once 
they are, 
 
confronted by a narrow Japanese ethno-national 
identity, in which Japaneseness is defined not 
only by Japanese racial descent, but by complete 
Japanese linguistic and cultural proficiency, the 
Brazilian nikkeijin discover that although they 
feel quite culturally 'Japanese' in Brazil, they are 
not ethnically accepted in Japan because they 
appear culturally foreign not only for their lack 
of Japanese language proficiency, but also for 
their Brazilian attitudes and behaviour.31 
 
This comes as an identity shock to many of the migrants 
because in Brazil they had been labelled as Japanese by 
the Brazilian community. In Brazil, “many of the 
Japanese Brazilians self-identified as japonês because of 
how Brazilian society labeled them based on their 
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physical characteristics”.32 Moreover, they themselves 
had emphasized their Japanese descent and heritage and 
had retained a strong sentimental attachment to Japan.33 
As a result of being labelled foreign in a land to which 
they had previously felt strongly connected, they 
experienced “a disorienting loss of their ethnic 
homeland”.34 
Therefore, the migrants experienced the effects of 
an important “ethnic identity shift”,35 where many 
Japanese Brazilians had to reorient their ethnic identities 
from Japanese to Brazilian.36 Ironically, the same 
Japanese Brazilians who had gone to Japan in hopes of 
becoming more attached to their ethnic homeland came 
to feel less sense of belonging in and to their ancestral 
homeland than they had had while living in a different 
country.37 In migrating to Japan, the Brazilian nikkeijin 
had to reorient their identity as an ethnic minority in the 
place they had hoped to call their homeland.  
 
Discrimination based on Culture 
 
The Japanese cultural expectations for those who had 
Japanese features and the Japanese Brazilian migrants’ 
inability to live up to these expectations resulted in 
certain levels of discrimination and alienation for the 
Japanese Brazilian migrants in Japan. Tsuda describes 
how “most Japanese in local communities and factories 
[had] not crossed ethnic boundaries by socially 
accepting the nikkeijin, but [had] excluded them as 
foreigners”.38 In this way, the outsider status conferred 
                                                          
32 Sasaki, “The Dekassegui Movement,” 169. 
33 Tsuda, “Homeland-less Abroad,” 133. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Sasaki, “The Dekassegui Movement,” 171. 
36 Tsuda, “Homeland-less Abroad,” 134. 
37 Roth, Brokered Homeland: Japanese-Brazilian Migrants in Japan, 2. 
38 Tsuda, “Crossing Ethnic Boundaries,” 119. 
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onto the Japanese Brazilians through the label gaijin 
(foreigner) was “reinforced by the ethnic 
marginalization they [experienced] and the tendency of 
most Japanese to avoid unfamiliar foreigners”.39 Since 
the Japanese Brazilians did not act in the way that was 
expected based on their physical Japanese features, the 
Japanese found it difficult to interact with the Brazilian 
nikkeijin. There was a specific cultural burden placed on 
those who “appeared to have a 100% ethnic Japanese 
face […] to behave like a Japanese”40 therefore when the 
nikkeijin did not, they were greeted with alienation. 
Additionally, Tsuda has stated that “the main reason 
the Japanese do not accept the Brazilian nikkeijin is 
because they perceive the cultural differences of the 
nikkeijin quite negatively”.41  For example, some 
Japanese have stated they “do not like to see nikkeijin 
walking around in groups, dressed in a strange manner, 
speaking loudly in Portuguese, and otherwise behaving 
in ways that seem alien”.42 This lack of acceptance for 
cultural differences leads many Japanese to be unwilling 
to engage with the Japanese Brazilians. 
This is most strikingly seen in the workplace, where 
“the alienation that at least some nikkeijin have felt in 
Japan has resulted from their exclusion from the 
workplace communities”.43 In the workplace, Tsuda 
found that it was quite rare for the two groups (Japanese 
and Japanese Brazilians) to interact. Rather, interaction 
was limited to work instructions.44 Japanese managers 
and workers alike often complained about the Japanese 
Brazilians, once again citing cultural differences whereby 
the Japanese perceived the Japanese Brazilians to be 
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lacking in gratitude, initiative, and a sense of group 
responsibility.45  
These negative feelings towards Japanese Brazilian 
cultural attributes carried into housing as well where 
“Japanese landlords were generally reluctant to rent 
apartments to Brazilians”.46 This was due to the fact that 
in order to rent an apartment the Brazilians needed 
knowledge of and compliance with Japanese rules such 
as maintaining quiet and serious behaviour.47 They were 
reluctant to rent to Brazilians who were often viewed as 
being loud and resented for partying too late. 
Conclusively, the disappointment the Japanese felt when 
they realized the Brazilian nikkeijin were more Brazilian 
than Japanese resulted in a certain level of prejudice and 
social alienation towards the migrant population. 
The Japanese Brazilians responded to this social 
alienation by reinforcing their Brazilian identities and 
creating their own communities. The Japanese Brazilians 
themselves played a large role in their social 
marginalization, since they responded to the initial 
Japanese reluctance to interact with foreigners and their 
rejection as ethnic Japanese “by actively withdrawing in 
an act of ethnic self-segregation”48 thus further 
differentiating themselves from Japanese society. This 
ethnic self-segregation resulted in the creation of 
“extensive self-contained immigrant communities” 
which included Brazilian restaurants, stores, and 
nightclubs.49 It was through these communities that 
Japanese Brazilians could obtain the “companionship, 
social support and mutual understanding, necessary for 
them to overcome the debilitating effects of social and 
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self-alienation”.50 After experiencing ethnic 
discrimination upon arrival, the Brazilian nikkeijin felt a 
“resurgence of Brazilian national sentiment and 
[distanced] themselves by asserting their Brazilian 
cultural differences”.51 Essentially, in order to deal with 
the shock of not being considered Japanese in Japan and 
having to reconstitute their identity, the Japanese 
Brazilians returned to their Brazilian culture and 
communities to create a sense of belonging. 
 
Economic Expectations 
 
In addition to the shock of having to reconstitute their 
cultural identities, many Japanese Brazilian migrants 
experienced a decline in economic class upon arriving to 
Japan, which further hindered their successful 
integration into Japanese society. As previously stated, 
many of the Brazilian nikkeijin had held an urban middle 
class status in Brazil,52 working as doctors, lawyers, and 
engineers. However, the jobs being filled by Brazilian 
nikkeijin in Japan were unskilled or semi-skilled factory 
positions. In this context, not only did the return 
migrants face a cultural identity crisis while trying to 
make a life for themselves in Japan; they also faced a 
professional identity and class identity crisis.53 
As migrants who previously held a “middle class 
socioeconomic status and worked in less alienating 
office settings” this sudden change in status to unskilled 
factory positions worked to “add to the general 
alienation they already experienced in the host 
society”.54 
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The challenge here was the Japanese Brazilians’ shift 
from being a positive minority in Brazil, where they are 
seen as a “successful middle-class minority […] that is 
culturally respected,” to being a negative minority in 
Japan where “they [became] low-status factory 
workers…who [were] culturally despised to a certain 
extent for their Brazilian behavior”.55 Such a profound 
change in the way in which they were viewed by the 
society in which they were living and the status that they 
held was a difficult adjustment for the Japanese 
Brazilian migrants. 
Unsurprisingly, the low economic status held by 
migrants led to further experiences of discrimination. 
The fact that Japanese Brazilians were working in these 
less well-regarded positions further aggravated the 
tensions between the migrants and the Japanese because 
many Japanese feel that factory work is an inappropriate 
position for those wishing to be considered 
respectable.56 Therefore, not only were the Japanese 
Brazilians viewed as second rate Japanese because of 
their lack of understanding of Japanese culture; they 
were also seen as not truly Japanese because of their 
jobs, which were most often reserved for foreign 
workers and not for true Japanese. 
Consequently, as explained in research by Tsuda, 
“social segregation in their ethnic homeland as cultural 
foreign minorities [was] further exacerbated by [the fact 
that] they [became] unskilled migrant workers who 
[were] a marginalized part of the working class”.57 The 
Japanese Brazilians could not be respected by the 
majority of Japanese society since they were performing 
low status jobs “which [were] actively shunned and 
denigrated by most Japanese”.58 In Japan, these factory 
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jobs are described as the 3K factory jobs, where the 
3K's represent kiken (dangerous), kitanai (dirty), and 
kitsui (difficult).59 These 3K positions are generally seen 
to be reserved only for the least educated in society.60 
Even though this is not the reality, as factory workers 
the Japanese Brazilians were viewed to be uneducated 
and were stigmatized and shunned. Clearly then, cultural 
difference coupled with a low socioeconomic 
distinction, further reinforced the social alienation 
experienced by the Japanese Brazilian return migrants in 
Japan. 
 
Length of Stay in Japan 
 
The original reason for migrating to Japan was an 
economically motivated desire to earn enough money in 
a short period of time to be able to maintain a middle 
class lifestyle when moving back to Brazil. With such 
difficulties adapting both economically and culturally to 
Japanese society, it might be assumed that many of the 
migrants left Japan as soon as they could to go back to 
the country where they were viewed more positively.  
However, after the initial migration, while some 
migrants did move back to Brazil fairly quickly, a larger 
number of the migrants ended up staying in Japan 
longer than they had anticipated. Tsuda found in his 
research that while many of the migrants wanted to save 
enough money to return to Brazil to “recover their self-
respect in order to enjoy “real life” [they tended to] 
gradually extend their stay in Japan since the final goal 
[was] never clearly defined”.61 In other words, the 
amount of money that was necessary in order to return 
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to Brazil was often not explicitly established and thus it 
was difficult to know when to return home. 
Therefore, even though the migrants continued to 
consider their time in Japan to be temporary, the 
settlement of Japanese Brazilians in Japan became quite 
advanced in the years immediately following the initial 
migration, with a number of migrants either continuing 
to prolong their stay or deciding to remain in Japan 
indefinitely, or, to a lesser extent, permanently.62 As a 
result, with the migrants staying in Japan longer than 
had been anticipated, another expectation of what the 
return migration would entail was not fulfilled. 
One of the main reasons the migration lasted longer 
than many had hoped or expected was that many of the 
migrants did not save as much money as they had 
anticipated in the two or three years they had wanted to 
stay in Japan. While saving money was the main 
motivation in returning to Japan, the migrants soon 
found that they “could not fully accomplish this desire 
as life in Japan proved to be extremely difficult to save 
money”.63 At the outset, most Japanese Brazilian 
migrants would not engage in much but work and were 
the first to accept overtime, however this life proved 
unfulfilling and difficult. Therefore, those migrants who 
had chosen to stay longer “tended to give up overtime 
and night shift work in favour of more normal working 
hours [… and] many began to re-evaluate their goals 
and priorities as they discovered certain pleasures of life 
in Japan”.64 
As more time passed and they had not earned the 
amount of money they felt they needed, the migrants 
opted to enjoy their time in Japan more, which in turn 
further hindered their ability to save money and thus 
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extended their stay in Japan. Moreover, many of the 
migrants, especially the young, were not used to the 
amount of money they were now making in Japan and 
the products they found in Japan were more appealing 
than those in Brazil and thus, as one migrant 
commented, “for anyone who does not outline a goal of 
saving money, it is very difficult to save”.65 
For those who wanted to enjoy life while they were 
in Japan, saving money did not remain the primary goal 
guiding behaviour and thus periods of time in Japan 
were gradually extended as the migrants continued not 
to save as much money as originally anticipated. 
 
Changing Migrant Patterns 
 
While in the years immediately following the initial 
migration, especially the 1990s, many Japanese 
Brazilians continued to remain in Japan in order to 
make use of their new purchasing power and greater 
access to consumer goods, the economic incentives to 
remain in Japan gradually began to lessen as the 
Japanese economy began to falter and the world went 
into an economic crisis. With these changing 
circumstances, many of the migrants in Japan found that 
the “ability to earn money became nearly impossible 
when the global economic crisis began that forced the 
bulk of the Brazilian population to prolong their stay in 
Japan or return to Brazil unwillingly”.66 Those who 
stayed in Japan faced unemployment, lack of job 
prospects, salary decreases, and a reduction in the 
number of both fixed and overtime hours,67 making life 
in Japan and migration to Japan increasingly 
unappealing. Moreover, with a declining wage 
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differential between Brazil and Japan, the amount of 
money saved in Japan did not mean as much as it once 
had. 
With the difficulties of finding employment in Japan 
for Japanese Brazilian migrants and the declining need 
for them in the Japanese labour market, the government 
created a policy in reverse to the one they had created to 
allow the migrants into Japan. While the government 
did try to help by providing an increase in job 
counseling and language preparation classes for the 
Brazilian nikkeijn, they also created a controversial 
program called the Pay-to-Go Program.68 This program 
was a voluntary return program for Nikkeijin, who had 
to prove unemployment and legal residency status.69 
Knowing that many of the migrants remaining in Japan 
were unable to leave due to lack of funds and wishing to 
avoid potential social problems involving unemployed 
Japanese Brazilians, the Japanese government 
incentivized returning to Brazil by making it easier for 
migrants to do so. During the 2009 fiscal year, 21 675 
Latin American nikkeijin workers (Brazilian and 
Peruvian) accepted the program and returned home.  
Evidently, the current state of Brazil to Japan 
migration is compromised due to the fact that economic 
and cultural incentives to return to Japan have been 
undermined and the Japanese government has shifted 
from policies that encourage migration to policies that 
actively attempt to remove migrants from Japan. 
 
Conclusion 
 
What is quite clear is that the Japanese-Brazilian return 
migration did not turn out as the Japanese Brazilian 
migrants, the Japanese government, or the Japanese 
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population had expected. As a result, the Japanese-
Brazilian migration stream has slowed over the years 
and many of the migrants have returned to Brazil. 
Most importantly, the fact that the Japanese 
Brazilian migrants could not be considered Japanese was 
a shock to all parties. The migrants, who had been called 
Japanese by Brazilian society and had themselves 
strongly identified with Japanese culture, were surprised 
to find that the Japanese population did not accept them 
as Japanese. The migrants had, to a greater extent than 
they realized, been culturally Brazilianized and thus in 
the face of strict views of what constituted 
Japaneseness, they could not be considered truly 
Japanese, but rather second-rate Japanese. Here, the 
migrants were a disappointment to Japanese citizens 
because of the strong belief that anyone raised by 
Japanese parents should have retained their Japanese 
culture. The disillusionment when this proved to be 
false severely hindered the integration of the migrants 
since the population did not know how to relate to 
Japanese-looking people who did not act Japanese. 
In addition to these cultural disappointments, the 
unskilled factory work proved to be demoralising to the 
migrants and saving money proved to be much more 
difficult than expected, especially when the end goal was 
not explicitly defined. This economic disappointment 
turned into longer stays in Japan than had initially been 
intended. To counteract these disappointments, the 
migrants created Brazilian communities, which provided 
support and familiarity for migrants in Japan. These 
communities, as they became more established, made it 
easier for many of the migrants to stay longer than they 
had planned, creating a new ethnic minority in Japan. 
However, with the Japanese economy in stagnation and 
the wage differential closing, many are reluctantly 
returning to Brazil without having achieved their 
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economic goals and disillusioned with what they had 
believed to be their homeland. 
Unfortunately, current research into Japanese-
Brazilian migration is lacking. Much of the research on 
these migrants was conducted during the initial period 
of migration in the 1990s. Therefore, what is needed to 
enhance the body of research on the Japanese Brazilians 
is more in-depth research into the current Brazilian 
nikkeijin population in Japan and how they are coping in 
the new economic environment as well as into the 
population of migrants who have returned to Brazil in 
disappointment and how this has affected their life in 
Brazil. 
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Why Do the Neighbours Fear a 
‘Normal’ Japan? 
David A. Welch 
 
First of all, let me say that it is a great privilege and 
pleasure to be here today. I was very impressed by the 
organization of the Symposium and by the line-up. I 
don’t normally spend my Sundays coming out to do 
work again, but when I saw the quality of the program I 
couldn’t resist. It’s a great treat to be here. With luck I 
can be briefer than my allotted time and we can have 
more time for questions and answers.  
The question I would like to address today is, “Why 
do the neighbours fear a ‘normal’ Japan?” By 
“neighbours,” I really only mean China and South 
Korea. Russia is a neighbour, of course, but I do not 
think Russia fears Japan. We can talk about why not if 
you would like. North Korea is also neighbour. I do not 
think North Korea really fears Japan, although I do not 
claim to understand the North Korean mindset at all, so 
who knows what they do or do not fear? 
China and South Korea have very consistently 
recently made surprisingly strong statements objecting 
to recent trends and developments in Japanese foreign 
and security policy, and these statements use the 
language of fear. Now one question, of course, is: “Do 
they mean it?” Are China and South Korea sincere 
when they attempt to raise warning flags about changes 
in Japanese foreign and security policy? This is a good 
question. My answer is that South Koreans are certainly 
sincere; some Chinese are sincere; other Chinese are not 
sincere and they use this fear tactically or strategically. 
What Korea and China claim to fear is essentially 
Japan becoming what for decades now we have called a 
‘normal’ country. That was a term first invented by the 
former leader of the Democratic Party of Japan, Ichiro 
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Ozawa. When he complained in the 1990s (shortly after 
the first Gulf War) that Japan was not a ‘normal’ 
country, he basically meant one thing on the foreign 
policy side: namely, that Japan—unlike any other 
country in the world—is not allowed to use military 
force, even for productive purposes, such as 
contribution to regional and global stability. This is the 
result of Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution, 
which prohibits Japan not only from ever using war as 
an instrument of statecraft, but also from even 
maintaining military forces. They do, of course, 
maintain military forces, and they really are very good 
military forces (they get around this restriction by calling 
them “Self-Defense Forces”). This clause is what makes 
Japan very unusual. No other country has a clause of 
this kind. In my opinion, this is the main thing that 
makes Japan an ‘abnormal’ country. 
Prime Minister Abe has been trying to make Japan 
more of a ‘normal’ country. Ideally, he would like either 
to abolish or to revise Article Nine; he has talked openly 
about his desire to do that. I think he would like to do it 
largely because Article Nine, in his mind, is an emblem 
of shame. It is essentially like a scarlet letter from the 
old Hawthorne short story. Japan has been forced to 
wear this scarlet letter since the end of World War II. 
It’s a symbol of Japan being on probation in an open-
ended kind of way. Abe is not a far right-wing hawkish 
militarist, but he is a proud Japanese, and he thinks that 
it’s time that the world got over World War II. He 
would like to see Japan let off parole. 
Now, he can’t revise Article Nine. Nobody has ever 
managed to revise the Japanese postwar constitution. 
The bar for constitutional amendment is set very high 
and it is difficult to surmount. However, he has sought 
to reinterpret Article Nine in a way that enables Japan to 
be a bit more ‘normal’ in its foreign and security policy. 
The big innovation is his recent cabinet reinterpretation 
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of Article Nine to permit collective self-defence. This 
would just allow the Japanese military to come to the aid 
of its allies. The United States is the only ally that we are 
really talking about here. The United States is obliged to 
help Japanese ships if they are under attack, and they 
would do certainly that. But constitutionally, most 
people would say, Japan is not allowed to go to the aid 
of American ships under attack. There is a strange 
asymmetry to that. Abe is essentially trying to fix that 
anomaly. Note that he has not been dramatically 
boosting defence spending. Nor has he been adding 
dramatic new capabilities to the Japanese military—for 
example, nuclear weapons. Japan could get nuclear 
weapons if it wanted to in about three weeks. That kind 
of thing is not on the agenda: only collective self-
defence. 
The reaction from China and South Korea has been 
rather hysterical. One possible reason for this is that 
China and South Korea have tangible conflicts of 
interest with Japan such as territorial disputes. Japan has 
three territorial disputes. The first one is with China 
over the Senkaku Islands. The second is with South 
Korea over what the Koreans call Dokdo and what the 
Japanese call Takeshima. The third is with Russia over 
the Northern Territories—but again, as I said, I am not 
interested in Russia today. 
Japan also has maritime disputes with China and 
Korea, of which the most significant is in the East 
China Sea. The questions at issue here are: “Which 
country has maritime jurisdiction? How far out and over 
what? Which country has drilling rights for oil and gas? 
How do you decide what the fishing rights are?” In fact, 
these things are under relatively good regulation. There 
are, technically speaking, conflicting maritime claims in 
the East China Sea, but they are not a big deal and on a 
day-to-day basis they do not give rise to serious conflict.  
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There are also history issues, such as visits by 
Japanese prime ministers to Yasukuni Shrine, at which 
14 Class A war criminals are enshrined. We can talk 
about this if you like. I think that the neighbours 
fundamentally misunderstand the nature of Yasukuni 
Shrine and the reasons why Prime Minister Abe might 
wish to visit it. 
It is important to note that the Japanese see this 
issue as a purely domestic issue. They do not believe 
that China and South Korea even have the right to 
comment on it. China always gets upset when outsiders 
comment on Tibet or Xinjiang, claiming that these are 
domestic issues and no one else’s business. The 
Japanese feel the same way about Yasukuni Shrine. But 
in any case, Yasukuni is not a national shrine. It has no 
official status, and there is no official sense in which 
visiting the shrine represents honouring Class A 
wartime criminals for committing war crimes. Contrary 
to public opinion, it is not even dedicated to all Japanese 
war dead. Abe himself has ancestors enshrined there. 
Nevertheless, it was very bad public relations on his part 
to go. The Americans and others begged him not to go. 
He still went. I think Abe is probably his and Japan’s 
own worst enemy, because, frankly, it was not necessary. 
There were ways of avoiding antagonizing the 
neighbours on this issue. But so it goes. By the way, my 
understanding is that he has tacitly promised not to go 
back while he is the prime minister, which should be a 
good thing. 
The history issue also rears its ugly head in 
textbooks. Japanese textbooks do treat the nasty things 
Japan inflicted on the neighbours before and during 
World War II very lightly. They gloss over them. To 
Chinese and Korean tastes they are treated far too 
lightly. I certainly see that perspective. I also understand 
why a nationalist such as Prime Minister Abe might not 
want the history books to engage in auto-flagellation. 
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No country really likes to beat itself up over the horrors 
it has committed in its past. I spent the first decade of 
my life in the United States studying American history 
as an elementary school child, and I never read anything 
about the Trail of Tears or about the soft genocide 
inflicted upon Native people by European colonists. 
From a Native American perspective, American 
textbooks treat things far too lightly too. It is not 
surprising that people disagree on how much self-
criticism is appropriate. But it is a real issue with real 
foreign policy consequences for Japan. 
The Comfort Women issue has also been in the 
news. Nobody denies that many women—primarily 
Korean, but also Chinese, Indonesian, and even 
significant numbers of Japanese women—found 
themselves serving in Imperial Japanese Army brothels 
before and during World War II. Hard-core right wing 
Japanese nationalists will tell you that they were all 
volunteers or prostitutes and that no one was coerced 
into sexual service. That’s nonsense. Large numbers 
were coerced. The record is very clear on that. It is also 
clear that some were not. But many were. Again, Prime 
Minister Abe has done a brilliant job of bad public 
relations by trying to emphasize that there is no 
documentary record of the official conscription of 
Comfort Women for sexual service. Big surprise! What 
government is going to write that down? This is another 
issue on which Japan could do a much better job of 
playing nice. Even just focusing on moral responsibility 
for pain and suffering would go a long way. But public 
relations is not Abe’s strong suit. 
Let me turn now to the question with which I 
began: “What do China and South Korea really fear 
about a normalizing Japan?” My colleagues and I at the 
Centre for International Governance Innovation are 
engaged in a research project on this topic titled, 
“Confidence, Trust, and Empathy in Asia-Pacific 
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Security,” for which we have been compiling a database 
of all the statements that we can find in the last two 
years from Chinese and Korean sources that touch on 
Japan’s rise, its changes, its normalization, and why 
these things might be of concern. What follows is a 
preview of what we have found so far. 
If you look at Chinese official and non-official 
statements on the relevant issues, a very interesting 
pattern emerges. The topic of Japan as an actual or 
potential military threat to Asia figures very 
prominently. More than 70 percent of official Chinese 
statements make reference to a Japanese threat. 
Unofficial statements—which of course in the case of 
China are very rarely out of line with official 
statements—are even more focused on threat. 
The history issue arises quite frequently in Chinese 
discourse, but dramatically less frequently than military 
threat. There is also a lot of talk about Japan and its 
untrustworthiness, its hypocrisy, or its duplicitousness. 
Some statements combine references to threat, to 
history, and/or to trust. Not surprisingly, if you 
combine more than one theme, they show up in a 
smaller proportion of the total number of statements. 
But it is interesting that there are very, very few Chinese 
statements that complain solely about history. Many 
more complain solely about threat. If you look at the 
overall pattern of references, it is clear that what China 
seems most concerned about is Japan as a military 
threat. 
South Korea is very different. South Koreans talk 
about Japan as a threat, but they are far more interested 
in the history issues. We have found that history alone 
occupies roughly one-third of South Korean statements 
about Japan. South Koreans tend not to see Japan as 
much of a threat. 
Contrast the Japanese self-perception. We analyzed 
official and unofficial Japanese statements about Japan. 
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It is not surprising that the Japanese generally do not see 
themselves as a threat, though a very small number of 
people in Japan actually agree with China and South 
Korea that Japan is on a dangerous path (these 
statements are primarily in the left-wing press). Nor do 
many Japanese tend to think that Japan has failed to 
acknowledge its historical dark side. Indeed, 86 percent 
of Japanese people think Japan has adequately 
acknowledged this and apologized for it. 
What Japanese do talk about is Japan’s positive role 
in the region and the world. One major theme is Japan 
as a constructive country. Another is Japan as a pacifist 
or defensive country. Not many people yet talk about 
Japan as a ‘normal’ country, though of course people 
like Abe would like to see it become one. There are 
references to Japan being “restrained,” which we 
interpret as ‘restrained in military roles.’ Japanese 
statements frequently refer to Japan as “cooperative,” 
but rarely as a leader or a Great Power. That last one is 
interesting to me. You would think that a country that 
wants a permanent seat on the Security Council would 
represent itself very consciously as a Great Power. 
Finally, there is a fair amount of talk of Japan as feeling 
threatened by others. 
To give you an example of some of the Chinese 
discourse that appears in our database, you see talk of 
Japan “deviating from the path of peaceful 
development,” and headlines such as: “Abe thirsts for 
military glory”.1 A full-page ad in a Chinese newspaper 
reads: “Japan Wants War Again,” with little mushroom 
clouds marking the locations of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki on a map—a not-so-subtle hint that that kind 
of thing might happen again if Japan were to step out of 
line. 
                                                          
1 Xinhua, 1 July 2014. 
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I hardly think that the Chinese need to worry about 
Japan remilitarizing. Japan is a well-functioning 
democracy, and even the Japanese don’t like the idea of 
collective self-defence. An Asahi Shimbun poll conducted 
a little less than two years ago showed that of all 
respondents, only 27 percent supported it—
notwithstanding the fact that most Japanese now quite 
like the US-Japan security treaty, which is a big change 
from the 1960s and ’70s. 59 percent overall oppose 
collective self-defence, as do 49 percent of self-
identifying Abe supporters (37 percent of whom are in 
favour). Among those who do not support Abe, 
opposition is overwhelming. So we can reasonably say 
that even the Japanese people don’t like the idea of 
collective self-defence. 
Is there a serious danger of Japan being a military 
threat to its neighbours? I think this is a ridiculous fear, 
quite honestly. First of all, China is a lot more populous 
than Japan. China is getting very wealthy relatively 
quickly and has been modernizing impressively. By most 
conventional measures, China now has a larger 
economy than does Japan, and it far outspends Japan on 
the military. The idea of Japan invading China again and 
having any luck seems very farfetched. But even if Japan 
lusted for military adventure, they do not have the 
people to do it. Japan’s population is old and aging 
quickly. The soldiers they would have to send into battle 
to conquer China don’t exist. They could send retirees 
into battle, but retirees do not make great soldiers.  
Looking at China’s population pyramid today, you 
can see that the bulk of Chinese are still in their 
economically productive years and that plenty of young 
Chinese are available for military service. China’s 
population is aging quickly too, of course, which is the 
main reason that China is not going to have double digit 
growth rates again. They have about 15 years’ worth of 
economic growth programmed into the system, 
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demographically. After that, watch out. The Chinese 
Communist Party is not going to be able to deliver the 
growth and prosperity on which acquiescence to its rule 
depends. Finally, just to round out the picture, South 
Korea’s population pyramid shows a rapidly aging 
population. At the moment they are still okay; the 
economically productive age cohort is robust. But it will 
soon drop off quickly. South Korea is going to have a 
significant problem maintaining economic growth, just 
as Japan does now and China will soon. 
Overall demographic trends in East Asia point in 
the direction of peace. Countries tend to have more 
wars when they have too many young, underemployed 
males. That is not the case in any of these three 
countries. However, that does not mean that we will 
necessarily avoid a serious confrontation over 
something like the Senkaku Islands. That is a very 
serious conflict. I do not think that the 
Dokdo/Takeshima dispute is a serious one; it does not 
keep me awake at night. But the Senkaku Islands 
dispute does. 
Japan: Still a First-tier Nation 
Donald Campbell 
 
I’m going to give a slightly broader survey on Japanese 
foreign policy. I had some fun with the title, because 
there was a report published a couple of years ago by 
Japan watchers Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage and a 
couple of others, who suggested that Japan was no 
longer a ‘first tier nation.’ I am not sure what a first tier 
nation actually is or isn’t, and I don’t think that Japan 
ever thought of itself or its foreign policy in that light, 
even though it was the second largest economic power 
in the world until fairly recently. It’s interesting that 
Prime Minister Abe found it necessary to refute that, in 
a significant speech to the US, saying that Japan was a 
first-tier nation. That’s a thread that runs very much 
through Mr. Abe in his approach to Japan and to 
foreign policy.   
I’m going to spend a moment on Japan and a 
stronger Japan because I think that sort of sets it up. In 
spite of claims that saying ‘Japan is back’ might be a 
somewhat superficial or perhaps Western view, it is Mr. 
Abe himself who has announced that Japan is back. Of 
course, you heard this morning about Abenomics – an 
economic program to put Japan back on track, so I 
won’t go into that in any great detail. Article Nine and 
the question of reinterpretation, rather than revision, of 
the Constitution for collective security has also already 
been discussed.  
I’ve been a bit struck by the Japanese standard 
phrases for a whole array of things. Usually it’s much 
more a Chinese or a totalitarian regime that comes out 
with a whole set of phrases that almost become 
jingoism. I’ve noticed quite a number of those finding 
their way into the many speeches that Abe-san gives. I 
don’t think that we should read too much into that. One 
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of them is “proactive contribution to peace,” and that 
really is what I would describe as his foreign policy writ 
large; the core of the principles of Japanese foreign 
policy, but without particular reference to any specific 
surrounding elements of foreign policy. At the same 
time, as you’ve heard throughout the course of the day, 
he is talking about a renewed, revived, reinvented Japan 
even, based on innovation. 
This morning, we heard the example of the 
hydrogen-fueled vehicles at Toyota, and Mr. Abe is 
talking a great deal about robots, which were also 
discussed by Mr. Farag. He’s also talking about the role 
of women and the potential role of women in the 
Japanese economy, both in terms of Japan and of 
Japanese foreign policy. He is using the slogan that 
women should ‘shine.’ That’s rather rich coming from 
Mr. Abe, given his past record, but in any event, there’s 
a fairly significant ambition there. He’s also talking 
about the Smart Platinum society, and the impact that 
robotics, innovation, and health care will have not only 
on Japan but also on the Japanese economy.   
He’s also talking about a restoration of confidence 
long term, and I think this is an issue, because Japan is a 
country that has lost confidence. It’s been in a state of 
angst. The Japanese have had at least two decades of 
lost economic growth that have translated into a 
collective angst. A restoration of confidence will change 
things fairly significantly if it comes – and I think that it 
is coming.  
Mr. Abe has decided that he is going to make a 
major statement on the 70th anniversary of the Potsdam 
Declaration. He has put together a blue ribbon 
commission made up of a large number of very leading 
lights throughout Japanese society to work on this. A lot 
of people are holding their breath on what that will be. 
Some are saying that he should take the Moriyama 50th 
anniversary statement and live with that. That, I think, 
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comes into the issue of a lot of people having questions, 
more so outside of Japan maybe than inside Japan, 
about Mr. Abe’s intentions. 
So, the stated pillars of Japanese foreign policy as 
enunciated by Mr. Abe, and more coherently by the 
Japanese foreign minister recently, are three. The first is 
to strengthen the U.S.-Japanese alliance, the second is to 
enhance relationships with neighbouring countries (and 
given what you've heard from other speakers, you know 
this is a challenge), and the third is to strengthen 
economic diplomacy as a means of revitalizing the 
Japanese economy. Certainly the Japan-US alliance is the 
lynchpin to Japanese foreign policy. The bargain which 
has been in place all these years is that collective security 
has been led by the United States for Japan, and in 
return, Japan has been fairly free to pursue economic 
growth. 
I’m not going to spend a lot of time on the second 
topic because my colleagues have talked already on the 
strengthening of the relationship with neighbouring 
countries. Thus, the third one is strengthening 
economic diplomacy. In that area, Mr. Abe can do a lot 
for promoting the revitalization of the Japanese 
economy and for that, participation in the Trans Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), which is the 14-nation discussion 
that is going on now, is key. It would require a fairly 
significant structural reform in the Japanese economy, a 
third arrow discussion involving the sensitive issues of 
agriculture and forestry in particular. Mr. Abe has 
described the program as ‘active pacifism.’ It is a rather 
awkward phrase, and apparently it sounds just as 
awkward in Japanese as it does in English, so we’ll see 
where and how that comes. 
Backing up, one of those three major pillars of 
Japanese foreign policy is a so-called proactive 
contribution to peace. I don’t think that’s very different 
from what we’ve seen; it’s the continuity of Japanese 
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foreign policy, which has seen very strong support for 
the United Nations (UN), and its subsidiary 
organizations. Japan has a long outstanding request to 
be granted permanent membership (on the Security 
Council). It has been opposed by China, of course, but 
that is not the only obstacle, and I don’t think that any 
of the other permanent members are anxious for any 
enlargement of the permanent members of the Security 
Council. Japan will be getting a seat, I’m sure, for the 
eleventh time, on a two-year temporary basis. It’s a 
driving force for arms control and disarmament. The 
nuclear issue has been used and they have been very 
prominent in that activity. They’ve also become much 
more prominent participants in UN peacekeeping 
activities and I think they’ve been involved now in 
eleven different peacekeeping operations and put about 
10,000 people in the field. This aside from the Japanese 
exercise in Afghanistan, which was not a UN mission. 
It has been a tremendous evolution: I was in Japan 
when the first UN peacekeeping operation was sent off 
from Sendai in 1995, and it was a huge trauma for the 
whole country to be sending unarmed peacekeeping 
officers from the Japan Self-Defense Force abroad. 
Basically, with that and with their Aid and Development 
program, which has always been one of the largest in 
the World, as well as with their activities on the 
environment and human security, their approach has 
been very much what I would call a significant force for 
good.   
The other thing that is starting to happen though, 
and this plays into the regional discussion that we’re 
having, is a great deal of focus on open and stable seas, 
and the issue of Law of the Sea. I don’t think Japan has 
particularly ever thought of itself as a sea power in the 
way that the United States is a sea power, or the 
traditional colonial powers have been sea powers. It’s 
fair to say that China has never really been a sea power, 
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at least not in modern times. China has been looking for 
sea access, both from the South Seas and also from 
Burma and towards the Indian Ocean. That’s where 
some of this competition is really coming from in terms 
of the seas, and Japan, of course, is stressing not only 
that it is a democracy, but that the rule of law is what 
should prevail in that whole discussion.   
The issue of international terrorism represents a 
particular challenge for the Japanese, as they lost ten 
people in Algeria some time ago and two people to the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) more 
recently. Japan, quite frankly, doesn’t know how to deal 
with this and wishes it would go away. Traditionally, 
Japan, when faced with these kinds of issues, uses what 
we used to call Cheque Book Diplomacy, meaning they 
try to pay their way out of it. They tried it in this case, 
and of course that didn’t work. So they have a particular 
challenge in terms of the set of international terrorist 
activities that are going on. If we look at the North-East 
Asian neighbourhood, and the previous speakers have 
gone into some detail on that, I won’t say much more 
than that in some cases it’s an issue of looking backward 
or looking forward where the Chinese and the Koreans 
refuse to forget or forgive, and the Japanese refuse to 
either remember or acknowledge.   
There has been some acknowledgement, but Mr. 
Abe says that they have to have a policy that is forward-
looking. He does not want to look back in spite of his 
strong and nationalistic intent and his visit to the 
Yasukuni Shrine, but he is very much looking 
outwardly. I think this is in part because Abe is 
someone who wants to portray himself as a strong 
nationalist internally, but very much as a statesman 
internationally. These two come into some kind of 
conflict. The perceptions that Japan and China have of 
each other are one thing, but the truth of the matter is 
that these economies are now very heavily integrated. 
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This is, in terms of the trade relationship and in terms 
of the economic relationship, the anchor for growth, 
and a revitalized Japan is important for China and the 
rest of Asia as well, but China is very much at the centre 
of it. The politics and the economics are somewhat at 
odds. Another of the standard phrases that comes up, 
which is the phrase “mutually beneficial based on 
common strategic interests,” is the phrase that Mr. Abe 
uses on every occasion when he is asked to describe the 
state of the China-Japan relationship. There’s a great 
deal underneath that statement, but that is his formal 
position on it.   
Japan has been making efforts. There is no regional 
cooperation mechanism to address issues. Last year, I 
was in Beijing for the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) leaders meeting and there was 
finally a bilateral exchange between the Chinese and the 
Japanese leadership. I don’t think it lasted more than 
about ten minutes. Mr. Abe sat beside the Korean 
president, and that was about it. The foreign ministers 
have met fairly recently, so there is some discussion 
going on, but where and how that will come, that is 
going to be the biggest challenge in what is a fairly 
tough neighbourhood. 
North Korea has been an intractable problem. I was 
also the Canadian Ambassador in South Korea, and I 
never believed or dreamed that today we would still 
have a succession of dictatorships. The Japanese 
approach to that is basically a very visceral one, as 
exemplified by the abductee issue. Also, Japan is more 
immediately threatened than anyone else, except for 
South Korea, by the range of North Korean missiles. 
The approach taken by Japan is one of dialogue but also 
pressure, and also action for actions, and we’ll see where 
that goes.   
In my opinion, it’s in the broader Asian 
neighbourhood, which includes South-East Asia and 
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India, that you’re finding the real China-Japan 
competition for influence. Again, Abe’s stated principles 
are directed very much at South-East Asia, where the 
Japanese are protecting freedom of thought and 
freedom of speech in the region and where his 
diplomats on every occasion abroad present Japan as a 
country with the rule of law and democracy, in contrast 
with their next door neighbour China. Again, with 
South-East Asia he is emphasizing that they seize on 
being governed by rules and laws, rather than by might, 
and pursue free and open interacting economies 
through flows of trade and investment. Of course, Japan 
and several of those South-East Asian countries are 
members of the negotiating teams for the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership and China is not. There is a grand design 
for an Asia-Pacific free trade area which would include 
China, called the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. 
This has been under discussion for about fifteen years, 
and I think we’ll probably be talking for another 15 
years on that particular issue.  
Japan-China rivalry also expresses itself in things like 
the Asian Development Bank, which is very much a 
Japanese-led development bank. The more recent 
decision by China to create an Asian Infrastructure 
Bank is again looking for influence in both directions 
and it puts a number of other countries, including 
Canada, in an interesting situation on how they play it.   
One of the things that is quite interesting to me 
right now is that you have three very strong leaders; Abe 
in Japan, Xi Jinping in China, and Modi in India. How 
that will play itself out I don’t know yet. We haven’t 
seen that juxtaposition of leadership, certainly, in recent 
times. Abe is also looking for more fruitful intercultural 
ties in South-East Asia and a lot of activity has been 
generated, particularly in fostering interchange among 
the younger generations. He’s also seeking an informal 
security relationship, or strategy, through what he calls 
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‘The Democracies’ in the region. What is fundamental 
to this is that, aside from the US, it would include only 
Australia, the Philippines, and Korea. I’m not sure if or 
how that will come, but it is certainly an objective of the 
Japanese in the region.   
I’m going to say one word on the Canada-Japan 
relationship. As a former Canadian diplomat, I can’t 
resist the opportunity to say that the Japanese foreign 
policy and Canadian foreign policy, traditionally, have 
had a great deal in common, both in terms of our 
multilateral and our international approaches. There’s 
been a lot of cooperation on our aid and development 
programs, in the UN and its agencies, and in 
peacekeeping over the years. Having said that, our 
relationship has been 'under-cultivated.' This phrase was 
used recently publicly by the outgoing Japanese 
ambassador to Canada, and I think that it is absolutely 
true. 
At the same time, I think there is a renewal of 
interest on the part of Japan and Canada after 15 years 
or so of benign neglect. We are in the negotiation 
process for a bilateral economic partnership agreement 
that has become complicated by our joint participation 
in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Sitting on the West 
Coast, where I spend a significant portion of my time, 
there is a much greater renewed expression of interest 
on the part of the Japanese in Canada from a security 
and supply point of view. They are involved in five of 
the fifteen liquefied natural gas proposals that are on the 
table. When I am traveling in Japan I see that Canada is 
back in some way on the Japanese map in a way that it 
has not been for a while.   
I would like to conclude with some observations. 
First, for Abe, it’s very much the politics of personality. 
I find it’s quite interesting because I was in Japan for 
almost 5 years and we went through five prime 
ministers. I’m not sure people will remember the names 
 
Campbell 
248 
 
of more than one or two of them. Nevertheless, I came 
to the conclusion that in Japan it was more important to 
have been a prime minister than to be a prime minister 
and to get back into the Liberal Democratic Party 
political system. But Abe, certainly the second time 
around, has surprised a lot of people after his aborted 
effort the first time. Second, I don’t think that there is 
going to be any real fundamental shift in Japanese 
foreign policy, in part for some of the reasons that were 
illustrated earlier. Japan is a democracy. There is not a 
desire for a significantly different approach to foreign 
policy, even though Asia and the neighbours of Japan, 
particularly China, have put effort into different 
dimensions, such as the rise of Chinese economic 
power. 
For a long time, Japan didn’t see itself as Asian. It 
saw itself as being in Asia, and it was Fukuzawa, the 
very influential Meiji thinker, who said that Western 
civilization had advanced so much that Japan must leave 
Asia to become a modern, industrialized country. So 
certainly Japan saw itself very much as a ‘Western 
power,’ a member of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, an advanced, 
developed country in a region that was not in that 
category. Yet it very much now sees itself as Asian, 
given the challenges and the opportunities. I think we 
are going to see more open economic diplomacy. 
I also think that Abe really does believe in opening 
up the economy, and that the TPP is an opportunity to 
do that. One could call it gaiatsu. I’m not sure that it’s 
gaiatsu because I’m not sure he sees it internally as such. 
His challenge, of course, even more than the general 
population, is going to be his own political party, where 
there is not a lot of stomach for the kinds of reform that 
he thinks are necessary. Also, we should never 
underestimate Japan’s ability to renew itself, to reinvent 
itself. It has done this repeatedly over the years, most 
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notably with the Meiji Restoration and again after the 
Second World War. A lot of us have misread Japan 
throughout the years; for many years we ignored Japan, 
we then became rather admiring of Japan and its 
economic prowess, and next we came to envy Japan.  
We now tend to be dismissive of Japan as a post-
modern society, a bit like Switzerland, but I think there 
is an opportunity and a capacity in that society to renew 
itself. More importantly, I think the big question is: 
“This time around, does it have the energy, and as an 
aging population, does it have the capacity to undertake 
significant renewal?” In my opinion, the next couple of 
years are going to be very interesting. If Abe fails in his 
Abenomics, in his economic policy, this will be a lurch 
further backwards. I don’t believe that he’s a militarist, 
and I also don’t think that he’s an irredentist either. He’s 
a strong nationalist. 
When you really do look at the things he’s looking 
for, which would and have required reinterpretation of 
the constitution, they are rather modest. We must 
recognize that Abe is playing in what has been vividly 
portrayed as a difficult and dangerous neighbourhood. 
From Meiji to Modern: Information 
Flows between Japan and ‘the West’ 
from 1853 to 2015 
Matthew P. Farrell 
 
Introduction 
 
For over two hundred years Japan remained closed off 
from the Western world. During this self-imposed 
isolation, numerous advances and evolutions occurred 
in ‘the West’ in areas including politics, culture, and 
technology. The Meiji Revolution in 1868 marked the 
beginning of a new era of Japanese relations with ‘the 
West’, spurring a rapid transfer of information from the 
latter to the former. During this period, Japan 
demonstrated an immense capacity to innovate and 
adapt by not only assimilating but also mastering 
information from foreign sources. 
To most observers, Japan’s subsequent ascent to 
Great Power status at the beginning of the twentieth 
century was both remarkable and largely unanticipated. 
Japan’s contemporary status as a notable player on the 
international stage, in conjunction with its ability to 
rapidly adopt and adapt Western information, raises a 
number of questions including ‘to what extent has the 
flow of information into and out of Japan changed since 
the Meiji period, beginning in 1868?’ 
This paper will argue that since the Meiji 
Restoration, the flow of information between Japan and 
‘the West’ has undergone a series of general evolutions 
which can be categorized based on the direction of 
information flows and on the nature of the information 
itself. Between 1853 and the First World War (1914-18), 
information flowed primarily into Japan and was largely 
political and technological in nature. In the years after 
the Second World War (1937-1945), there has been a 
 
Japan and the World 
251 
 
tendency for technological and cultural information to 
flow out of Japan and towards ‘the West’. 
The paper’s thesis is informed and influenced by a 
Critical epistemological perspective whose influence is 
manifest in the subject of the paper; In undertaking to 
show the origins and transfer of information, this paper 
fundamentally examines the production of knowledge. 
The Critical perspective also impacts the understanding 
of various components of the argument at hand. 
Consequently, the first sections of the paper are devoted 
to defining key terms as they are understood from a 
Critical perspective and to discussing the assumptions of 
the methodology. The subsequent section identifies and 
classifies information flows in the period of the Meiji 
Restoration and the post-World War II era. 
 
Definitions 
 
In this section, significant terms will be defined in order 
to clarify usage in the subsequent discussion. The terms 
defined in this section are information, information 
flow, and ‘the West’. These terms are essential to a 
complete understanding of the argument and must 
therefore be clearly understood in the context at hand. 
Given that the fundamental topic of discussion in 
this paper is the transfer of information between two 
parties, and given its broad meaning in popular usage, it 
is pertinent to begin by specifying what is meant by 
information. For the purposes of the current discussion, 
information should be understood in its broadest 
conceptualization, including, but not limited to; 
knowledge of political norms, cultural practices, and 
technological advancements. For instance, information 
may refer to anything from ideologies, to popular media, 
to machinery. 
The term ‘information flow’ is borrowed from 
telecommunications studies such as Daqing Yang’s 2010 
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study “Telecommunication and the Japanese Empire: A 
Preliminary Analysis of Telegraphic Traffic”. In the 
context of telecommunications, information flows refer 
to “the content, volume, and direction of information”.1 
Although this limited definition is sufficient for Yang’s 
study and consequent arguments, in the present 
discussion it must be broadened to accommodate the 
comprehensive understanding of information proposed 
above and to account for the broader scope of 
information transfer at the international (rather than 
national) level. Consequently, information flows here 
refer to noticeable and sustained trends in the transfer 
of information from one entity to another that leads to 
behavioural changes and/or socio-cultural shifts in the 
recipient entity. These flows are categorized in terms of 
their nature (political, cultural, or technological) and 
direction (inflow or outflow). 
Information flows may for example include the 
transfer of customs, processes, or goods. In order to 
constitute information flow, information transfer should 
persist over the course of at minimum two consecutive 
administrations or approximately ten years when the 
government is not directly implicated in the information 
transfer. Additionally, neither the nature of the 
information nor the predominant direction of the 
transfer should change substantially within this 
timeframe. If either of these criteria are not met, there 
may be information transfer, but not the macro-level, 
sustained information flows which are of interest here. 
‘The West’ (or variations thereon such as ‘Western’) 
indicates the collection of North American and Western 
European states which tended toward Great Power 
status during key historical periods between 1853 and 
                                                          
1 Daqing Yang, “Telecommunication and the Japanese Empire: A 
Preliminary Analysis of Telegraphic Traffic,” Historical Social Research 
/ Historische Sozialforschung 35, no 1 (2010): 66, Accessed February 6 
2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20762429. 
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2015. In the Meiji period (1853 – 1918) ‘the West’ 
included Germany, the British Empire, the Netherlands, 
and the Russian Empire. Between the periods under 
consideration (1918 – 1945), ‘the West’ included 
Germany, the British Empire, the Netherlands, the 
United Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR), and the United 
States of America (U.S.). In the post-World War II 
period (1945 – 2015), ‘the West’ took on a new 
politicized meaning due to the reality of the Cold War, 
however it will here be considered to include members 
of both the Western and Eastern blocs without 
significant regard for their political tendencies during 
the Cold War. 
Information, information flows, and ‘the West’ are 
essential terms in this paper largely due to the 
methodological choices which underlie the discussion at 
hand. Once these terms have been defined it becomes 
possible to examine the assumptions of the 
methodology used in the course of the essay, which will 
be done in the next section. 
 
Methodology 
 
The first methodological assumption is to consider 
macro-level information flows rather than information 
transfers. The second is that the nature of information 
flows can be limited to three dimensions. The third 
assumption is that information flows between Japan and 
‘the West’ can be identified without significant 
interference from information transfers with other 
entities. 
Since the late twentieth century, the speed of 
information transfer has increased exponentially due to 
technological advances such as the telephone and the 
airplane as well as political advances such as the 
establishment of permanent foreign missions. 
Furthermore, individuals and collectives throughout the 
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World are able to ideate and to share their ideas via 
information-transfer technology (e.g. communications 
technology). Based on the speed of information 
transfer, the plurality of sources of information, and the 
proliferation of information-transfer technology, it 
could be reasoned that information transfer, which may 
take the form of many small bursts of information is 
more significant than the sustained information flows 
defined above. This analysis prioritizes micro-level 
information transfer between actors ranging from 
multinational corporations to private citizens. However, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately track or 
estimate micro-level information transfers and such 
transfers could hardly be limited to either inflow or 
outflow. Rather than attempting to examine these 
micro-level information flows, many of which are 
extremely brief in duration, this paper focuses on 
macro-level information flows which are sustained and 
have discernable long-term effects. This allows for a 
macro-level discussion that considers information at the 
level of the state rather than a micro-level discussion 
fixed in a technically specific context (as in Yang 2010). 
Another assumption is that the nature of 
information flows can be defined in terms of only 
political, cultural, and technological dimensions. One 
might propose the use of additional dimensions, 
considering these three insufficient. For example, 
information flows could be defined in terms of social, 
legal, and economic dimensions in addition to political, 
cultural, and technological dimensions. However, 
adding more dimensions to the analysis would make it 
more difficult to identify information flows because 
information would be disaggregated and therefore the 
criterion that the nature of information remain 
consistent for a sustained period of time would be 
undermined. It is therefore practical to amalgamate 
various types of information under one of the three 
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dimensions of politics, culture, and technology. For 
example, political, cultural, and technological 
information would involve the reception of foreign 
diplomats, television programmes, and nuclear power 
plant designs respectively. 
The final assumption in this paper is to focus on 
information flows between ‘the West’ and Japan (rather 
than focusing on any other regions or countries). This 
may be misconstrued as Eurocentrism. To focus on ‘the 
West’, however, is not to say that nearby countries, such 
as China or Korea, have had a negligible relationship 
with Japan in terms of information transfer. Rather, ‘the 
West’ has been chosen in order to demonstrate the 
transmission of information between entities which had 
had nearly no contact before a certain point in time, but 
which nonetheless developed along similar lines after 
contact was made. The relationship between ‘the West’ 
and Japan presents an interesting example of this 
situation because it began definitively with the Meiji 
Restoration and has continued to grow and evolve ever 
since. 
The purpose of the present essay is to examine the 
flows of information into and out of Japan between the 
late nineteenth and early twenty-first centuries. A 
particular methodology has been employed to that end 
which has three assumptions. First, this paper views 
information flows at a macro level. Second, the nature 
of information flows is considered only in terms of its 
political, cultural, and technological dimensions. Third, 
‘the West’ is identified as the counterpart to Japan 
(rather than an entity such as China) because the 
relationship between ‘the West’ and Japan has an 
identifiable beginning, the Meiji Restoration, and has 
experienced continued growth from that point. 
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Information Flows 
 
A brief discussion of the history of Japan is necessary as 
a foundation upon which to build to the central theme 
of information flows. Each of the following subsections 
will consequently begin with a brief history of the 
period being addressed and will include a categorization 
of the predominant information flows in that period. 
 
The Meiji Period (1853 – 1918) 
 
The Meiji Restoration began in 1868, marking the end 
of the Tokugawa era, which had begun nearly three 
hundred years earlier in 1600.2 1868 further marks the 
date of Japan’s reopening to the outside world. The 
process leading to the reopening of Japan began in 1853 
when an American fleet under the command of 
Commodore Matthew Perry arrived in Japan.3 Perry’s 
arrival in Japan, in conjunction with pre-existing internal 
political struggles, 
 
brought an end to the ascendancy of the warrior 
class [samurai] and replaced the decentralized 
structure of early modern feudalism [bakufu] 
with a central state under the aegis of the 
traditional sovereign, now transformed into a 
modern monarch.4 
 
From the economy to the political sphere, after 1853 life 
in Japan was to undergo a series of changes that would 
                                                          
2 George M. Wilson, “Plots and Motives in Japan's Meiji 
Restoration,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 25, no. 3 
(1983): 407, Accessed February 11 2015, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/178622. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Marius B. Jansen, The Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 5 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 144. 
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prepare it for the imminent information flows which 
had thus far been suppressed by its policy of isolation. 
With the Meiji Restoration came a strong desire on 
the part of the reformed Japanese government to 
emulate the Western nations that it had rejected up to 
that point. The consequent efforts of the government to 
achieve this goal began the flow of information between 
Japan and ‘the West’. At the beginning of the Meiji 
Period, information flows were primarily political in 
nature, soon becoming coupled with technological 
information flows. 
In his 1948 article, “Western Influences on the Meiji 
Restoration”, Nobutaka Ike notes that the political 
change of the Meiji Restoration “was obviously a 
conscious attempt to adapt Western techniques of 
government in order to refurbish the old feudal 
system”5 prevalent in Japan prior to the 1860s. This 
attempt to replicate Western politics constitutes the 
beginnings of an information transfer, but not an 
information flow per the definition provided above. In 
order to identify a sustained political information flow 
from ‘the West’ to Japan it is necessary to return to 
Japanese history. 
One of the major stimuli that compelled Japan to an 
interest in Western political structures was the defeat of 
China by the British during the Anglo-Chinese War, 
which took place from 1839-1842.6 Seeing war as the 
exercise of political power abroad, victory in war was 
considered indicative of strong domestic politics. The 
defeat of their (geographically) close neighbour made 
Japanese politicians realize that Western political 
information might have something to contribute to the 
existing Japanese political structure. Consequently, 
                                                          
5 Nobutaka Ike, “Western Influences on the Meiji Restoration,” 
Pacific Historical Review 17, no. 1 (1948): 1, Accessed February 9 
2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3634763. 
6 Ibid, 3. 
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encyclopedic Chinese volumes such as the Hai-kuo t'u-
chih and Ssu-chou chih gained a greater importance in 
Japan, in part due to the fact that they included content 
regarding the political structures of ‘the West’.7 
Although the Meiji Restoration did not occur until 1868, 
the beginnings of information flows into Japan can be 
seen from 1842 when Japanese politicians began to 
import Western political information. After 1853, Japan 
increased its pursuit of Western political information 
and “intellectuals and officials were able to travel abroad 
and study Western institutions at first hand”.8 The 
experiences of these officials constituted further 
acquisition and transfer of information. 
The historical data provided above demonstrates the 
commitment of Meiji-era Japan to acquiring Western 
political information, not only as an isolated instance in 
the Meiji Restoration, but as a trend dating from at least 
as far back as 1842 and continuing through 1853 to 
result in the reconfiguration of the Japanese political 
structure in 1868. Evidently, given this later 
transformation of the Japanese political system in the 
image of Western systems, the political information 
which entered Japan with the Meiji Restoration was not 
an isolated instance. Rather, an information flow was 
established by the Japanese in the mid-nineteenth 
century via political texts and diplomatic missions in 
order to develop a new political system which might 
help to secure a strong place in the twentieth century 
world. This trend of information transfer and 
acquisition demonstrated an information flow into 
Japan which was political in nature. 
A strong political foundation was not the only 
requirement for Japan to become a powerful player on 
the international stage. In addition to developing 
                                                          
7 Ibid, 3-4. 
8 Ibid, 4-5. 
 
Japan and the World 
259 
 
politically, Japan also developed technologically, again 
drawing on information from Western countries to 
build its own expertise. To do so, a technological 
information inflow was established from ‘the West’ to 
Japan. 
In his 1977 article “Success Illgotten? The Role of 
Meiji Militarism in Japan's Technological Progress”, 
Kozo Yamamura argues that technological advancement 
in Japan is primarily the result of military concerns. 
Although there may be other reasons for technological 
advancement, this argument is particularly relevant for 
the current discussion given the interest in Japan’s quick 
ascent to power on the international stage just before 
the global conflicts of the twentieth century and the 
definitive role of technology in allowing that rise to take 
place. 
Yamamura states that it was concerns about national 
security combined with new militarist policies that were 
 
the principal motivation behind creating and 
expanding the arsenals and other publicly-
financed shipyards and modern factories which 
acted as highly effective centers for the 
absorption and dissemination of Western 
technologies and skills”.9 
 
Such technologies and skills constitute a strong example 
of technological information. This information was 
transferred into Japan as the country sought to bring its 
military to the same level as those of foreign nations. As 
in the case of political information, this isolated example 
permits the identification of an information flow when 
                                                          
9 Kozo Yamamura, “Success Illgotten? The Role of Meiji Militarism 
in Japan's Technological Progress,” The Journal of Economic History 
37, no. 1 (1977): 113, Accessed February 2 2015, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2119450. 
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coupled with previous information transfer across the 
Meiji period. 
As was stated above, Japan’s reopening to the world 
was precipitated in part by American military pressure 
and by the Anglo-Chinese War between 1839 and 1842. 
These two factors also played a part in preparing Japan 
to seek technological information from ‘the West’.10 
Japanese leaders at the time recognized that more 
advanced Western technology, and not only political 
structure, had contributed to the superiority of the US 
and British militaries and sought to replicate it by 
importing technological information. This continued 
into the twentieth century, notably prior to the 1904 
Russo-Japanese War when Japan undertook “the rapid 
dissemination of modern [Western] technology” within 
its “shipbuilding, machinery, and machine-tool 
industries”, for instance by importing European 
machinery and recruiting skilled European workers in 
order to have a military on a par with that of the 
Russian Empire.11,12 The continuous Japanese interest in 
Western military information from the mid-nineteenth 
to early twentieth century demonstrates a trend which 
permits the identification of an information flow into 
Japan that was technological in nature. 
Given the rather overwhelming inflow of 
information into Japan during the Meiji Period, it is 
difficult to identify information flows from Japan 
toward ‘the West’. This is compounded by 
contemporary Western countries’ ethnocentric values 
and their consequent resistance to adopting information 
                                                          
10 “After being forced to sign the humiliating unequal treaties with 
the Western powers and witnessing also the fate of China, the new 
Meiji government hastened to expand Japan’s military capabilities” 
(Yamamura, 113-114). 
11 Ibid, 121. 
12 This strategy was successful and resulted in the victory of the 
Japanese Empire. 
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from a country where “they encountered nothing […] 
to jolt their faith in [Western] civilization and 
progress”.13 That is, Japanese technology and political 
structures seemingly did not have anything to offer ‘the 
West’ and the corresponding information consequently 
was not transferred. As such, the information flows 
between Japan and ‘the West’ during the Meiji Period 
were unidirectional and took the form of inflows into 
Japan for the most part. These inflows were political 
and technological in nature. 
 
The Postwar Period (1945 – 2015) 
 
The period following World War II marks a new phase 
of Japan’s relationship with ‘the West’. In this period, 
information flows are of a different nature from those 
of the Meiji era and have largely changed direction as 
well. In the postwar period, the primary information 
flows are technological and cultural and flow from 
Japan to ‘the West’. 
Immediately following World War II, Japan was a 
nation in tatters. The country was a part of the losing 
alliance of the war and was the first target of nuclear 
weapons. Despite this disadvantageous start to the 
postwar period, Japan is “at the forefront of much of 
the latest technology”,14 such that Western nations 
which fought against it then, now look to Japan as a 
leader in innovation and technological information. 
Japan’s motivation for technological advancement 
stems in part from the effects of the 1970s oil crisis.15 In 
order to avoid succumbing to the potential devastation 
                                                          
13 Wilson, “Plots and Motives in Japan's Meiji Restoration,” 413. 
14 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, The Technological Transformation of Japan: From 
the Seventeenth to the Twenty-First Century (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 308. 
15 Carter V. Findley and John A. M. Rothney, Twentieth-Century 
World (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2011), 408. 
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of the crisis, funding for research and development in 
the country was quadrupled, leading Japan to become an 
exporter of technology by 1980.16 Japanese investment 
in innovation continued after the oil crisis was over and 
Findley and Rothney note that after 1989, there was “a 
new wave of Japanese-led technological innovation”,17 
implying that technological information was produced 
in Japan and shared with other entities including ‘the 
West’. This trend of innovation, information 
production, and export of technological information 
from the 1970s through to the 1990s and beyond 
demonstrates an information outflow from Japan to ‘the 
West’ which is technological in nature. 
Technological information flow from Japan includes 
communications technology, which has played a major 
role in conveying cultural information since the Second 
World War. In the postwar period, cultural information 
has become increasingly important and cultural 
information flows between Japan and ‘the West’ are 
primarily outflows from the former to the latter. 
The growth of Japan’s soft power is one notable 
example of cultural information. In his 2009 article 
“Japan’s Gross National Cool,” Douglas McGray 
examines the idea that modern-day Japan is no longer 
merely accepting cultural trends from ‘the West’, but 
that it is now producing cultural information for export 
to ‘the West’. McGray identifies this as a trend from the 
late twentieth century to the present day. One example 
of this trend is the popularity of Japanese anime and 
manga, which contain many elements of Japanese 
mythology, religion, and history (all of which fall into 
the category of cultural information), in North America. 
In Cinema Anime (2006), Antonia Levi writes about 
anime that were available in North America from the 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid, 414. 
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1960s such as Astroboy.18 She also writes about the 
“dramatic growth”19 from the 1990s to the early 2000s 
of conventions which either incorporate, or are 
exclusively dedicated to, anime and/or manga (ex. 
Anime Expo, founded in 1990 and J-Con, founded in 
2008). The consistent popularity of anime and manga in 
‘the West’ and their export to ‘the West’ demonstrate a 
transfer of cultural information from Japan, but show 
only the informal transfer. 
It is also important to highlight that the Japanese 
government supports the export of cultural information. 
The brand Cool Japan, for example, has been actively 
promoted by the Japanese government since the mid-
2000s with the specific intent of exporting Japanese 
cultural information. The Japanese government also 
demonstrated its commitment to the production and 
dissemination of cultural information when it appointed 
Doraemon, an iconic anime character both in Japan and 
abroad, as the Anime Ambassador of Japan.20 
The support of the Japanese government for 
cultural information outflows is particularly important 
because it shows a link between information flows and 
foreign policy, specifically a consciousness of the 
importance of soft power.21 Based on the new 
importance placed on cultural information flows by the 
Japanese government, it is possible to say that the 
Japanese understanding of foreign policy has evolved 
                                                          
18 Antonia Levi, “The Americanization of Anime and Manga: 
Negotiating Popular Culture,” in Cinema Anime: Critical Engagements 
with Japanese Animation, Steven Brown (ed.), 47 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006). 
19 Ibid, 46. 
20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Pop-Culture Diplomacy,” 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, last modified August 14, 2014, 
Accessed February 7 2015, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/exchange/pop/. 
21 Soft power is “the ability to indirectly influence behavior or 
interests through cultural or ideological means” (Yano, 2009). 
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over the past 150 years. Whereas in the nineteenth 
century information flows promoted by the government 
had the goal of bringing Japan closer to the standards of 
the West for military reasons, in the twenty-first century 
information flows are employed to spread the soft 
power of Japan abroad. 
Both informal and governmental initiatives have 
contributed to outflows of Japanese cultural information 
in the postwar period. Informal transfers of cultural 
information beginning in the 1960s have continued and 
have even been formalized and endorsed by the 
Japanese government in the twenty-first century. This 
trend indicates cultural information flows from Japan to 
‘the West’. 
Unlike those during the Meiji Period, post-World 
War II information flows between Japan and ‘the West’ 
are no longer dominated by the transfer of information 
into Japan. Japan’s commitment to innovation in the 
post-World War II period has made it a leader in 
creating technological information and has thus led to a 
technological information outflow. Simultaneously, 
technology has facilitated the spread of cultural 
information between Japan and ‘the West’ resulting in a 
significant outflow of cultural information from Japan 
notably as a mechanism of soft power. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Information flows are broad trends in the movement of 
information from one entity to another. During the 
Meiji Period there was a tendency toward political and 
technological information flows from ‘the West’ into 
Japan. This essay helps to show that this is no longer 
true in the post-World War II period. Since then, 
technological information flows and cultural 
information flows originating in Japan flow towards ‘the 
West’. 
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Information flows are extremely helpful in 
identifying the motivations and concerns of 
governments as well as other important information 
such as trends in innovation and development. 
Maintaining an awareness of information flows should 
be a priority of any critical observer of international 
affairs. Although the future is uncertain, such awareness 
can help make sense what has been and what may yet 
come to pass. 
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3K JOBS: 
Factory jobs in Japan which 
are considered kiken 
(dangerous), kitanai (dirty), 
and kitsui (difficult). 
 
 
ABENOMICS: 
An economic policy 
composed of three arrows 
proposed by Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe of Japan in 
2012. 
 
AMERICANIZATION: 
Incorporation and influence 
of Western culture in a non-
Western context. 
 
 
AMA-LOLI: 
Sweet Lolita. A style of 
“Lolita” which tends 
towards very sweet, girly, or 
childish styles. 
 
ANGLO-CHINESE WAR: 
A conflict between China 
and the British Empire from 
1839 to 1842 which resulted 
in the defeat of the Chinese. 
 
 
ANGURA (アングラ): 
A subculture including 
subcultures and fashion 
styles such as S&M, fetish, 
body modification, gothic, 
steam punk, and cyber punk. 
Glossary 
|Glossaire 
 
 
Les emplois au Japon qui 
sont considérés kiken 
(dangereux), kitanai 
(dégoutants), et kitsui 
(difficiles). 
 
 
Une politique économique à 
trois flèches créée par le 
Premier Ministre du Japon 
Shinzo Abe en 2012. 
 
 
 
L’incorporation et l’influence 
de la culture occidentale 
dans des contextes non-
occidentales. 
 
 
Une subdivision de “Lolita” 
qui tend à être 
particulièrement mignonne, 
féminine, ou infantile. 
 
 
Une guerre entre l’Empire 
britannique et la Chine entre 
1839 et 1842 qui a résulté 
dans la capitulation de la 
Chine. 
 
 
Une sous-culture qui inclut 
des styles telle que le 
fétichisme, la modification 
du corps, le gothique, le 
steampunk, et le cyberpunk. 
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ANIME (アニメ): 
Animated productions of 
Japanese origin or inspired 
by Japanese styles. 
 
APEC: 
See “Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation” 
 
ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC 
COOPERATION: 
An economic forum for 
Pacific Rim nations. 
 
 
ASSEMBLY CENTERS: 
Hastily prepared 
accommodations for persons 
of Japanese descent in 
Canada and the United 
States before they were sent 
to detention camps. 
 
ASSET BUBBLE: 
When assets prices rise at a 
rate exceeding that justified 
by valuations, eventually 
leading to a sudden drop in 
prices as they correct 
themselves with valuations. 
 
 
BAKUFU: 
Early modern feudalism in 
Japan. 
 
CAMPS DE DÉTENTION: 
See “Detention Camps” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Des animations venant du 
Japon ou inspirées par les 
styles japonais. 
 
 
Voyez “Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation” 
 
 
 
Un forum économique pour 
les nations bordant le 
Pacifique. 
 
 
Voyez “Centres de 
Rassemblement” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Le fait pour les prix 
d’augmenter plus rapidement 
que les évaluations justifiées, 
résultant dans une baisse 
soudaine dans les prix quand 
ils se règlent avec ces 
évaluations. 
 
 
Le féodalisme pré-modern 
au Japon. 
 
 
Des centres rapidement 
préparés au Canada et aux 
États-Unis pour loger des 
personnes d’ascendance 
japonaise pendant la 
Deuxième Guerre Mondiale. 
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CENTRES DE 
RASSEMBLEMENT: 
See “Assembly Centers” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CENTRES DE 
RÉINSTALLATION  
(Relocation Centers): 
See “Detention Camps” 
 
 
CHEQUE BOOK 
DIPLOMACY: 
Foreign policy which 
consists of using economic 
means to improve 
diplomatic relations. 
 
CHŪSHINGURA 
(忠臣蔵): 
Portrayals of the story of the 
47 ronin in Japanese 
literature, theatre, and film. 
 
 
CIVIL CODE OF 1898: 
A body of private law 
promulgated in 1898 which 
is notable for its role in 
formalizing the patriarchal 
family system in Japan. 
 
 
CLA-LOLI: 
Classic Lolita. The most 
basic form of “Lolita.” 
Tends to be prudish and to 
borrow imagery from the 
Victorian era. 
 
 
 
Les centres temporaires pour 
l’hébergement des personnes 
d’ascendance japonaise au 
Canada et aux États-Unis 
avant d’être envoyées aux 
camps de détention. 
 
 
 
 
Voyez “Camps de 
Détention” 
 
 
 
Une politique qui promeut 
l’utilisation de moyens 
économiques pour améliorer 
les relations diplomatiques. 
 
 
 
Les représentations de 
l’histoire des 47 ronin dans la 
littérature, le théâtre, et les 
films japonais. 
 
 
Un corpus de loi privée 
promulgué en 1898 qui est 
notable parce qu’il a 
formalisé le système du 
patriarcat dans les familles 
japonaises. 
 
 
Le “Lolita” classique. Tend à 
être prude et d’emprunter 
l’imagerie anglaise de l’ère 
victorienne. 
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CLASS-A WARTIME 
CRIMINALS: 
Classification used during 
the Tokyo War Crimes Trial 
by the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East; 
“Class A” indicates crimes 
against peace. 
 
COMFORT WOMEN: 
Translated from ianfu, a 
euphemism for shōfu 
(prostitute); this term refers 
to the women and girls 
forced into sexual slavery by 
the Imperial Japanese Army 
in occupied territories before 
and during WWII. 
 
COMMISSION DE 
SÉCURITÉ DE COLOMBIE-
BRITANNIQUE: 
A federal instrument created 
to manage the internment of 
Japanese in Canada during 
the Second World War. 
 
 
COOL JAPAN: 
A project initiated by the 
Ministry of Economy, 
Industry, and Trade in 2002 
to promote Japanese culture 
broad. 
 
COSPLAY: 
Also known as costume 
playing; people who dress up 
as their favourite anime, 
game, or manga characters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Classification utilisée par le 
Tribunal militaire 
international pour l'Extrême-
Orient pendant le Tribunal 
de Tokyo; “Class A” indique 
les crimes contre la paix. 
 
 
Le mot pour ianfu, un 
euphémisme pour shōfu 
(prostitue); référence aux 
femmes et filles forcées dans 
l’esclavage sexuelle par 
l’Armée Impériale Japonaise 
pendant la Deuxième Guerre 
mondiale. 
 
 
 
 
Un organisme fédéral crée 
pendant la Deuxième Guerre 
mondiale pour gérer 
l’internement des japonais au 
Canada. 
 
 
Un projet commencé par le 
ministère de l’Économie, du 
Commerce, et de l’Industrie 
en 2002 pour promouvoir la 
culture japonaise à l’étranger. 
 
 
Le fait de se costumer 
comme un(e) personnage 
d’un anime, jeu, ou manga. 
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CRITICAL 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE: 
A lens which highlights the 
production and structure of 
knowledge within the 
context of existing sets of 
power relations. 
 
CULTURAL 
HEGEMONY: 
The theory that a ruling class 
may dominate a diverse 
society by manipulating that 
society to prioritize its own 
culture. 
 
 
CULTURAL 
ODORLESSNESS: 
Absence of any specific 
culture or ethnicity. 
 
DETENTION CAMPS: 
Hastily-prepared camps in 
Canada and the United 
States in which many 
persons of Japanese descent 
were interned during the 
Second World War. 
 
DOKDO: 
Korean name for 
Takeshima. See “Takeshima” 
 
DUAL LABOUR 
MARKET: 
A system in Japan in which 
temporary female workers 
are hired in order to support 
core male workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Une approche qui met en 
relief la production et la 
structure des idées dans le 
contexte des relations de 
pouvoir préexistantes. 
 
 
 
La théorie qu’une classe 
prépondérante peut dominer 
une société diverse en 
manipulant cette société 
d’une manière qui priorise sa 
propre culture. 
 
 
 
Un manque de traites 
culturelles ou ethniques. 
 
 
Voyez “Camps de 
Détention” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mot coréen pour Takeshima. 
Voyez “Takeshima” 
 
 
 
Un système de travail au 
Japon dans lequel des 
travailleuses à temps partielle 
seront embauchées afin de 
supporter les hommes qui 
sont embauchés de façon 
permanent. 
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ECONOMIC MIRACLE: 
The significant reversal of 
Japan’s economy which led it 
to grow from its 
impoverished postwar state 
to become the World’s third-
largest economy in only a 
few decades. 
 
 
ENEMY ALIENS 
(Étrangers Ennemis): 
Designation given to persons 
of Japanese descent in 
Canada and the United 
States during the Second 
World War. 
 
ETHNIC IDENTITY: 
To identify oneself with a 
particular ethnic group. 
 
ÉTRANGERS 
ENNEMIS (Enemy Aliens): 
See “Enemy Aliens” 
 
 
 
 
 
FREE TRADE AREA OF 
THE ASIA-PACIFIC: 
A free-trade area proposed 
by Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation members. 
 
 
 
FUEIHÔ: 
A law written in Japan 
during the 1920s forbidding 
dancing in public spaces. 
 
 
 
Le renversement complet de 
l’économie du Japon qui lui a 
permis d’évoluer d’un état de 
pauvreté après la Deuxième 
Guerre mondiale à la 
troisième économie au 
monde en quelques 
décennies. 
 
 
 
Voyez “Étrangers Ennemis” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S’identifier avec un groupe 
ethnique. 
 
 
 
Nom donné aux personnes 
d’ascendance japonaise au 
Canada et aux États-Unis 
pendant la Deuxième Guerre 
mondiale. 
 
 
 
Une zone de libre-échange 
proposée par les membres de 
la Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation. 
 
 
 
Une loi au Japon qui date 
des années 1920s interdisant 
la dance dans les espaces 
publiques. 
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GAIATSU: 
Pressure applied by one 
nation on another. 
 
GAIJIN: 
Foreigner. 
 
GENCHI GENBUTSU: 
A Japanese expression 
meaning “go and see.” 
 
GENTLEMAN’S 
AGREEMENT OF 1907 
(Nichibei Shinshi Kyōyaku): 
An informal agreement 
between the United States 
(USA) and Japan to improve 
relations per which the USA 
would not impose 
restrictions on Japanese 
immigration and Japan 
would not allow further 
emigration to the USA. 
 
GOTH-LOLI: 
Gothic Lolita. A popular 
“Lolita” subculture which 
incorporates dark colours 
and Christian imagery. 
 
GOVERNMENT PENSION 
INVESTMENT FUND 
(GPIF): 
An independent 
administrative institution 
established by the Japanese 
government. 
 
GREAT POWER STATUS: 
Recognition of a sovereign 
state’s ability to exert its 
influence globally. 
 
 
 
 
Le fait pour un État de 
mettre la pression sur un 
autre. 
 
Étranger. 
 
 
Une expression japonaise 
signifiant “allez voir.” 
 
 
 
 
Un traité non-officiel entre 
les États-Unis et le Japon 
pour améliorer leurs 
relations selon lequel les 
États-Unis n’imposeraient 
pas de restrictions sur 
l’immigration japonaise et le 
Japon ne permettrait plus 
l’émigration aux États-Unis. 
 
 
Gothic Lolita. Une 
subculture de “Lolita” qui 
incorpore les couleurs foncés 
et le symbolisme chrétien. 
 
 
 
 
Une institution indépendante 
administrative établie par le 
gouvernement japonais. 
 
 
 
La recognition qu’une nation 
a la capacité d’influencer les 
relations et occurrences 
mondiales. 
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HAIKUO T’U-CHIH: 
A work published by Wei 
Yuan in 1844 on the 
geography and material 
conditions of foreign 
nations. 
 
HAKEN: 
Temporary worker. 
 
 
HENTAI: 
Perverted. 
 
HIGH-GROWTH ERA: 
The postwar period during 
which Japan experienced 
significant economic and 
socio-political growth. 
 
 
IE: 
Household. 
 
INFORMATION FLOWS: 
Noticeable trends in the 
adoption of information 
originating in one entity by 
another entity, particularly 
when that information takes 
the form of customs, 
processes, or goods. 
 
INWARD FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT: 
Investment from a foreign 
entity into the local or 
national economy. 
 
IOMANTE: 
An Ainu ceremony 
traditionally involving the 
sacrifice of a brown bear. 
 
 
Une publication écrite par 
Wei Yuan en 1844 traitant la 
géographie et les conditions 
matérielles des nations 
étrangères. 
 
 
Un(e) employé(e) 
temporaire. 
 
 
Pervers. 
 
 
La période de l’après-guerre 
pendant laquelle le Japon a 
connu une importante 
croissance économique et 
socio-politique. 
 
 
Famille. 
 
 
Des tendances importantes 
dans l’adoption de 
l’information créée dans une 
entité par une autre entité, 
notamment l’information en 
forme de coutume, de 
processus, ou de bien. 
 
 
 
L’investissement étranger 
dans l’économie locale ou 
nationale. 
 
 
Une cérémonie Ainu 
comprenant 
traditionnellement le 
sacrifice d’un ours brun. 
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ISIS: 
See “Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant” 
 
ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ 
AND THE LEVANT: 
A militant group which has 
been active since 1999 and 
which proclaimed itself a 
caliphate in 2014. 
 
ISSEI: 
The first generation of 
Japanese immigrants. 
 
JAPAN HOUSEWIVES 
ASSOCIATION: 
See “Shufuren” 
 
JAPAN SELF-DEFENCE 
FORCES: 
Japan’s domestic armed 
forces, which have 
participated in multiple 
peacekeeping missions 
abroad. 
 
JAPONÊS: 
Portuguese for “Japanese.” 
 
JINGOISM: 
Patriotism in the form of 
aggressive foreign policy. 
 
 
KAIZEN: 
Continuous improvement. 
 
KANKO-AINU (Ainu in 
Tourism): 
Ainu who portray or 
maintain traditional Ainu 
lifestyle and/or culture for 
the purpose of tourism. 
 
Voyez “Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant” 
 
 
 
Une groupe militante active 
depuis 1999 et qui, en 2014, 
s’est auto-proclamé un 
califat. 
 
 
La première génération 
d’immigrants japonais. 
 
 
 
Voyez “Shufuren” 
 
 
 
Les forces armées 
domestiques du Japon, qui 
ont fait partie de plusieurs 
opérations de maintien de la 
paix à l’étranger. 
 
 
Portugais pour “japonais.” 
 
 
Le patriotisme en forme de 
politiques étrangères 
agressives. 
 
 
L’amélioration continue. 
 
 
 
Des personnes Ainu qui 
présentent ou pratiquent la 
vie et/ou la culture 
traditionnelle Ainu pour sa 
valeur touristique. 
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KOKUSEI: 
Nationality. 
 
KOZOKU KOKKA (Family-
state): 
The idea of Japan being a 
single family, with the 
Emperor as the father and 
the population as his 
children. 
 
LOLITA: 
Individuals whose fashion 
style, and sometimes 
lifestyle, values, and ideas are 
inspired by the European 
aristocracy; A movement 
which began in the 1980s. 
 
 
MANGA (漫画): 
Comics created in Japan, or, 
less commonly, outside of 
Japan but in Japanese. 
 
MASS EVACUATION: 
See “Mass Expulsion” 
 
MASS EXPULSION: 
The forced expulsion of 
persons of Japanese descent 
from the Pacific West coast 
during the Second World 
War. 
 
MEIJI REVOLUTION: 
See “Meiji Restoration” 
 
MEIJI RESTORATION: 
The period of change 
beginning in 1868 during 
which Japan abandoned its 
policy of isolationism. 
 
 
Nationalité. 
 
 
 
L’idée du Japon comme une 
seule famille, avec 
l’Empereur comme le père et 
la population comme ses 
enfants. 
 
 
Les individus dont la mode, 
et quelquefois la mode de 
vie, les valeurs, et les idées 
s’inspirent de l’aristocratie 
européenne; Un mouvement 
commencé aux années 
1980s. 
 
 
Des bandes dessinées créées 
au Japon, ou créées hors du 
Japon mais écris en japonais. 
 
 
Voyez “Mass Expulsion” 
 
 
L’expulsion forcée des 
personnes d’ascendance 
japonaise du Côte Pacifique 
pendant la Deuxième Guerre 
mondiale. 
 
 
Voyez “Meiji Restoration” 
 
 
La période de changement 
au long de laquelle le Japon a 
abandonné l’isolationnisme. 
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MIRAI: 
Future. 
 
MUKOKUSEKITEKI: 
Denationalized. See 
“Cultural Odorlessness” 
 
MUKOKUSEKI: 
See “Cultural Odorlessness” 
 
 
NATIONAL STRATEGIC 
SPECIAL ZONES: 
Six economic zones 
designated by the Japanese 
government as areas in 
which dramatic regulatory 
reforms may be carried out. 
 
NICHIBEI SHINSHI 
KYŌYAKU: 
See “Gentleman’s 
Agreement of 1907” 
 
NIHON NO 
KAGAKUSHA: 
A Japanese scientist. 
 
NIKKEIJIN: 
Used to describe an emigrant 
or the descendants of 
emigrants from Japan. 
 
OCCUPATION 
CONSTITUTION: 
The 1947 Constitution of 
Japan which was largely 
influenced by the Allies 
following Japan’s defeat in 
World War Two. Notable 
for its renunciation of 
military force. 
 
 
 
Futur. 
 
 
Dénationalisé. Voyez 
“Cultural Odorlessness” 
 
 
Voyez “Cultural 
Odorlessness” 
 
 
 
Six zones économiques 
nommées par le 
gouvernement japonais pour 
être les sites des réformes 
dramatiques. 
 
 
 
Voyez “Gentleman’s 
Agreement of 1907” 
 
 
 
Un(e) scientiste japonais(e). 
 
 
Un émigrant ou les 
descendants d’un émigrant 
japonais. 
 
 
 
La Constitution du Japon 
créée en 1947 suite à la 
capitulation du Japon durant 
la Deuxième Guerre 
mondiale. Était largement 
influencée par les Alliés et 
est notable pour sa 
renonciation de la force 
militaire. 
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OCCUPATION OF 
JAPAN: 
The occupation of Japan by 
the Allies (led by the United 
States) following Japan’s 
defeat in World War Two. 
 
 
OUJI: 
Prince. 
 
PAATO-TAIMU 
(Temporary Employment): 
Part-time working positions 
in Japan. Characterized by 
lower wages, less benefits, 
and less job protection than 
permanent employment. 
 
 
PAY-TO-GO PROGRAM: 
A voluntary program created 
by the Japanese government 
to encourage nikkeijin to 
leave Japan. 
 
PEARL HARBOR: 
Site of a surprise attach by 
the Japanese military against 
an American naval base on 
December 7, 1941. Led to 
the entry of the United 
States into the war. 
 
 
PERMANENT 
EMPLOYMENT: 
A system in Japan wherein 
companies rarely dismiss 
employees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L’occupation du Japon par 
les Alliés (gérés par les États-
Unis) suite à la capitulation 
du Japon pendant la 
Deuxième Guerre mondiale. 
 
 
Un prince. 
 
 
 
Des emplois à temps partiels 
au Japon. Caractérisés par 
une moindre rémunération, 
moins de bénéfices, et moins 
de sécurité d’emploi que 
l’emploi permanent. 
 
 
Un programme volontaire 
créé par le gouvernement 
japonais pour encourager le 
départ des nikkeijin du Japon. 
 
 
Le site d’une attaque 
brusquée contre une base 
navale américaine par le 
militaire japonais le 7 
décembre, 1941. A mené les 
États-Unis à entrer dans la 
guerre. 
 
 
 
Un système au Japon dans 
lequel les entreprises ne 
congédient que rarement les 
travailleurs. 
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POLITIQUE FISCALE: 
One of the Three Arrows of 
Abenomics. Refers to 
reducing corporate taxes and 
increasing sales tax. 
 
 
POLITIQUE 
MONÉTAIRE: 
One of the Three Arrows of 
Abenomics. Refers to the 
injection of cash into the 
economy. 
 
POSTNATIONALISM: 
A lens which posits that 
traditional nation states have 
become unnatural, and even 
insignificant entities. 
 
POTSDAM 
DECLARATION: 
The declaration calling for, 
and defining the terms of, 
Japan’s surrender during 
World War II. 
 
PROTECTED AREA 
(Zone Militaire): 
A 100-mile area on the West 
coast of Canada and the 
United States in which 
persons of Japanese descent 
were not permitted to reside. 
 
QUANTITATIVE 
EASING (QE): 
Aggressive monetary easing; 
A strategy whereby the 
national bank purchases 
assets with newly minted 
money in order to increase 
the quantity of money in 
circulation. 
 
Une des trois flèches 
d’Abenomics. Consiste à la 
réduction des impôts des 
entreprises et la hausse de la 
taxe de vente. 
 
 
 
Une des trois flèches 
d’Abenomics. Vise à injecter 
des liquidités dans 
l’économie. 
 
 
L’idée que l’état-nation 
traditionnel n’est plus l’unité 
pertinente dans le monde 
actuel. 
 
 
 
Un document qui exigeait la 
capitulation du Japon 
pendant la Deuxième Guerre 
mondiale. 
 
 
 
Voyez “Zone Militaire” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L’assouplissement quantitatif 
agressive; Une politique 
selon laquelle la banque 
nationale achète des actifs 
avec l’argent crée ex nihilo 
afin d’accroitre la masse 
monétaire. 
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REGISTRATION CARD: 
A unique form of wartime 
identification issued to all 
persons of Japanese descent 
over the age of 16 in Canada. 
 
 
 
RELOCATION CENTERS 
(Centres de Réinstallation): 
See “Detention Camps” 
 
 
RETURN MIGRATION: 
The return of Japanese 
emigrants from Brazil to 
Japan. 
 
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: 
A conflict over imperial 
conquests between the 
Russian Empire and the 
Empire of Japan from 
February 8, 1904 to 
September 5, 1905. 
 
RYOSAI KENBO: 
A Japanese expression 
meaning “good wife and 
wise mother.” The idea that 
a woman has a duty to look 
after the family. 
 
S&M: 
Sadomasochism; 
Gratification, especially 
sexual, acquired by inflicting 
or receiving pain. 
 
 
SAMURAI:  
Warrior class in feudal Japan. 
 
 
 
Une pièce d’identité 
obligatoire pour toute 
personne d’ascendance 
japonaise au Canada âgée de 
plus de 16 ans pendant la 
Deuxième Guerre mondiale. 
 
 
 
Voyez “Camps de 
Détention” 
 
 
Le retour au Japon des 
émigrants japonais au Brésil. 
 
 
 
Un conflit entre l’Empire 
Russe et l’Empire Japonaise 
entre le 8 février, 1904 et le 5 
septembre, 1905 pour des 
conquêtes impériales. 
 
 
 
Une expression japonaise 
signifiant “bonne marie 
et mère sage.” L’idée qu’une 
femme a une obligation de 
s’occuper de la famille. 
 
 
Sadomasochisme; La 
gratification, notamment 
sexuelle, comme 
conséquence d’infliger ou de 
recevoir la douleur. 
 
 
Combattants au Japon 
féodal. 
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SANSEI: 
Third generation Japanese 
migrants. 
 
SENKAKU ISLANDS: 
A group of islands located 
east of China and west of 
Okinawa Island whose 
territorial sovereignty is 
disputed by China, Taiwan, 
and Japan. 
 
SHIMINKEN: 
Citizenship. 
 
SHINTO: 
One of the largest religions 
in Japan. A traditional 
religion of Japan. 
 
 
SHIRONURI: 
A subculture in which 
individuals paint their faces 
white in order to act as a 
canvas for elaborate 
decoration and make up. 
 
 
SHUFUREN (Japan 
Housewives Association): 
An organization created by 
Japanese women in the mid-
20th century to pressure the 
government for better 
management of economic 
growth and quality of life. 
 
 
SINOCENTRISM: 
An ideology which holds 
China to be the central core 
and other groups to be 
peripheral. 
 
La troisième génération de 
migrants japonais. 
 
 
Un groupe d’iles à l’est de la 
Chine et à l’ouest d’Okinawa 
dont la souveraineté 
territoriale est disputée par la 
Chine, le Taiwan, et le Japon. 
 
 
 
Citoyenneté. 
 
 
Une des religions les plus 
répandues au Japon. Une 
religion traditionnelle du 
Japon.  
 
 
Une sous-culture dans 
laquelle des individus 
blanchissent leurs visages 
afin de les utiliser comme 
des toiles pour la décoration 
élaborée. 
 
 
 
Une organisation créée par 
des femmes japonaises au 
milieu du 20ième siècle pour 
faire la pression sur le 
gouvernement de mieux 
gérer la croissance 
économique et qualité de vie. 
 
 
Une idéologie selon laquelle 
la Chine est au centre et les 
autres sont à la périphérie. 
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SMART PLATINUM 
SOCIETY: 
A form of society in which 
the standard of living of the 
elderly would be raised 
thanks to technology. 
 
 
SOCIAL DARWINISM: 
The theory that individuals 
are subject to natural 
selection. Often employed in 
the 19th and early 20th 
centuries to justify racism, 
domination, and 
assimilation. 
 
SOCIAL IDENTITY 
THEORY: 
The theory that an 
individual’s self-
identification is impacted by 
their role as part of a 
collective. 
 
SSU-CHOU CHIH: 
An encyclopedic compilation 
by Lin Tse-Hsü concerning 
foreign (primarily European) 
nations. 
 
 
STEAMPUNK: 
Subgenre of science fiction 
that incorporates technology 
and aesthetic designs 
inspired by 19th-century 
industrial steam-powered 
machinery. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Une manifestation de société 
où le niveau de vie des 
personnes âgées serait 
augmenté grâce à la 
technologie. 
 
 
La théorie que les individus 
sont sujet à la sélection 
naturelle. Souvent utilisée à 
la fin du 19ième siècle et au 
début du 20ième siècle afin de 
justifier le racisme, la 
domination, et l’assimilation. 
 
 
 
La théorie que l’auto-
identification est influencée 
par le rôle de l’individu 
comme membre d’une 
collective.  
 
 
Une compilation 
encyclopédique par Lin Tse-
Hsü concernant les nations 
étrangères (principalement 
les nations européennes). 
 
 
Sous-genre de la science-
fiction qui incorpore la 
technologie et les images 
inspirées par les machines à 
vapeur du 19ième siècle. 
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SUBCULTURE: 
A group of individuals 
within a culture that 
differentiates itself from the 
parent culture to which it 
belongs. 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY 
EDUCATION: 
Private, for-profit education 
which may take the form of 
exam preparation schools or 
remedial education 
programs, among others. 
 
 
TAKESHIMA: 
Japanese name for a group 
of islets in the Sea of Japan 
which are controlled by 
South Korea but contested 
by Japan. 
 
 
TASHME: 
A family detention camp 
near Hope, British 
Columbia. 
 
TECHNOLOGY 
DIFFUSION THEORY: 
A theory which posits a 
correlation between human 
capital, technology 
absorption, and productivity. 
 
 
TEMPORARY 
EMPLOYMENT: 
See “Paato-taimu” 
 
 
 
 
 
Une groupe d’individus à 
l’intérieure d’une culture qui 
se différencie de cette 
culture. 
 
 
 
 
L’éducation privée et à but 
lucrative qui peut prendre la 
forme des écoles de 
préparation aux examens ou 
des programmes de 
rattrapage, entre autres. 
 
 
Nom japonais pour un 
groupe d’îlots dans la Mer du 
Japon qui sont sous le 
contrôle de la Corée du Sud 
mais qui sont contestés par 
le Japon. 
 
 
Un camp de détention près 
de Hope, Colombie-
Britannique. 
 
 
 
Une théorie qui postule une 
corrélation entre la capitale 
humaine, l’absorption de la 
technologie, et la 
productivité. 
 
 
 
Voyez “Paato-taimu” 
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THREE ARROWS: 
The three prongs of 
Abenomics; monetary 
easing, fiscal stimulus, and 
structural reforms. 
 
TPP: 
See “Trans-Pacific 
Partnership” 
 
TRAIL OF TEARS: 
A series of forced 
relocations of Native 
American nations in the 
United States following the 
Indian Removal Act of 1830. 
 
TRANSFORMATIONS 
STRUCTURELLES: 
One of the Three Arrows of 
Abenomics. Refers to the 
liberalisation of certain 
sectors of the economy and 
various corporate reforms. 
 
 
TRANSNATIONALISM: 
A lens that describes the 
increased interconnectivity 
between individuals and the 
decreased significance of 
national borders. 
 
 
TRANS-PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP: 
A proposed economic free 
trade agreement between 
several Pacific Rim 
countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
Voyez “Trois Flèches” 
 
 
 
 
 
Voyez “Trans-Pacific 
Partnership” 
 
 
Une série de déportations 
forcées des amérindiens aux 
États-Unis suite à la Indian 
Removal Act de 1830. 
 
 
 
 
Une des trois flèches 
d’Abenomics. Consiste à la 
libéralisation de certains 
secteurs de l’économie et de 
nombreuses réformes 
touchant aux entreprises. 
 
 
L’idée que les frontières 
nationales ont moins 
d’importance et que 
conséquemment des diverses 
entités peuvent contribuer à 
une seule production. 
 
 
 
Un accord de libre-échange 
proposé entre plusieurs pays 
bordant le Pacifique. 
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TRICKLE DOWN 
ECONOMICS: 
The theory that economic 
benefits for the rich will aid 
the economy and 
consequently benefit the 
entire population. 
 
 
TROIS FLÈCHES: 
See “Three Arrows” 
 
 
 
 
 
UTARI KYŌKAI: 
The Hokkaido Utari 
Association. An organization 
operated by and composed 
of Ainu. 
 
 
WAJIN: 
The predominant native 
ethnic group of Japan. 
 
WAR RELOCATION 
AUTHORITY: 
A federal instrument created 
to manage the internment of 
Japanese in the United States 
during the Second World 
War. 
 
YANDERU (病んでる): 
A Japanese expression 
meaning “to be sick.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
La théorie que les bénéfices 
économiques pour les plus 
riches bénéficieraient à 
l’économie et 
conséquemment à toute la 
population. 
 
 
Les trois volets 
d’Abenomics; la politique 
monétaire, la politique 
fiscale, et les transformations 
structurelles. 
 
 
La Hokkaido Utari 
Association. Une 
organisation gérée par et 
consistant de personnes 
Ainu. 
 
 
Le groupe ethnique natif 
prédominant au Japon. 
 
 
 
Un organisme fédéral crée 
pendant la Deuxième Guerre 
mondiale pour gérer 
l’internement des japonais 
aux États-Unis. 
 
 
Une expression japonaise 
signifiant “être malade.” 
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YASUKUNI SHRINE: 
A Shinto shrine located in 
Chiyoda, Tokyo; 
Controversial for listing the 
names of 1,068 war criminals 
(including 14 Class-A war 
criminals) in 
commemoration of those 
who have died for the 
Empire of Japan. 
 
YUTORI EDUCATION: 
A Japanese educational 
policy introduced in 2002 
which reduced the content 
of the primary school 
curriculum. 
 
 
ZONE MILITAIRE 
(Protected Area): 
See “Protected Area” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Un sanctuaire Shinto à 
Chiyoda, Tokyo; 
Controversé dû au fait qu’il 
liste 1,068 criminels de 
guerre (y inclus 14 criminels 
Class-A) en commémoration 
de ceux  qui sont mort pour 
l’Empire Japonaise. 
 
 
 
Une politique japonaise 
touchant à l’éducation qui 
était introduite en 2002 et 
qui a réduit le contenu du 
programme d’enseignement 
primaire. 
 
 
 
Une zone s’étendant 100 
miles de la côte occidentale 
du Canada et des États-Unis 
pendant la Deuxième Guerre 
mondiale pour exclure les 
personnes d’ascendance 
japonaise. 
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well as the International Studies Symposium course.  
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Sandra Annett – Wilfrid Laurier University 
 
Sandra Annett is an assistant professor in the 
Department of English and Film Studies at Wilfrid 
Laurier University, specializing in digital and new media 
studies. Her first book, Anime Fan Communities: 
Transcultural Flows and Frictions, was released in 
December 2014 by Palgrave Macmillan. 
She has also published articles in journals such as 
Transcultural Studies, The Journal of Postcolonial Writing, The 
Journal of Adaptation in Film and Performance, and 
Mechademia (forthcoming). Her research interests include 
digital cinema, animation, and Japanese popular culture. 
Her hobbies include modular origami and swing 
dancing. 
 
 
 
 
Bernard Bernier – Université de Montréal 
 
Bernard Bernier is a professor in the Department of 
Anthropology and a member of the East Asian studies 
programme at l’Université de Montréal. He received his 
Ph.D. from Cornell University in 1970 and has been at 
l’Université de Montréal since that time. 
The topics of his research on Japan have included 
folk religion (Ph.D. thesis), philosophy, changes in 
agriculture and rural society, labor relations and 
company organization, factory automation, and young 
urban women’s vision of career and marriage. 
Theoretically, his interests have included social change, 
globalization, and ideology. His latest book was on 
changes in labor in Japan, and a new book prepared 
jointly will soon be published on the topic of Youth in 
Japan. 
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Donald Campbell – The Japan Society 
 
Don Campbell was Canada’s Ambassador to Japan from 
1993 to 1997. In 2003 he was appointed by the Prime 
Minister to be the Canadian Co-Chair of the Canada 
Japan Forum 2000. Don is currently Senior Strategy 
Advisor at Davis LLP. 
In his distinguished career with Canada’s 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
he also served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
the Prime Minister’s Personal Representative for G-
7/G-8 Summits. Deputy Minister of International 
Trade, Ambassador to South Korea and Assistant 
Deputy Minister, United States Branch. He is the 
current International Co-Chair of the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council and a member of the Board of 
The Japan Society. 
 
 
Andrea DaSilva – Student Contributor 
 
Andrea DaSilva graduated with a Bachelor of Arts, 
Bilingual, Honours in International Studies from 
Glendon College, York University, and is also a High 
Honours graduate from the Social Service Work 
Immigrants and Refugees Diploma Program at Seneca 
College. Andrea is passionate about global dynamics 
between countries and cultures and has an interest in 
the development of state-citizen relationships. 
Andrea had the unique opportunity to explore many 
aspects of Japanese culture in her role as Internal 
Coordinator for the 20th Annual International Studies 
Symposium and as a participant of the 2015 Japan-
Canada Academic Consortium (JCAC) International 
Student Forum at Université Laval, Quebec. 
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Julian Dierkes – University of British Columbia 
 
Julian Dierkes is an associate professor and the 
Keidanren Chair in Japanese Research at the Institute of 
Asian Research of the University of British Columbia 
where he teaches in the MA Asia Pacific Policy Studies 
program. Julian received his Ph.D. in sociology from 
Princeton University. 
He is the author of Guilty Lessons? Postwar History 
Education in Japan and the Germanys (Routledge 2010), the 
editor of Change in Democratic Mongolia (Brill 2012), and a 
co-editor of The Global Intensification of Supplementary 
Education (Emerald 2013). His research has focused on 
the contemporary Japanese education system. Follow 
him @jdierkes. 
 
 
 
 
Akané D’Orangeville – Université de Montréal 
 
Akané D’Orangeville is a Ph.D. candidate in 
anthropology at l’Université de Montréal, currently 
working on subculture communities in Tokyo. Her 
research interests include Japanese youth, juvenile 
delinquency, subcultures in Tokyo, multiethnic and 
multiracial individuals (particularly “hafu”) and mental 
health among youth. She is also a Kendo instructor (4th 
dan) at the McGill University Kendo Club. 
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John-Paul Farag – Toyota Canada Inc. 
 
John-Paul Farag is a Manager with the Toyota Canada 
Inc. (TCI) External Affairs department. He was later 
appointed to the position of Manager in the Advanced 
Technology and Powertrain department where he is 
responsible for the education of various technologies 
with Governmental and Non-Governmental 
Organizations, the media, and the general public. 
John-Paul holds a Bachelor of Engineering Science 
in Mechanical Engineering from the University of 
Western Ontario and a Master of Business 
Administration from the Edinburgh Business School 
(Heriot Watt University). He was also a Student Trustee 
on the Niagara Catholic District School Board and Vice-
President of the Ontario Student Trustees Association. 
 
 
 
Jay Goulding – York University 
 
Jay Goulding is a Professor in the Department of Social 
Science, York University where he has been Programme 
Coordinator for Social and Political Thought. His 
expertise is in classical and modern Chinese philosophy, 
as well as Japanese philosophy, hermeneutics, and 
phenomenology. 
He has published a variety of articles on Chinese 
and Japanese culture and thought. He is currently 
working on a book manuscript, Culture and Philosophy: 
East and West (400 pages) that explores an intersection 
between Chinese, Japanese and Western philosophy and 
popular culture. In 2015, Professor Goulding was 
recognized by the Journal of Chinese Philosophy as a 
distinguished scholar in Chinese, Japanese, and 
comparative philosophy. 
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Frank Moritsugu – Nikkei Voice 
 
Frank Moritsugu is an oldtimer in the grandest sense of 
the word. Born in Port Alice, British Columbia, he was 
still in his teens when he was hired by Tom Shoyama as 
writer for The New Canadian immediately following the 
attack on Pearl Harbor. When WW2 broke out, Mr. 
Moritsugu was separated from his family. Despite the 
treatment accorded his family, Frank enlisted in the 
Canadian army, served honourably in intelligence work, 
and was discharged after the war. Winning the best 
editorial award in the annual Canadian University Press 
competition set him on his career in journalism over the 
course which he worked for Maclean’s, Canadian 
Homes & Gardens, Toronto Star, and the Montreal 
Star. In his retirement, he has been publisher of Nikkei 
Voice, for which he currently writes a regular column. 
 
 
Alexandra Pullano – Student Contributor 
 
Alexandra Pullano graduated from Glendon College, 
York University in June 2015 with an International 
Bachelor of Arts in International Studies as well as a 
Certificate of Bilingualism. Her interests throughout the 
program included international development, foreign 
policy, and diplomacy, as well as law. Alexandra is 
currently a law student studying at the University of 
Ottawa with the goal of working in human rights and 
social justice law. 
As Co-Project Coordinator for the 20th Annual 
International Studies Symposium, Alexandra enjoyed 
showing the innovative, cultural, and economic realities 
of Japan and the way in which Japan interacts with the 
world. 
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Greg Robinson – Université du Québec à Montréal 
 
Greg Robinson is Professor of History at l’Université du 
Québec À Montréal. A specialist in North American 
Ethnic Studies and U.S. Political History, he is the 
author of several notable books including A Tragedy of 
Democracy: Japanese Confinement in North America 
(Columbia University Press, 2009), winner of the 2009 
History book prize of the Association for Asian 
American Studies and After Camp: Portraits in Mid Century 
Japanese American Life and Politics (University of California 
Press, 2012), winner of the Caroline Bancroft History 
Prize in Western U.S. History. Professor Robinson 
writes a regular column, “The Great Unknown and the 
Unknown Great,” for the San Francisco Nichi Bei Weekly. 
He is an editorial board member of the Journal of 
Transnational American Studies. 
 
 
Odmaa Sod-Erdene – Student Contributor 
 
Odmaa Sod-Erdene holds a BA Double-Honours in 
Economics and International Studies from Glendon 
College. She is currently pursuing her Masters of Arts in 
Economics at the University of British Columbia. Her 
main interest areas include international economics, 
development studies, gender, and income inequalities. 
As Panelist Coordinator for the 20th Annual 
International Studies Symposium, she enjoyed working 
with many distinguished Japanese Studies scholars. 
Studying the rich and unique history of Japan, 
particularly of Japanese women, provided her with new 
perspectives and inspirations, and was an experience for 
which she is very thankful. 
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David Welch – University of Waterloo 
 
David A. Welch is CIGI Chair of Global Security at the 
Balsillie School of International Affairs, Professor of 
Political Science at the University of Waterloo, and 
Senior Fellow at the Centre for International 
Governance Innovation.  His 2005 book Painful Choices: 
A Theory of Foreign Policy Change (Princeton University 
Press) is the inaugural winner of the International 
Studies Association ISSS Book Award for the best book 
published in 2005 or 2006, and his 1993 book Justice and 
the Genesis of War (Cambridge University Press) is the 
winner of the 1994 Edgar S. Furniss Award for an 
Outstanding Contribution to National Security Studies. 
His articles have appeared in Asian Perspective, Foreign 
Affairs, International Security, and others. He received his 
Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1990. 
 
 
Alexandra Welsh – Student Contributor 
 
Alexandra Welsh graduated from Glendon College with 
an Honours BA in International Studies. She hopes to 
pursue a career in law in the not-for-profit sector. 
Alexandra’s previous publications include “Women of 
the Jungle: Guerrilleras on the front lines of the FARC-
EP” (2015) in the Glendon Journal of International Studies. 
In the role of Co-Project Coordinator for Glendon 
College’s 20th Annual International Studies Symposium, 
she enjoyed discovering the Japanese community in 
Toronto and exploring its relationship with Canada. 
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Bernard Wolf – York University 
 
Bernie Wolf is Professor Emeritus of Economics and 
International Business at the Schulich School of 
Business, York University, where he is Director of the 
Certificate in Managing International Trade and 
Investment Program. His areas of research include 
international business education, foreign exchange 
movements, international trade, prospects for the global 
economy, and global restructuring of manufacturing 
industries. Professor Wolf was on the editorial board of 
two major journals as well as on the executive boards of 
several scholarly organizations including the Association 
of Japanese Business Studies. In addition to his 
academic work, he has acted as a consultant and advisor 
to a number of multinational firms and SMEs in 
Canada, as well as to various governments. 
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HISTORY OF THE 
SYMPOSIUM 
The Annual International Studies Symposium is a project 
entirely conceived and managed by students. It was initiated 
during the 1995-1996 academic year by a group of highly 
motivated students, eager to deepen their knowledge and 
experience of foreign countries or regions and the relations 
between Canada and those countries or regions. 
 
This highly demanding course has five main components; a 
series of seminars, the organization of an international 
colloquium, a field research trip to the country of study, the 
submission of a research essay on aspects of the country 
concerned, and the publication of the proceedings of the 
Symposium and students’ essays. 
 
To date, the following countries and/or regions have been 
discussed; Cuba (1995-1996), China (1996-1997), South 
Africa (1997-1998), the European Union (1998-1999), the 
Middle East (1999-2000), South East Asia (2000-2001), Brazil 
(2001-2002), Russia (2002-2003), India (2003-2004), The 
Great Lakes Regions of Central Africa (2004-2005), Mexico 
(2005-2006), Turkey (2006-2007), Egypt (2007-2008), 
Venezuela (2008-2009), Iran (2009-2010), Hispaniola (2010-
2011), Germany (2011-2012), the Korean Peninsula (2012-
2013), and The United States of America (2013-2014). This 
year’s Symposium marks the 20th anniversary of the project 
and the country which has been chosen for study is Japan. 
 
While many, inside and outside the university, make significant 
contributions to this annual event, the key to the project’s 
success lies mainly in the boundless enthusiasm, dedication, 
and creativity of the students. 
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ITINERARY 
08:00 Doors Open to the Public 
Breakfast, Tea and Coffee in the Atrium 
 
09:00 – 9:15 Opening Ceremony in Room A100 
Welcome by Alexandra Pullano and Alexandra Welsh 
Lead Project Coordinators, International Studies Symposium 
 
Opening Remarks by Principal Donald Ipperciel 
Principal, Glendon College, York University 
 
09:15 – 9:45 Keynote Address - Room A100 
Introduction of Keynote Speaker by Dr. Awalou Ouedraogo 
Associate Professor, International Studies, York University 
 
Keynote Address by Mr. James Heron 
Executive Director, Japanese-Canadian Cultural Centre 
 
10:00 – 11:45 Concurrent Morning Panels 
Panel A: History and Memory: Japanese Communities during WWII 
Panel B: The Economy Under Abe and Looking Ahead: Economy, 
Business, and Technology 
 
11:55 – 13:20 Lunch in the Glendon Dining Hall 
Japanese cuisine provided by Edo Restaurant 
Cultural performances by Sakuramai (Traditional Yosakoi dance) and; 
Mu Mon Kai Dojo (Iaido swordplay demonstration) 
 
13:30 – 15:15 Concurrent Afternoon Panels 
Panel C: Post-growth Japan and Its Domestic Policies 
Panel D: Youth and Pop Culture: From Godzilla to Naruto 
 
15:30 – 17:15 Final Afternoon Panel 
Panel E: Japan and the World: Politics and Diplomacy 
 
17:15 – 17:30 Closing Remarks and Acknowledgements in Room 
A100 
Closing Words on behalf of the International Studies Symposium 
Organizing Team by Alexandra Pullano and Alexandra Welsh 
Lead Project Coordinators, International Studies Symposium 
 
17:30 – 20:00 Wine and Cheese Reception in the BMO Skyroom 
Performances by Anna Ishihara and by; 
Members of the Glendon Musical Ensemble 
 
French, Japanese, Mandarin, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish 
interpretation will be provided in Room A100 
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WHY JAPAN? 
This year, for Glendon College’s 20th Annual International 
Studies Symposium, the team decided to pick a country that 
was unique in both its domestic culture and its contribution 
to global politics. Japan fits this description beautifully. 
While it has managed to maintain the continuity of a single 
imperial line over hundreds of years, it has a complex past 
and an ever evolving future. Japan is particularly interesting 
to the team as it is a state that built its own path to 
development. While Japan is a modern nation, it reached 
this point in a very unique way; by mixing new techniques 
with age old traditions. The members of the team wanted to 
examine this in more detail. Other research interests of the 
members of this year’s Symposium team lie in various fields 
regarding Japan, ranging from popular culture to the future 
of technology. As such, the team thought it appropriate to 
choose Japan, a state that has a rich history and a 
fascinating future. 
THE TEAM 
Alexandra Welsh, Co-Project Coordinator 
Alexandra Pullano, Co-Project Coordinator 
Assia Belhassan, Financial Coordinator 
Andrea DaSilva, Internal Coordinator 
Matthew Farrell, Logistics Coordinator 
Kelly Lui, Media & Communications Coordinator 
Luc Pokorn, Public Relations Coordinator 
Vanessa Pukal, Fundraising Coordinator 
Odmaa Sod-Erdene, Panelist Coordinator 
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PANEL A 
The Economy Under Abe and Looking 
Ahead: Economy, Technology, & the 
Environment 
 DR. RICHARD BEASON, University of Alberta 
Having served as a Research intern at the former Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
Visiting Scholar at the Ministry of Finance in Japan and at the Bank of Japan, and 
Senior Economist at HSBC in Tokyo and Chief Strategist at UBS, Dr. Beason is 
also author of many scholarly articles and co-author of two books. 
 
 DR. BERNARD M. WOLF, York University 
As Professor Emeritus Economics and International Business at the Schulich 
School of Business, and on the editorial board of two major journals and several 
executive boards of scholarly organizations including the Association of 
Japanese Business Studies, Dr. Wolf has had a keen interest in the Japanese 
bearings and automotive industry for over forty years. 
 
 JOHN-PAUL FARAG, Toyota Canada INC. 
Manager with the Toyota Canada Inc. (TCI) External Affairs department where he 
is now responsible for the promotion and education of Toyota Hybrid technology 
and other technologies with Government agencies, NGO’s (Non-Governmental 
Organizations), the media, and the general public. 
 
 Moderator: DR. LORNA WRIGHT, York University 
Currently Executive Director of the Centre for Global Enterprise and EDC 
Professor of International Business at the Schulich School of Business, Dr. 
Wright is also the founding director of the Centre for Canada Asia Business 
Relations at Queens University, co-founder of the Asian Business Consortium, 
and inaugural director of the Centre for Global Enterprise at York University. 
 
PANEL B 
History and Memory: Japanese Communities 
during WWII 
 DR. GREG ROBINSON, Université du Québec à Montréal 
A specialist in North American Ethnic Studies and U.S. Political History, he is the 
author of several notable books such as “A Tragedy of Democracy. Japanese 
Confinement in North America” (Columbia University Press, 2009), winner of the 
2009 History book prize of the Association for Asian American Studies. 
 
 FRANK MORITSUGU, Nikkei Voice 
An “old timer” in the grandest sense of the word: Mr. Moritsugu experienced living 
in an internment camp and honourably served in intelligence work for the 
Canadian army during WWII. Leaving the army, he found his way into journalism 
and eventually became a founding member of Nikkei Voice. 
 
 Moderator: CATHERINE ISHINO, York University 
Upon discovering the Japanese-American internment, while reading her high 
school US History textbook in 1968, Catherine became personally and actively 
involved in it. Since then she has documented it by creating multimedia 
discourse. For further reference see: http://www.catherineishino.org and 
http://ishinoportfolio.wordpress.com. 
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PANEL C 
Post-Growth Japan and its Domestic Policies 
 DR. JAMES TIESSEN, Ryerson University 
Having served as President of the Japan Studies Association of Canada, Visiting 
Scholar at the Asian Institute, Munk Centre of Global Affairs and Visiting 
Research Fellow at the National Institute of Population and Social Security 
Research in Tokyo, Dr. Tiessen studies Japanese healthcare, particularly its 
hospitals, the core of that system. 
 
 DR. BERNARD BERNIER, Université de Montréal 
Receiving his Ph. D. from Cornel in 1970, Dr. Bernier’s topics of research in 
Japan have been folk religion, philosophy, changes in agriculture & rural society, 
labor relations & company organization, factory automation, and young urban 
women’s vision of career and marriage. His latest book was on changes in labor 
in Japan. 
 
 DR. JULIAN DIERKES, University of British Columbia 
Associate professor and Keidanren Chair in Japanese Research at the Institute 
of Asian Research of the University of British Columbia. His research has 
focused on the contemporary Japanese education system and he is the author of 
“Guilty Lessons? Postwar History Education in Japan and the Germanys”. Follow 
him @jdierkes. 
 
 Moderator: DR. YUKARI TAKAI, University of Windsor 
Faculty advisor of the Japan Symposium team, Dr. Takai is establishing herself 
as an expert on the history of migration and demographic change. Her most 
recent study of migratory patterns into and throughout the Quebec/New England 
region in the 19th and 20th centuries offers a new framework for examining the 
immigrant experience. 
PANEL D 
Youth and Pop Culture: From Godzilla to Naruto 
 DR. SANDRA ANNETT, Wilfred Laurier University 
Author of “Anime Fan Communities: Transcultural Flows and Frictions” and of 
several published articles in journals such as Transcultural Studies, The Journal 
of Postcolonial Writing, The Journal of Adaptation in Film and Performance, and 
Mechademia (forthcoming). Her research interests include digital cinema, 
animation, and Japanese popular culture. 
 
 DR. JAY GOULDING, York University 
Having extensive expertise in classical and modern Chinese philosophy, 
hermeneutic, and phenomenology, Dr. Goulding is currently working on a book 
manuscript, “Culture and Philosophy: East and West”, exploring an intersection 
between Chinese, Japanese, and Western philosophy and popular culture. 
 
 AKANÉ D’ORANGEVILLE, Université de Montréal 
A Ph.D. candidate in anthropology at Université de Montréal, currently working on 
subculture communities in Tokyo, Akané’s research interests include Japanese 
youth, juvenile delinquency, subcultures in Tokyo, multiethnic and multiracial 
individuals (particularly “hafu”) and mental health among youth. 
 
 Moderator: DR. CARY TAKAGAKI, York University 
A Professor in the Department of Languages, Literatures & and Linguistics, Dr. 
Takagaki teaches Citing the Classics: The ‘Premodern’ in Modern Japanese 
Literature and Film, and Contemporary Japanese Culture and Society at York 
University. 
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PANEL E 
Japan and the World: Politics and Diplomacy 
 DR. JACOB KOVALIO, Carleton University 
Recipient of a 2014 Foreign Minister of Japan’s Commendation for contributions 
to the study of Japan and to Canada-Japan relations, Dr. Kovalio is past 
president of the Japan Studies Association of Canada (JSAC) – Canada’s 
leading organization for the promotion of Canada-Japan ties. Currently, he is 
president of Japan Pacific Consulting. 
 
 DR. DAVID A. WELCH, University of Waterloo 
CIGI Chair of Global Security at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, 
Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo and Senior Fellow at 
the Centre for International Governance Innovation. His 2005 book “Painful 
Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change” is the inaugural winner of the 
International Studies Association ISSS Book Award for the best book published 
in 2005. 
 
 DONALD W. CAMPBELL, The Japan Society 
Currently Senior Strategy Advisor at Davis LLP, a Canadian national law firm, 
Don was Canada’s Ambassador to Japan from 1993 to 1997. In 2003 he was 
appointed by the Prime Minister to be the Canadian Co-Chair of the Canada 
Japan 2000, a commission established to recommend to the governments of 
Canada and Japan measures for the improvement of the bilateral relationship. 
 
 Moderator: DR. AWALOU OUEDRAOGO, York University 
A beloved Associate Professor at the Department of International Studies at 
Glendon College. His research interests include the history and philosophy of 
international law, war, its regulations and alternatives, human rights and 
humanitarian law, peaceful settlement of disputes, states responsibility, and post-
conflict peace building in Africa. 
 
 
* For the complete bio of each Panelist and Moderator as well as the title of their presentation, 
please visit http://www.japansymposium.com, and click on the “Panels” tab. 
 
 
 
KEEP UP THE DISCUSSION BY 
using the hashtags: #GLJPN2015 and 
#symposiumGL; following us on Twitter 
(@japansymposium); liking us on Faceboook 
(fb.com/japansymposium); and, visiting our 
website for updates at 
www.japansymposium.com. 
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Statistical Handbook of Japan 2014, Statistics Bureau Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 2014, 
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/pdf/2014all.pdf, 8. 
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Statistical Handbook of Japan 2014, Statistics Bureau Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 2014, 
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/pdf/2014all.pdf, 
13. 
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Statistical Handbook of Japan 2014, Statistics Bureau Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 2014, 
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/pdf/2014all.pdf, 
15. 
     
Japan is a nation of tradition and innovation and 
which now faces an array of new challenges. In a 
region filled with tension, Japan seeks to maintain a 
strong international position, while on the domestic 
front, the impact of socio-political, demographic, 
and economic changes have begun to make 
themselves known. 
 
This volume brings together presentations and 
essays from a variety of perspectives in order to 
provide readers with a multidisciplinary 
understanding of Japan across three centuries. It 
represents a unique opportunity to explore the 
challenges facing Japan domestically, and to 
consider how these may translate on a global scale. 
 
